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Introduction
1. In December 2005, the Commission of the European Communities
published the “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the
Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)”1 (hereinafter “Rome I-P”). The Rome I-P is an important further step towards a homogeneous codification of the private international law of obligations in the
Community. It was preceded in January 2003 by the “Green Paper on the
1

Rome I-P, COM(2005) 650 final of 15. 12. 2005.
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conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernisation”,2
which generated a great number of comments, among others those of the
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law.3 The
Rome I-P was transmitted to the European Parliament and the Council in
December 2005 and is open for public debate. The following observations on
the Rome I-P are meant to contribute to this discussion. The topics have essentially been determined by the proposed rules contained in the Rome I-P.
However, the Institute has also seen the need to address some additional issues
to round off the Commission’s proposal.
2. The Institute’s comments are the result of intense – although not necessarily comprehensive or complete – discussions held from January to May
2006. We have focused our comments as much as possible on legislative proposals. While the proposals have undergone several discussion rounds and reflect the majority opinion of the group, not all of them have been approved
unanimously.
3. The article-by-article commentary is structured as follows: First, a synopsis of the respective article of the Rome I-P and our proposal is given
(changes are highlighted in italicised print). Second, a summary at the beginning of each section will inform the reader about the principal reasons of the
proposed changes. Third, the proposed changes are explained in more detail.
4. When amending the Rome I-P, it should be kept in mind that Rome I is
not the only Regulation “in the making” in the field of European private international law of obligations. In May 2002, the European Commission
launched a “Consultation on a preliminary draft proposal for a Council regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations” in which the
Hamburg Group for Private International Law participated.4 In July 2003, it
was followed by a “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and
the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome
II)”.5 Far reaching changes adopted by the European Parliament6 forced the
Commission to overhaul its Proposal. In February 2006, an “Amended Pro2 Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernisation,
COM(2002) 654 final of 14. 1. 2003 (cited Green Paper Rome I).
3 Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I.
4 Hamburg Group for Private International Law, Comments on the European Commission’s
Draft Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: RabelsZ 67 (2003) 1–56 (cited: Hamburg Group for Private International Law, Comments on Draft Proposal Rome II).
5 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), COM(2003) 427 final of 22. 7. 2003.
6 European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations
(“Rome II”), A6–0211/2005.
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posal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the
Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II)” (hereinafter
“Rome II-AP”) was presented.7 As a result, the European Parliament has to
discuss two different Regulations (Rome I and Rome II) dealing with the
European private international law of obligations.
5. The Institute has serious doubts that this bifurcated approach will ensure
a coherent set of rules on private international law in the field of obligations.
Contractual and non-contractual obligations are closely connected to each
other. The dividing line between these two types of obligations is oftentimes
difficult to draw. Thus, there is the obvious danger of disparities between the
future Rome I and Rome II Regulations. Moreover, many issues are common for both types of obligations and cannot reasonably be subject to different rules. Therefore, it is indispensable that the rules of the future Rome I
Regulation be aligned with the rules contained in the future Rome II Regulation. The best solution to assure a coherent body of law would be to merge
the Rome I-P and the Rome II-AP into one single Regulation covering the
private international law of obligations in general. If this cannot be achieved,
the European legislature should keep in mind that amendments to one Regulation will often bear upon the operation of, or will create inconsistencies
with, the other. This is recognised in recital 4 Rome I-P which emphasises
the “need to achieve the greatest harmony” between the Rome I and the
Rome II Regulations. However, the proposal as it stands does not always ensure the necessary consistency. The following observations will, therefore, address the issues – where necessary – against the background of the Rome IIAP.
6. Furthermore, coherence must be attained with jurisdictional issues as
addressed in Regulation (EC) 44/20018 (hereinafter “Brussels I Regulation”)
to ensure a certain synchronisation of forum and applicable law.9
7. A final remark should be made on translation issues. In preparing these
observations, the Institute reviewed the French, English and German versions
of the Rome I-P. It was noted that the English version often differed from the
two other versions. It seems that the Rome I-P was drafted in French and/or
German and was later translated – often not very accurately – into English.
The Institute has proposed corrections of the translation errors as far as
7 Amended Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the
law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), COM(2006) 83 final of 21. 2.
2006 (cited Rome II-AP).
8 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22. 12. 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, O.J. EC 2001 L
12/1.
9 See for a detailed analysis with respect to convergence and divergence between
Brussels I and Rome I: Enforcement of International Contracts in the European Union,
ed. by Meeusen/Pertegás/Straetmans (2004).
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possible. As the English version of a legal text may often be used as basis for a
translation into other EU official languages, the Institute urges the European
legislature to ensure that the various language versions of the final Rome I
Regulation be adjusted.
Recitals
(7) Freedom for the parties to
choose the applicable law must be
one of the cornerstones of the system of conflict-of-laws rules in matters of contractual obligations.

(7) Freedom for the parties to
choose the applicable law must be
one of the cornerstones of the system of conflict-of-laws rules in matters of contractual obligations. This
comprises the right to choose as the applicable law principles and rules of substantive law of contract recognised internationally or in the Community. However, such
principles and rules must comply with certain minimum standards in order to be
eligible. Especially, they have to be created by an independent, impartial, and
neutral body; their content has to be balanced and protected against evasion and
abuses by certain mandatory rules; and
they must regulate the rights and duties
in a fairly comprehensive way. These conditions are met, for instance, by the Principles of European Contract Law and the
UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts. It is understood
that such principles, if laid down in an act
of the European Communities chosen by
the parties shall take precedence over this
Regulation in accordance with its Article
22 (1)(b).
(13a) The assignment of a claim may
include both contractual and non-contractual claims and generally includes the creation of rights in receivables.
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Summary
The Institute suggests the following amendments to the recitals:
– Recital 7 should state objective criteria as to what constitutes principles
and bodies of rules that can be chosen by the parties as the governing law
of the contract under Article 3(2) subpara. 1 Rome I-P (see infra
no. 8).
– A minor translation inconsistency in Recital 7 should be eliminated (see
infra no. 10).
– An additional recital should clarify the ambit of Article 13 Rome I-P to
the effect that it generally encompasses contractual as well as non-contractual claims and that it covers the creation of limited rights in rem in
receivables (see infra no. 11).
Comments
Amendments to Recital 7
Stating criteria for internationally recognised principles and rules of
substantive law
8. The Institute endorses the European Commission’s decision to allow the
parties of cross-border contracts to choose internationally recognised principles and rules of substantive law as the applicable law pursuant to Article
3(2) subpara. 1 Rome I-P. The Institute further appreciates the Commission’s
understanding of this provision as expressed in the Explanatory Memorandum: The parties should only be entitled to choose a qualified body of rules
such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(PICC),10 or the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL)11 while the socalled lex mercatoria, or private codifications not adequately recognised by
the international community such as standard contract forms should not be
eligible.12 Put in other words: A given body of rules which is chosen by the
parties will only be recognised as the governing law of the contract if it complies with certain minimum standards.13 In particular, the respective set of
principles has to be created by an independent, impartial, and neutral body;
its content has to be balanced and protected against evasion and abuses by cer10 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Principles of International Commercial Contracts, available at ⬍http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm⬎.
11 Principles of European Contract Law, ed. by Lando/Beale Parts I/II (combined and revised) (2000); Principles of European Contract Law, ed. by Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann Part III (2003).
12 See Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 5.
13 For a more detailed analysis see Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper
Rome I, p. 32 seq.
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tain mandatory rules; and it must regulate the rights and duties in a fairly
comprehensive way. The Institute recommends stating these criteria as well as
the exemplary role of the PICC and the PECL explicitly in the recitals of the
Regulation. Such an approach is preferable to a mere reference to the PICC
and the PECL in the Explanatory Memorandum because the latter will not
form part of the future Rome-I instrument whereas the recitals will serve as
binding guidelines for the courts. Hence, identifying objective criteria as well
as two appropriate examples in the recitals will ensure a uniform interpretation of Article 3 Rome I-P within the Community. Thus, the proposed solution enhances legal certainty and provides guidance to legal counsel when
drafting international contracts.
9. In recent years the Commission has initiated scholarly work and stakeholder discussions on the future of substantive contract law in Europe. A
Common Frame of Reference is scheduled to be adopted in the near future.14
To a large extent, it will most likely adapt rules and principles from PECL.
Provided that the Common Frame of Reference will be adopted as a Community instrument, its role under the Rome I-P would be unclear. Could it
be chosen by the parties under Article 3 Rome I-P, i.e. subject to the exceptions contained in Articles 5 and 6 Rome I-P and to the internationally mandatory rules of national law in accordance with Article 8 Rome I-P? Or would
it take priority over the Rome I Regulation under Article 22(1)(b) Rome IP? The Explanatory Memorandum, by mentioning both possibilities, stirs
confusion.15 It is only the latter solution which would take account of the objective to create common standards of contract law in the EU. Therefore, the
latter solution should be clearly preferred in an addition to Recital 7.
Adjustment of the English version
10. The French and German versions read: “La liberté des parties de choisir
le droit applicable doit constituer la clé de voûte du système de règles de conflit de lois en matière d’obligations contractuelles” and “Die Kollisionsnormen für vertragliche Schuldverhältnisse müssen auf der freien Rechtswahl der
Parteien gründen.” Both texts thereby stress the key role of the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law whereas this freedom is only “one of ” the
cornerstones of conflict of laws in the field of contracts according to the English version. In order to bring the English language version of the Rome I-P
in line with the corresponding French and German texts the words “one of ”
have to be deleted in Recital 7.
14 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, A more coherent European contract law – An action plan, COM(2003) 68 final
of 12. 2. 2003.
15 See infra nos. 28 (comment on Article 3) and 183 (comment on Article 22).
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Clarifying the ambit of Article 13 Rome I-P by adding a new Recital
13a
11. The wording of the different language versions of Article 13 Rome I-P
dealing with voluntary assignment and contractual subrogation is ambiguous
in respect of non-contractual claims. At the same time, the proposed Rome II
Regulation does not address the assignment of non-contractual claims. The
Institute therefore suggests clarifying in the recitals that the ambit of Article
13 Rome I-P will generally include contractual and non-contractual claims.16
Moreover, the text of Article 13 Rome I-P does not address the creation of
limited rights in rem in receivables.17 Nevertheless, charges, pledges, gages
and comparable rights in receivables can perform economic functions similar
to assignments, especially those created for security purposes.18 Therefore the
UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade19
and also the new Belgian Private International Law20 explicitly include the
creation of real rights within the applicable scope of their conflict rules.
Hence, the European legislator should clarify in the recitals that in general,
Article 13 Rome I-P also refers to the creation of rights in receivables.
Article 1 – Scope
1. This Regulation shall apply, in
any situation involving a conflict of
laws, to contractual obligations in
civil and commercial matters. It shall
not extend, in particular, to revenue,
customs or administrative matters.

Article 1 – Substantive scope
1. [no changes]

See for details infra no. 150 (comment on Article 13).
See also the criticism made by Flessner/Verhagen, Assignment in European Private International Law (2006) 18; Kieninger/Sigman, The Rome-I Proposed Regulation and the
Assignment of Receivables: European Legal Forum 2006, 1 (6).
18 E.g., in the Netherlands a pledge of receivables is frequently used to secure credit, see
Reehuis, Forderungen als Sicherheit in den Niederlanden, in: Die Forderungsabtretung,
insbesondere zur Kreditsicherung, in ausländischen Rechtsordnungen, ed. by Hadding/
Schneider (1999) 469 (470 seq.).
19 See Article 2(a) of the UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (adopted on 12. 12. 2001) which reads as follows: “’Assignment’ means the
transfer by agreement from one person (‘assignor’) to another person (‘assignee’) of all or
part of or an undivided interest in the assignor’s contractual right to payment of a monetary
sum (‘receivable’) from a third person (‘the debtor’). The creation of rights in receivables as
security for indebtedness or other obligation is deemed to be a transfer.”
20 See Article 87 § 3 Loi portant le Code de droit international privé of 16. 7. 2004,
Moniteur belge of 27. 7. 2004: “La constitution de droits réels sur une créance ainsi que les
effets de la cession d’une créance sur tels droits sont régis par le droit de l’Etat sur le territoire duquel la partie qui a constitué ces droits ou a cédé la créance avait sa résidence habituelle au moment de la constitution ou de la cession.”
16
17
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2. The Regulation shall not apply
to:
(a) questions involving the status
or legal capacity of natural persons,
without prejudice to Article 12;
(b) contractual obligations relating
to a family relationship or a relationship which, in accordance with the
law applicable to it, has similar effects, including maintenance obligations;
(c) obligations arising out a matrimonial relationship or a property
ownership scheme which, under the
law applicable to it, has similar effects
to a marriage, wills and successions;

(d) obligations arising under bills
of exchange, cheques and promissory notes and other negotiable instruments to the extent that the obligations under such other negotiable
instruments arise out of their negotiable character;
(e) arbitration agreements and
agreements on the choice of court;
(f) questions governed by the law
of companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporate such as the
creation, by registration or otherwise, legal capacity, internal organisation or winding up of companies
and other bodies corporate or unincorporate, the personal liability of
officers and members as such for the
obligations of the company or body
and the question whether a management body of a company or other
body corporate or unincorporated
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2. The Regulation shall not apply to:
(a) questions involving the status
or legal capacity of natural persons,
without prejudice to Article 12;
(b) contractual obligations relating
to a family or similar relationship a relationship which, in accordance with
the law applicable to it, has similar
effects, including maintenance obligations;
(c) maintenance obligations;
(c) (d) obligations arising out of a
matrimonial or similar relationship or
a property ownership scheme
which, under the law applicable to
it, has similar effects to a marriage,
wills and successions;
(e) property and rights arising out of
family and similar relationships;
(f) wills and successions;
(d) (g) obligations arising under
bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes and other negotiable instruments to the extent that the obligations under such other negotiable
instruments arise out of their negotiable character;
(e) (h) arbitration agreements and
agreements on the choice of court;
(f) (i) questions governed by the
law of companies and other bodies
corporate or unincorporate such as
the creation, by registration or
otherwise, legal capacity, internal organisation or winding up of companies and other bodies corporate or
unincorporate, the personal liability
of officers and members as such for
the obligations of the company or
body and the question whether a
management body of a company or
other body corporate or unincor-
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can bind the company or body in relation to third parties;
(g) the constitution of trusts and
the relationship between settlers,
trustees and beneficiaries;
(h) evidence and procedure, without prejudice to Article 17;
(i) obligations arising out of a precontractual relationship.

3. In this Regulation, the term
“Member State” shall mean Member States with the exception of
Denmark [, Ireland and the United
Kingdom].

RabelsZ

porated can bind the company or
body in relation to third parties;
(g) (j) the constitution of trusts and
the relationship between settlers,
trustees and beneficiaries;
(h) (k) evidence and procedure,
without prejudice to Article 17;
(i) (l) obligations arising out of a
pre-contractual relationship. pre-contractual obligations to the extent that they
are governed by the Regulation on the
law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).
3. [no changes]

Summary
The Institute welcomes the rules on the Rome I-P’s scope and their closely
mirroring the parallel rules of the Rome Convention. Nevertheless, a few
substantive and stylistic changes seem advisable:
– First, the English version’s title should conform to the French and the
German texts which better reflect the provision’s purpose (see infra no. 12).
– Second, Article 1(2)(b) and (c) Rome I-P invites misunderstanding as to
the exact questions excluded from the Rome I-P’s scope. Non-marital relationships certainly need to be dealt with expressly. The substance of the Commission’s proposal, however, is questionable. Also, minor textual changes
would enhance its legibility and clarity (see infra nos. 13–16).
– Third, the Institute strongly endorses the idea underlying Article 1(2)(i)
Rome I-P, namely, the need to determine expressly whether and to what extent the Regulation covers pre-contractual relationships. However, since such
relationships can also be of a contractual nature, they should not be excluded
from the Rome I-P altogether. Applying the Rome II Regulation to these
cases could result in contradictory, arbitrary and unforeseeable results. The
courts, and ultimately the European Court of Justice, are in a better position
to delineate the boundaries between the contractual and non-contractual
types of this hybrid legal entity. The express reference to the Rome II Regulation as suggested by the Institute would confirm the European legislator’s
intention to deal with such duties comprehensively in the Rome I and II
Regulations without leaving any lacunae (see infra nos. 17–23).
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Comments
Headline
12. The insertion of the term “substantive” should avoid the misunderstanding that Article 1 Rome I-P exhaustively enumerates all – for instance,
also geographical – conditions of application, instead of defining only the
Regulation’s subject matter. Furthermore, the French and German versions
already contain a pertinent qualification (Champ d’application matériel, Materieller Anwendungsbereich). Hence, linguistic coherence warrants the suggested addition.
Non-marital relationships and further issues in Article 1(2)(b) and (c)
Rome I-P
13. Due to the enormous pace of national legislation on non-marital – registered or unregistered – relationships21 the Institute welcomes express rules
on the (in-)applicability of the Rome I-P on these novel legal institutions.
The Institute shares the view that the Rome I-P does not provide suitable
conflict-of-law rules for such relationships because they are mainly rooted in
the realm of family law. In particular, the principle of freedom of choice and
the focus on the characteristic performance in case of an absence of choice are
inappropriate. Nevertheless, the Rome I-P’s objective of harmonising the
prerogatives of its application requires as much uniformity as possible – including the harmonisation of the concept of family relationships as opposed
to typical contractual obligations not involving specific personal and emotional elements.
14. The Commission’s proposal, however, unnecessarily complicates the
issue. There is no express reference as to which law determines the existence
of a “family” or “matrimonial relationship” or whether such an institution is
to be characterised from an autonomous viewpoint, i.e. whether it has to
meet certain minimum standards in order to be recognised as a legal relationship of the kind mentioned above.22 In contrast, Article 1(2)(c) Rome I-P requires the comparability of a non-marital relationship with a family or matrimonial relationship according to the applicable national law. The most likely
reason for the different treatment of family and matrimonial relationships on
the one hand and non-marital relationships on the other hand is the lack of a
single cross-border concept of non-marital relationships whereas matrimonial
21 For a partial overview on some of the legislative solutions see, e.g., Curry-Sumner, All’s
well that ends registered?, The Substantive and Private International Law Aspects of NonMarital Registered Relationships in Europe (2005).
22 For an autonomous interpretation of the term “Rights in property arising out of a
matrimonial relationship” under Article 1(2) Brussels Convention see, e.g., ECJ 27. 3. 1979
– case 143/78 (Jacques de Cavel v. Luise de Cavel), E.C.R. 1979, I-1055, para. 7.
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and family relationships comparatively speaking are quite uniformly structured. The legislator can therefore presumably dispense with a similarity test
to established notions in cases of family and matrimonial relationships.
For those having to apply the Regulation, however, the relegation to the
respective national law is cumbersome. It also endangers legal unity in this
area. The Regulation’s applicability, and therefore the possible exclusion of a
non-marital relationship from its scope, should be easy to determine without
requiring lengthy, substantive legal considerations. The Rome I-P, however,
compels the parties and lawyers not only to first determine the law applicable
to the relationship, but also to research the respective national law and compare the effects attributed to a “family” or “matrimonial” relationship because only in case of comparability to such a relationship would the nonmarital relationship be excluded from the Rome I-P. For purposes of this
comparison, however, it is not even clear whether national or European standards guide the interpretation of “family”. Furthermore, such a comparison
has to go beyond the effect relevant in the specific case and extend to a general
analysis of two legal institutions. There are possibly hundreds of factors to be
considered in civil, criminal and public law. Hence, different courts may reach
opposite conclusions as to the Regulation’s applicability. This is all the more
true because the required degree of similarity between the relevant institutions remains open. The resulting interpretational gaps tend to invite forum
shopping and create other unwanted effects intended to be wiped out by uniform conflict-of-law rules.
15. The Institute therefore suggests addressing the comparability test in the
Regulation without referring to a national law. This would permit the European Court of Justice (hereinafter “ECJ”) to come to the conclusion that
there is a minimum of family relationship characteristics on a European level
(such as the creation of parental relationships, specific tax treatment, special
rights in criminal procedure etc.) which serve as the model with which national regulations will have to be compared (autonomous interpretation of
the Rome I Regulation). This would not only reduce legal uncertainty, foster
legal unity and thus hinder forum shopping, but would also considerably facilitate the task of determining whether certain national regulatory schemes
meet the standards to be excluded from the Rome I Regulation. If the Court
considers European standards to be insufficient and the advantages of a reference to national law to outweigh the goal of greater international coherence, it can still consult national laws.
16. The Institute not only recommends changes with respect to the text intended to cover non-marital relationships, but also suggests streamlining the
formulation excluding obligations rooted in family law, such as maintenance
obligations, and in wills and successions. Maintenance obligations by their
very nature are almost always an offspring of family or similar relations. For
the sake of clarity, they should be dealt with in a separate provision instead of
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attaching them to other provisions related to family or similar relationships.
This would also remove the possible misunderstanding resulting from the current wording of Article 1(2)(b) Rome I-P that maintenance obligations are an
element of determining whether a relationship has sufficiently similar effects
to a family relationship. The Institute also suggests excluding the area of wills
and successions from the scope of Rome I-P. The Commission’s proposal is
confusing at best because Article 1(2)(c) Rome I-P places the term “wills and
successions” in the context of a family or similar relationship instead of relating it to “contractual obligations”.
Pre-contractual duties
17. The Institute approves a rule on pre-contractual duties. However, the
general characterisation of such relationships as non-contractual in Article
1(2)(i) Rome I-P is flawed. In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission argues that in accordance with the ECJ’s judgments concerning Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention such obligations should be governed by
the future Rome II instrument and therefore excludes them from the scope of
application of the Rome I Regulation altogether.23
Brussels I distinction no suitable model
18. The close analogy to the Brussels I Regulation is questionable because
jurisdictional and conflict-of-law instruments serve distinct objectives. Not
surprisingly, the criteria employed in Article 5(1) and (3) Brussels I Regulation to determine jurisdiction are not identical with the criteria used to determine the applicable law under the Rome I and the Rome II instruments and,
thus, by no means necessarily point to the same jurisdiction/legal system in
each individual case. Article 5(1) Brussels Convention considers “the place of
performance of the obligation in question” to be relevant and thereby obviously concentrates on the procedural aspect of performance particularly
relevant for the determination of jurisdiction.24 Article 4 Rome I-P, however,
generally declares the law of the country to be applicable in which the party
that owes the obligation characterising the contract has its habitual residence.
This reflects the desire to foster legal certainty.25 If the characteristic obligation
has to be fulfilled in a country other than that of the debtor’s habitual
residence, jurisdiction vested in accordance with Article 5(1) Brussels I
Regulation and the law applicable under Article 4(1) Rome I-P will not
Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 5.
ECJ 28. 9. 1999 – case C-440/97 (Groupe Concorde and Others v. The Master of the vessel
“Suhadiwarno Panjan” and Others), E.C.R. 1999, I-6307, para. 29: “[...] with a view to efficient organisation of procedure”.
25 Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 5.
23
24
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coincide. Since the provisions obviously pursue at least partially different objectives and point in different directions, the attempt to streamline jurisdictional and conflict-of-law instruments seems misguided. That is all the more
true since the Brussels I Regulation may lead to the competence of the courts
of several countries whereas the Rome I-P and Rome II-AP must always
point to only one legal system. The completely parallel system of jurisdiction
and applicable law that the Commission may have in mind thus cannot be
achieved as a matter of principle.
General application of a future Rome II Regulation to pre-contractual obligations
not in line with ECJ case law
19. Even if the Brussels I Regulation contained appropriate criteria, the
proposal does not truly incorporate them. The ECJ does not automatically
consider all pre-contractual duties as a matter of tort law. To the contrary, the
Court generally favours a broad interpretation of Article 5(1) Brussels Convention:26 It is sufficient – even in the absence of the conclusion of a contract
– that in the relevant situation one party has freely assumed an obligation towards another and that the claim underlying the dispute is based on this obligation.27 The wording of Article 1(2)(i) Rome I-P therefore does not
properly reflect the distinction drawn by the ECJ judgments concerning Article 5(1) and (3) Brussels I Convention between “contract” and “tort” cases.
Applicability of a future Rome II Regulation substantively inappropriate
20. Admittedly, the Member States lack a uniform standard on the contract
or tort characterisation of pre-contractual duties. Some pre-contractual
duties perceived as contractual in nature in one Member State are treated as
cases of tort liability in another or maybe most Member States. An independent characterisation of pre-contractual obligations is therefore desirable and
even necessary to avoid forum shopping and the resulting possibility of manipulating applicable law. That, however, neither justifies nor warrants the total
exclusion of pre-contractual obligations from the scope of the proposed
Rome I Regulation.
21. Relegating all pre-contractual obligations to the proposed Rome II
Regulation would create severe dysfunctions. Duties of disclosure, for instance
26 See, e. g., ECJ 20. 1. 2005 – case C-27/02 (Petra Engler v. Janus Versand GmbH),
E.C.R. 2005, I-481, para. 48: “[...] the concept of ‘matters relating to contract’ referred to
in Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention is not interpreted narrowly by the Court.”
27 ECJ 20. 1. 2005 (preceding note) para. 50 and expressly para. 51: “[...] the application
of the rule of special jurisdiction provided for matters relating to a contract in Article 5(1)
presupposes the establishment of a legal obligation freely consented to by one person towards another and on which the claimant’s action is based.”

71 (2007)

comments on rome i proposal

239

the seller’s duty to inform the buyer about certain features of the goods sold,
are a prime example of “contractual” pre-contractual obligations. The close
connection between the conditions for their existence, i.e. the making of the
contract and the legal remedies available in case of breach, justify this classification. This assumption also underlies the Principles of European Contract
Law28 which deal with duties of disclosure in 4:107 PECL. If Articles 3(6) and
9(1) Rome I-P determine the law applicable to the making of the contract
(which may be PECL according to Article 3(2) Rome I-P) and if the proposed Rome II Regulation leads to a different system regarding duties of disclosure, almost insolvable problems of adapting the rules of two legal systems
to each other may be caused. Suppose that non-compliance with a duty of
disclosure flowing from the law of State A, applicable in accordance with the
proposed Rome II Regulation, is sanctioned by damages under that law. Yet,
the non-compliance might lead to invalidity of the contract or ipso facto
avoidance under the law of State B, applicable as the proper law of the contract under Articles 3(6) and 9(1) Rome I-P. Duties and the sanctions for their
violation should always result from one and the same legal order. The proposed provision does not accord with this principle and threatens to subject
functionally close-connected questions to two different legal systems. Furthermore, it severely undermines the fundamental principle of free choice of
law because the parties, despite their choice-of-law clause, could not be sure
which legal system (regardless whether they have chosen PECL or a national
body of law) would apply to the question of duties of disclosure.
22. Under the rules of the Rome I-P the law applicable to the breaking-off of
negotiations would also have to be determined according to the rules of the
proposed Rome II Regulation. That would be true even in a case where the
parties have already agreed upon the law applicable to their intended contract
before the break-off occurs. In this case, the choice of law might be ineffective under the law applicable according to the proposed Rome II Regulation
even though the parties have expressed their intention clearly in a contractual
manner which would be recognised under Article 3 Rome I-P. The proposed
rule is also in conflict with the contractual rules of PECL Article 2:301(2) and
(3) on the breaking-off of negotiations. Assuming that the parties have chosen
PECL as applicable law according to Article 3(1) of the Rome I-P before the
breaking-off occurs, it is unclear whether such a choice should be honoured
under Rome I-P, whether its validity should be determined under the Rome
I-P or whether the law applicable under the Rome I-P and Rome II-AP
should be cumulatively applied. In such a case, however, any unnecessary barriers to recognizing the parties’ intention should be avoided. The only way to
do so safely is to recognise the choice-of-law clause according to the Rome
I-P.
28

Principles on European Contract Law (supra n. 11).
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Superiority of a case law approach
23. The desirable autonomous interpretation of the distinction between
contract and tort pre-contractual obligations should, therefore, rather be
achieved by leaving the allocation of pre-contractual duties between the
Rome I-P or Rome II-AP to the courts (and thereby ultimately to the ECJ).
The Commission’s formal, yet substantively inappropriate, criterion might
simplify the determination of applicable law but would create a quagmire of
substantive law rules. The criteria for the suitable distinction developped
under Article 5(1) Brussels I Convention should not be neglected. However,
the independence and different purpose of conflict-of-law rules from jurisdictional issues needs to be respected. These goals can best be achieved by reminding national judges that a tort classification of pre-contractual duties is
possible without sacrificing the objective of creating a comprehensive system
of conflict-of-law rules for such obligations under either the Rome I-P or
Rome II-AP. This is the purpose of the Institute’s proposal which makes it
clear that every issue in this area would be covered either by Rome I or Rome
II and that it is up to the courts to decide on the proper allocation.
Article 2 – Application of law of non-Member States
Any law specified by this Convention shall be applied whether or not
it is the law of a Member State.

Any law specified by this Convention Regulation shall be applied
whether or not it is the law of a
Member State.

Summary/Comments
24. The Institutes recommends only one minor, stylistic change. As the
Convention has been transformed to a Community instrument, the term
“Convention” must be replaced by the term “Regulation”.
Article 3 – Freedom of choice
1. Without prejudice to Articles
5, 6 and 7, a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.
The choice must be expressed or
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract
behaviour of the parties or the circumstances of the case.

1. Without prejudice to Articles
5, 6 and 7, a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.
The choice must be expressed or
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract,
the behaviour of the parties, or the
circumstances of the case.
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If the parties have agreed to confer
jurisdiction on one or more courts
or tribunals of a Member State to
hear and determine disputes that
have arisen or may arise out of the
contract, they shall also be presumed
to have chosen the law of that Member State. By their choice the parties
can select the law applicable to the
whole or a part only of the contract.
2. The parties may also choose as
the applicable law the principles and
rules of the substantive law of contract recognised internationally or in
the Community.
However, questions relating to
matters governed by such principles
or rules which are not expressly settled by them shall be governed by
the general principles underlying
them or, failing such principles, in
accordance with the law applicable
in the absence of a choice under this
Regulation.
3. The parties may at any time
agree to subject the contract to a law
other than the law that previously
governed it, whether as a result of an
earlier choice under this Article or of
other provisions of this Regulation.
Any change in the law to be applied
that is made after the conclusion of
the contract shall not prejudice its
formal validity under Article 10 or
adversely affect the rights of third
parties.
4. The fact that the parties have
chosen a foreign law in accordance
with paragraphs 1 or 2, whether or
not accompanied by the choice of a
foreign tribunal, shall not, where all
the other elements relevant to the
situation at the time of the choice are
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If the parties have agreed to confer
jurisdiction on one or more courts
or tribunals of a Member State to
hear and determine disputes that
have arisen or may arise out of the
contract, they shall also be presumed
to have chosen the law of that Member State. By their choice the parties
can select the law applicable to the
whole or a part only of the contract.
2. The parties may also choose as
the applicable law the principles and
body of rules of the substantive law of
contract recognised internationally
or in the Community.
However, questions relating to
matters governed by such principles
or body of rules which are not expressly settled by them shall be governed by the general principles
underlying them or, failing such
principles, in accordance with the
law applicable in the absence of a
choice under this Regulation.
3. [no changes]

4. The fact that the parties have
chosen a foreign law in accordance
with paragraphs 1 or 2, whether or
not accompanied by the choice of a
foreign tribunal, shall not, where all
the other elements relevant to the
situation at the time of the choice are
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connected with one country only,
prejudice the application of rules of
the law of that country which cannot be derogated from by contract,
hereinafter
called
“mandatory
rules”.
5. Where the parties choose the
law of a non-Member State, that
choice shall be without prejudice to
the application of such mandatory
rules of Community law as are applicable to the case.

6. The existence and validity of
the consent of the parties as to the
choice of the applicable law shall be
determined in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 9, 10 and 12.
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connected with one country only,
prejudice the application of rules of
the law of that country which cannot be derogated from by contract,
hereinafter
called
“mandatory
rules”.
5. Where the parties choose the
law of a non-Member State, that
choice shall be without prejudice to
the application of such mandatory
rules of Community law as are applicable to the case. The fact that the
parties have chosen a law other than that
of any Member State, whether or not accompanied by the choice of a tribunal situated in a non-Member State, shall, where
all the other elements relevant to the contract at the time of the choice are connected
with one or more of the Member States,
neither prejudice the application of the
mandatory rules contained in European
regulations nor the application of Member
State rules which implement mandatory
European directives. In the latter case, the
provisions of the relevant directive apply
as implemented in the domestic law of the
Member State that would govern the contract in the absence of a choice-of-law
clause.
6. [no changes]

Summary
The Institute welcomes the proposed Article 3 Rome I-P as far as paragraphs 1 to 4 are concerned. Especially, the parties’ option to choose principles and rules recognised internationally or in the Community as their governing law is endorsed by the Institute. Nevertheless, the Institute regards the
following modifications as necessary:
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– As to those first four paragraphs of Article 3 Rome I-P, only minor
changes of wording are proposed (see infra nos. 25–30).
– However, the Institute strongly advocates a different solution for Article
3(5) Rome I-P. This paragraph aims to protect mandatory provisions of
Community law against the parties’ choice of a third state law. Article 3(5)
Rome I-P as it stands now is ambiguous in its wording and none of the
possible interpretations is convincing. The Institute recommends the approach taken by the Commission in the parallel provision of the Rome II-AP:
The technique of Article 3(4) Rome I-P, which deals with the application of
mandatory rules in purely domestic cases, should be extended to intra-Community cases. Hence, the fact that the parties have chosen the law of a nonMember State does not, where all the other elements relevant to the contract
are connected with one or more Member States, prejudice the application of
mandatory rules contained in European regulations or the application of
mandatory Member State rules insofar as they implement European directives
(see infra nos. 31–41).
Comments
Article 3(1) Rome I-P: Implied choice of law
25. The Institute welcomes the Commission’s solution laid down in Article
3(1) subpara. 3 Rome I-P whereby in case of a jurisdiction clause it is presumed that the contracting parties have chosen the lex fori of the designated
court. This synchronisation of forum and ius saves time and transaction costs.
However, the presumption of Article 3(1) subpara. 3 Rome I-P should not
only apply to cases where the parties have chosen a tribunal of a Member
State but also to cases where the parties have agreed to confer jurisdiction on a
court of a Non-Member State. The underlying rationale of Article 3(1) subpara. 3 Rome I-P applies to the latter situation as well. It is true that litigation
arising from such contracts will usually not take place in the courts of Member States and that the chosen court of a third state will not apply a future
Rome I Regulation. But a Member State court could be confronted, in an
annex lawsuit relating to guarantee contracts or security interests, with the
issue of the law applicable to the main contract. Moreover, the parties could
confer jurisdiction on a Member State court by way of submission.29 In such a
case the court should consider the fact that the parties originally have chosen
a court of a third state when establishing the law governing the contract. The
mere fact that the parties have entered appearance before a non-competent
court does not always imply a choice of law in favour of the lex fori. Furthermore, when determining the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation, a
29

See Article 24 Brussels I Regulation.
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Member State court will have to account for a pre-existing relationship between the parties according to Article 5(3) Rome II-AP. Consequently, the
law applicable to a pre-existing contract might also govern potential noncontractual obligations relating to it. If, for example, a Member State court is
seized with a dispute concerning a tort, the judge might have to consider the
law applicable to a contractual obligation even if the court had no jurisdiction
to adjudicate on the contract itself due to the choice of a non-Member State
forum. In those cases, a universal wording of the presumption contained in
Article 3(1) subpara. 3 Rome I-P could be useful and would be appropriate.
A final remark concerns only the English language version of Article 3(1)
subpara. 2 Rome I-P: In order to bring the text in line with the corresponding
French and German versions (“des dispositions du contrat, du comportement
des parties ou des circonstances de la cause”; “aus den Bestimmungen des Vertrages, dem Verhalten der Parteien oder aus den Umständen des Falles”) the
provision must read: “The choice must be [...] demonstrated [...] by the terms
of the contract, the behaviour of the parties, or the circumstances of the case”.
Article 3(2) Rome I-P: Possibility to choose internationally recognised
principles
26. The Institute endorses the European Commission’s proposal to allow
the parties of cross-border contracts to choose internationally recognised
principles and rules as the applicable law. However, these principles have to
comply with certain requirements. The respective set of principles has to be
created by an independent, impartial, and neutral body; its content has to be
balanced and protected against evasion and abuses by certain mandatory rules;
and it must regulate the rights and duties in a fairly comprehensive way. The
Institute recommends stating these criteria explicitly in the recitals of the
Regulation.30 The Institute welcomes the Commission’s view that the socalled lex mercatoria does not qualify as an eligible set of rules.31 For the sake
of clarification it should also appear from the text of Article 3(2) Rome I-P itself that only a sufficiently comprehensive set of rules can be chosen as the
governing law.32 Therefore, the Institute suggests inserting the words “body
of ” before the term “rules”.
27. The notion of internationally recognised “rules” of substantive law in
Article 3(2) Rome I-P also encompasses provisions laid down in international
conventions provided that they comply with the aforementioned general requirements. Given the practical need for the possibility to choose international conventions especially in the field of transport law, e.g., the Hague
30
31
32

See supra no. 8 (comment on Recitals).
Cf. Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 5.
See supra no. 8 (comment on Recitals).
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Visby Rules, the Institute appreciates the Commission’s decision in this respect.
28. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the wording of Article
3(2) Rome I-P authorises the parties not only to opt for generally recognised
principles of substantive law such as the Principles of European Contract
Law33 but also offers the possibility to choose a possible future optional Community instrument,34 i.e. the Common Frame of Reference.35 However, pursuant to the comments on Article 22(b) Rome I-P, it is this latter provision
that is in fact designed to address the relationship between Rome I and a
possible instrument in the Context of a European Contract Law project.36
Hence, two different rules are supposed to deal with the same problem which,
as a matter of principle, appears to be inconsistent. This is all the more true,
given the fact that the two provisions entail different and irreconcilable results:
If the choice of the optional Community instrument was based on Article
3(2) Rome I-P, party autonomy would be subject to the restrictions embedded in Articles 5, 6 and 8 Rome I-P, i.e. national law could override the
harmonised European rules. By contrast, if Article 22(b) Rome I-P was to be
construed to the effect that only this provision addressed the election of a future Community instrument, the optional body of rules would prevail over
national law irrespective of the envisioned Regulation whereby a truly uniform law would be achieved. It appears that only the latter solution would be
in line with the objective pursued by the adoption of an optional Community
instrument. Therefore, the relationship between Article 3(2) and Article
22(b) Rome I-P as to a future optional instrument, far from being clear, needs
to be established. The Explanatory Memorandum in its current wording is
contradictory in this respect. In order to avoid problems of interpretation, it
should be clarified in a recital of the Regulation that only Article 22(b) Rome
I-P applies to the choice of such an instrument.37
Article 3(4) Rome I-P: Mandatory provisions in purely domestic cases
Terminology: Internally and internationally mandatory rules
29. The Institute recommends using a different terminology for the provisions dealt with in Articles 3(4), 3(5) and 6 Rome I-P on the one hand and in
Article 8 Rome I-P on the other hand. All these conflict rules speak in their
English version of “mandatory rules” but have different concepts in mind.38
33
34
35
36
37
38

Principles on European Contract Law (supra n. 11).
Cf. Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 5.
See supra no. 9 (comment on Recitals) with n. 14.
Cf. Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 9.
See supra no. 9 (comment on Recitals).
For details see Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 53 seq.
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Mandatory provisions as defined by Articles 3(4), 3(5) and 6 Rome I-P are internally mandatory only and cannot be derogated from by contract, but can
normally be set aside by choice of law if the parties conclude a contract
which, in addition to a choice of law, carries sufficient international elements.
By contrast, Article 8 Rome I-P deals exclusively with the application of socalled internationally mandatory provisions. Due to their crucial importance
for the political, social or economic organisation of a state, those internationally mandatory provisions apply, from the viewpoint of the enacting state, irrespective of the law governing the contract.
The important distinction between nationally and internationally mandatory rules has been honoured by the Commission in the French and German
version of its proposal. The same has to be done in the English wording. A viable
solution would be to retain the references in Articles 3(4), 3(5) and 6 Rome
I-P to “mandatory rules” but to change the terminology of Article 8 Rome
I-P by replacing “mandatory rules” by “internationally mandatory rules”.39
Reference to the chosen law
30. Additionally, the Institute suggests, that Article 3(4) Rome I-P should
refer to the law chosen by the parties rather than the foreign law chosen by
them. Article 3(2) Rome I-P enables the parties to elect as their governing
law the principles and rules of the substantive law of contract recognised internationally or in the Community. Those principles and rules, e. g., the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,40 are not
part of the law of a state and thus not foreign to the state whose law the parties
want to derogate from. As a consequence, Article 3(4) Rome I-P in its current wording might be interpreted in such a way as to allow the parties to a
contract having only connections to France to evade internally mandatory
provisions of French law by choosing the UNIDROIT Principles. Hence, by
removing “foreign”, it should be clarified that Article 3(4) Rome I-P applies
regardless of the parties choosing a state law according to Article 3(1) Rome
I-P or a non-state law according to Article 3(2) Rome I-P.
Article 3(5) Rome I-P: Internally mandatory provisions in
intra-Community cases
Underlying rationale
31. Article 3(5) Rome I-P aims to serve the same purpose as Article 4(4)
Rome II-AP.41 It purports to foreclose an evasion of mandatory provisions
39
40
41

See infra no. 141 (comment on Article 8).
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (supra n. 10).
Explanatory Memorandum, Rome II-AP (supra n. 7) p. 14: “The parties’ choice of
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contained in Community instruments if the contract has significant links to
one or more of the Member States.42 The harmonisation of private law has
proceeded and has created, in some areas, a common minimum standard
within the Community. Community law provides, for instance, for the postcontractual compensation of commercial agents43 or for interest rates that are
due in case of late payment of certain debts.44 Hence, situations similar to
those provided for by Article 3(4) Rome I-P for purely domestic cases may
occur if the parties choose the law of a third state, although all other factors
relevant to the contract are linked with the Community.
The Institute shares these concerns:45 The parties should not be able to
evade any internally mandatory minimum standards of Community law if
their contract has only connections to Member States. Article 3(4) Rome I-P
does not suffice to restrain the parties from evading internally mandatory
Community law if there are links to different Member States. Even if all elements relevant to the contract are located in the Community, Article 3(4)
Rome I-P, just like Article 3(3) Rome Convention, does not limit the parties’
freedom to choose the law of a third state as the governing law insofar as the
circumstances point to more than one Member State. This gap for cross-border intra-Community cases could be closed by applying Article 3(4) Rome
Convention by analogy, as some propose.46 Yet, a clear-cut provision is desirable,47 since not everyone seems to be convinced by an analogous application
the applicable law shall not debar the application of provisions of Community law where
the other elements of the situation were located in one of the Member States of the European Community at the time when the loss was sustained.”
42 Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 5; Green Paper Rome I (supra n. 2) pp. 18
seq.
43 Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18. 12. 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the
Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents, O.J. EC 1986 L 382/17.
44 Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29. 6. 2000
on combating late payment in commercial transactions, O.J. EC 2000 L 200/35.
45 See Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 16 seq.; see also
Groupe européen de droit international privé (GEDIP), Réponse au Livre vert de la Commission sur la transformation de la Convention de Rome en instrument communautaire
ainsi que sur sa modernisation (2003), available at ⬍www.drt.ucl.ac.be/gedip/⬎; Reply of
the Dutch government to the Commission’s Green Paper, p. 3; Reply of the Nordic Group for
Private International Law, p. 23; Reply of Rauscher, p. 5; critically, however, the replies of the
Norwegian Ministry of Justice of 9. 9. 2003, p. 2; of the German Federal Ministry of Justice of
6. 10. 2003, p. 4, of the Government of the United Kingdom, para. 7, of the Ministry of Justice of
the Czech Republic, p. 2, all replies available at ⬍http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/
consulting_public/rome_i/news_summary_rome1_en.htm⬎; reply of Magnus/Mankowski, The Green Paper on a Future Rome I Regulation – on the Road to a Renewed European Private International Law of Contracts: ZVglRWiss. 103 (2004) 131 (143 seq.).
46 Lando, The EEC Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations:
C.M.L. Rev. 24 (1987) 159 (181 seq.); Michaels/Kamann, Europäisches Verbraucherschutzrecht und IPR: JZ 1997, 601 (604).
47 Basedow, Materielle Rechtsangleichung und Kollisionsrecht, in: Internationales Verbraucherschutzrecht, ed. by Schnyder/Heiss/Rudisch (1995) 11 (34).
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of Article 3(4) Rome Convention in cross-border intra-Community cases.48
Additionally, Articles 5 and 6 Rome I-P do not sufficiently protect Community law from evasion by the choice of the law of a non-Member State,
either. Those provisions only safeguard the application of certain internally
mandatory Community provisions within their substantive scope,49 but do
not tackle the evasion of Community law generally.
Ambiguous wording of Article 3(5) Rome I-P
32. However, Article 3(5) Rome I-P, as it stands now, does not provide a
suitable solution for the evasion problem in cross-border intra-Community
cases. Notably, it is not clear what is meant by limiting the party autonomy
with regard to mandatory rules of Community law “as are applicable to the
case”.50 This ambiguous wording can be understood in very different ways, as
the first academic reactions to the Commission’s proposal already show:
Article 3(5) Rome I-P could, on the one hand, be interpreted to the effect
that the parties cannot derogate from mandatory Community law via Article
3(1) and (2) Rome I-P if the case falls within the substantive scope of the
Community law provision in question and the law of a Member State would
be applicable pursuant to Article 4 Rome I-P.51 On the other hand, one could
infer from the clause “as are applicable to the case” that the national judge in
applying Article 3(5) Rome I-P is required to assess whether the specific
mandatory Community law provision is by its own virtue internationally applicable, irrespective of the law governing the contract according to Rome I.52
Yet, neither of these possible interpretations of Article 3(5) Rome I-P is
satisfactory with regard to the Commission’s aim to protect internally mandatory Community law provisions in pure intra-Community cases.
One possible meaning of “as are applicable to the case”: Turning all internally
mandatory Community law provisions into internationally mandatory rules
33. If Article 3(5) Rome I-P is understood as covering all mandatory rules
of Community law which are applicable to the case rationae materiae and
would be applicable according to Article 4 Rome I-P in the absence of a
choice of law, the scope of Article 3(5) Rome I-P would be far too wide. Un-

48 See for further details Münchener Kommentar zum BGB4 (-Martiny) X (2006) Art. 27
EGBGB, no. 92 seq. (cited Münch. Komm. BGB [-Martiny]).
49 Green Paper Rome I (supra n. 2) pp. 18 seq.; Max Planck Institute, Comments on
Green Paper Rome I, p. 17.
50 Mankowski, Vorschlag Rom-I-VO 102.
51 Cf. Bitterich 267.
52 Cf. Mankowski, Vorschlag Rom-I-VO 102; Dickinson 172.
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like Article 4(4) Rome II-AP53, Article 3(5) Rome I-P in its current wording
is not restricted to intra-Community cases. Rather, Article 3(5) Rome I-P
applies regardless of any additional link to the Community. Hence, it would
be merely sufficient for ousting a choice of law with regard to internally mandatory provisions of Community law if Article 4 Rome I-P points to the law
of a Member State. Thus, within the substantive scope of any Community instrument, the parties could not derogate from that instrument by electing the
law of a non-Member State as their governing law, even if there are no additional links to the Community.54 Within the ambit of internally mandatory
Community law, party autonomy would cease to exist.55 One could hardly regard the freedom of the parties to choose the applicable law as “one of the
cornerstones” of the Regulation anymore, as the Commission still maintains
in its proposed Recital 7.56 Unlike mandatory provisions of national origin,
every internally mandatory rule of Community law would be turned into a
“loi de police” by Article 3(5) Rome I-P.
34. Such an extensive meaning of Article 3(5) Rome I-P is not justified. It
would grant internally mandatory Community law a much stronger protection than internally mandatory provisions of national law. This would, notably, be contrary to the jurisprudence of the ECJ. In Maxicar, a Brussels Convention case, the Court has held that, with regard to the public policy exception, provisions of national law and Community law are, in principle, to be
treated equally;57 the same has to apply to the international scope of internally
mandatory rules. Furthermore, Article 3(5) Rome I-P would even go beyond
the Ingmar decision of the ECJ,58 to which the Commission referred in its
Green Paper as a possible example for a future Article 3(5). In Ingmar the
Court had to decide whether Articles 17 and 18 of the Commercial Agents
Directive59 guaranteeing a post-contractual indemnity to commercial agents
must be applied where the commercial agent carried out its activity in a
Member State, even though the principal is established in a non-Member
State and the parties have chosen the law of that latter state. The ECJ ruled
that those provisions will apply which are at least internally mandatory provisions of Community law because Article 19 of the Commercial Agents Directive forbids any contractual derogation to the detriment of the agent.
See wording supra n. 41.
Dickinson 172 with n. 7.
55 See also Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 68.
56 For the wording of Recital 7 in the English version see supra no. 10 (comment on Recitals).
57 ECJ 11. 5. 2000 – case C-38/98 (Régie nationale des usines Renault SA v. Maxicar SpA
und Orazio Formento), E.C.R. 2000, I-2973, paras. 32 seq.
58 ECJ 9. 11. 2000 – case C-381/98 (Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies),
E.C.R. 2000, I-9305.
59 Council Directive 86/653/EEC (supra n. 43).
53
54
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However, the ECJ stressed that Articles 17 and 18 of the Commercial Agents
Directive were not only internally mandatory, but that their application was
“essential for the Community legal order” – a condition which is missing in
the current wording of Article 3(5) Rome I-P. The Advocate General Léger
also regarded Article 19 of the Commercial Agents Directive as an internationally mandatory provision (as opposed to an internally mandatory provision in the sense of Article 3(4) Rome I-P), which is applicable to an international situation according to its intention to be applied, regardless of its designation by a conflicts rule.60 Furthermore, in Ingmar – unlike in Article 3(4)
Rome I-P – there was a sufficient connection to the Community justifying
the application of a mandatory provision of Community law in spite of the
choice by the parties of a non-Member State law.61
Another possible meaning of “as are applicable to the case”: hinting at
internationally mandatory provisions of Community law
35. It is therefore more likely that the reference to the applicability of the
mandatory rules of Community law in Article 3(5) Rome I-P (“as are applicable to the case”) is to be understood in the second sense: Only provisions of
Community law should be applied which are internationally applicable irrespective of the law governing the contract.62 However, many Community instruments do not contain explicit provisions on their international scope.
Thus, under Article 3(5) Rome I-P the national judge would be supposed, as
was the ECJ in Ingmar, to interpret the Community instrument in question
and to decide whether it is intended to cover the case at hand internationally
although the parties have chosen the law of a non-Member State.
36. If the wording of Article 3(5) Rome I-P is understood in that way,
however, it is equally unconvincing: First, if the Ingmar test is meant to be the
true function of the annex “as are applicable to the case”, there would be no
practical need for Article 3(5) Rome I-P. A provision of Community law
which claims international application irrespective of a choice of law by the
parties is arguably applicable by its own virtue, by virtue of Article 8(2) Rome
I-P as an internationally mandatory rule,63 or as a prevailing Community act
under Article 22 Rome I-P. If Ingmar is to be codified for reasons of clarification, it should, at the most, be accommodated within Article 8 Rome I-P
where issues of internationally mandatory rules are specifically addressed.64

Advocate General Léger 11. 5. 2000, in ECJ 9. 11. 2000 (supra n. 58) para. 89.
ECJ 9. 11. 2000 (supra n. 58) para. 25.
62 This interpretation is supported by reference to the Ingmar decision (supra n. 58) in the
Green Paper Rome I (supra n. 2) p. 19.
63 Dickinson 172.
64 Reply of Rauscher (supra n. 45) pp. 5 seq.; Reply of the Nordic Group for Private Interna60
61
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37. Secondly, the Ingmar problem would only be solved in part. The application of internationally mandatory rules of Community law would merely
be safeguarded by Article 3(5) Rome I-P if the parties have chosen a governing law (Article 3 Rome I-P), but not in the absence of such a choice (Article
4 Rome I-P).65 By contrast, internationally mandatory provisions of national
law would under Article 8 Rome I-P prevail over the law designated by both
Articles 3 and 4 Rome I-P. One may conceive a case, where a Community
law provision should be applicable because the provision is essential for the
Community legal order and the case has some strong links to the Community,
but Article 4 Rome I-P would lead nonetheless to the application of the law
of a third state. Hence, the Commission’s proposal, if understood in the second sense, would lead to the odd result, that a given provision of Community
law would be applied internationally irrespective of the parties’ choice of law,
but not irrespective of the law applicable to the contract in the absence of a
choice of law. There is no reason for such a distinction. This observation
clearly demonstrates that the priority of internationally mandatory rules of
the Community law has to be established in the systematic context of Article
8 Rome I-P and not in Article 3 Rome I-P.
38. Finally, if Article 3(5) Rome I-P has to be conceived as a mere declaratory provision hinting at the unconditional enforcement of internationally
mandatory provisions of Community law, the Commission’s proposal would
make no material change to the status quo:66 Under the current regime, an internationally mandatory provision of Community law is applicable by its own
virtue, by virtue of Article 7(2) Rome Convention or as a prevailing Community act under Article 20 Rome Convention. The question whether the
parties should be able to avoid the internally mandatory rules of Community
law in pure intra-Community contracts by electing the law of a third state – an
issue which the Commission raised in the Green Paper67 – would still be left
open. Article 4(4) Rome II-AP68 would find no counterpart in the Rome I-P.
Incompleteness as to Directives
39. Apart from its ambiguity of wording, the possible interpretations of Article 3(5) Rome I-P do not explicitly address the question which law is to be
applied instead of the law of the non-Member State chosen by the parties.
This causes no problems if the parties derogate from a Community regulation
because this regulation would be enforced directly. Yet, the situation is differtional Law (supra n. 45) p. 23; Dickinson 172; in the same direction Reply of the Ministry of
Justice of the Czech Republic (supra n. 45) p. 2.
65 Bitterich 267; see also Magnus/Mankowski (supra n. 45) 143 seq.
66 Mankowski, Vorschlag Rom-I-VO 102.
67 Green Paper Rome I (supra n. 2).
68 See wording supra n. 41.
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ent if the parties deviate from a directive; then the question arises whose
Member State’s implementation is to be applied.
Proposed solution: Extension of Article 3(4) Rome I-P to
intra-Community cases
40. The Institute suggests that the Commission’s legitimate concerns are to
be addressed by extending Article 3(4) and Article 8(2) Rome I-P to provisions
of Community law: As proposed by the Institute in its 2004 comments, the
Commission’s aim would best be served by applying mutatis mutandis the technique of Article 3(4) Rome I-P to intra-Community cases.69 Accordingly,
similarly to Article 4(4) Rome II-AP,70 Article 3(5) of the Rome I Regulation
should state that the fact that the parties have chosen the law of a non-Member
State does not, where all the other elements relevant to the contract are connected with one or more of the Member States, prejudice the application of
mandatory rules contained in European regulations or the application of Member State rules insofar as they implement mandatory European directives. In the
latter case, the provisions of the relevant directive shall apply as implemented in
the domestic law of the Member State that would govern the contract in the absence of a choice-of-law clause pursuant to Article 4 Rome I-P.71
Extension of Article 8(2) Rome I-P to internationally mandatory
provisions of Community law
41. The concern addressed in Article 3(5) Rome I-P has to be distinguished from the Ingmar issue. Article 3(5) Rome I-P is confined to cases
which have no relevant connection with non-Member States. It is a different
question whether certain provisions of Community law, which are essential
for the Community legal order, deserve additional protection and are to be
applied irrespective of the law applicable to the contract under Rome I, even
if not all elements relevant to the contract point to the Community. The parties might not be allowed to circumvent such provisions, neither directly by a
choice of law pursuant to Article 3 Rome I-P in favour of a non-Member
State law nor indirectly by changing connecting factors relevant under Article
4 Rome I-P in order to make a non-Member State law applicable. But Ingmar
cannot be codified within Article 3 Rome I-P because, as seen above, this arMax Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 16 seq.
See wording supra n. 41.
71 See GEDIP proposal of 2003 (supra n. 45); Reply of the German Federal Ministry of Justice (supra n. 45), p. 4; Reply of Rauscher (supra n. 45) 6; Reply of the Nordic Group for Private
International Law (supra n. 45) p. 15; Stoll, Fragen der Selbstbeschränkung des gemeinschaftlichen Rechts der internationalen Schuldverträge in Europa, Eine Skizze, in: Festschrift
(FS) für Erik Jayme I (2004) 905 (910).
69
70
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ticle deals only with the parties’ choice of law, whereas the Ingmar rationale
concerns the outer limits of all conflict rules – not only those laid down in Article 3 Rome I-P, but also those contained in Articles 4 to 7, 9 and 10 Rome
I-P. The application of internationally mandatory rules of Community law
should therefore, as with the application of internationally mandatory rules of
the lex fori in general, be addressed within Article 8 Rome I-P.72
Article 4 – Applicable law in the absence of choice
1. To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been
chosen in accordance with Article 3,
the contract shall be governed by the
law determined as follows:

(a) a contract of sale shall be governed by the law of the country in
which the seller has his habitual
residence;
(b) a contract for the provision of
services shall be governed by the law
of the country in which the service
provider has his habitual residence;

(c) a contract of carriage shall be
governed by the law of the country
in which the carrier has his habitual
residence;

72

1. To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been
chosen in accordance with Article 3,
the contract shall be governed by the
law determined as follows: of the
country with which it is most closely connected.
2. It shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with the
country in which the party who is to effect
the performance which is characteristic of
the contract has his habitual residence at
the time of conclusion of the contract.
3. In particular, a contract shall be
presumed to be most closely connected as follows:
(a) a contract of sale shall be governed by the law of shall be presumed
to be most closely connected with the
country in which the seller has his habitual residence;
(b) a contract for the provision of
services shall be governed by the law
of shall be presumed to be most closely
connected with the country in which the
service provider has his habitual
residence;
(c) a contract of carriage shall be
governed by the law of shall be presumed to be most closely connected with
the country in which the carrier has
his habitual residence;

See infra nos. 142–144 (comment on Article 8).
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(d) a contract relating to a right in
rem or right of user in immovable
property shall be governed by the
law of the country in which the
property is situated;

(e) notwithstanding point (d), a
lease for the temporary personal use
of immovable property for a period
of no more than six consecutive
months shall be governed by the law
of the country in which the owner
has his habitual residence, provided
that the tenant is a natural person and
has his habitual residence in the same
country;

(f) a contract relating to intellectual or industrial property rights shall
be governed by the law of the
country in which the person who
transfers or assigns the rights has his
habitual residence;

(g) a franchise contract shall be
governed by the law of the country
in which the franchised person has
his habitual residence;

RabelsZ

(d) a contract relating to a right in
rem or right of user in immovable
property to a right in rem in immovable
property or a right to use immovable
property shall be governed by the law
of shall be presumed to be most closely
connected with the country in which the
property is situated;
(e) notwithstanding point (d), a
lease for the temporary personal use
of immovable property for a period
of no more than six consecutive
months shall be governed by the law
of the country shall be presumed to be
most closely connected with the country in
which the owner landlord has his habitual residence, provided that the
tenant is a natural person and has his
habitual residence in the same
country;
(f) [Primary proposal: delete Article 4(1) (f)] a contract relating to intellectual or industrial property
rights shall be governed by the law of
the country in which the person
who transfers or assigns the rights has
his habitual residence;
[Alternative proposal (see infra
no. 54)]
a contract relating to intellectual or industrial property rights shall be presumed
to be most closely connected with the law
of the country in which the person who
transfers or licenses the rights has his habitual residence, unless the transferee or
licensee has accepted a duty to exploit the
rights;
(g) notwithstanding point (f), a franchise contract shall be governed by
the law of shall be presumed to be most
closely connected with the country in
which the franchised person franchisee has his habitual residence;
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(h) a distribution contract shall be
governed by the law of the country
in which the distributor has his habitual residence.

2. Contracts not specified in paragraph 1 shall be governed by the law
of the country in which the party
who is required to perform the service characterising the contract has
his habitual residence at the time of
conclusion of the contract. Where
that service cannot be identified, the
contract shall be governed by the law
of the country with which it is most
closely connected.
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(h) notwithstanding point (f), a distribution contract shall be governed
by the law of shall be presumed to be
most closely connected with the country in
which the distributor has his habitual
residence.
[see supra paragraph 2]

4. The presumptions of paragraphs 2
and 3 may exceptionally be disregarded if
it is clear from all the circumstances of the
case that the contract is manifestly more
closely connected with another country.
Summary
Article 4 Rome I-P constitutes one of the most significant departures from
the law as it now stands under the Rome Convention. The Commission proposes to enhance certainty by adopting a list of fixed connection points for
certain contracts enumerated in Article 4(1) Rome I-P. Contracts not specified in the list of Article 4(1) Rome I-P shall be governed by the law of the
country in which the party required to perform the service characterising the
contract has his habitual residence (Article 4(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P). The
flexible criterion of the closest connection is only retained in the exceptional
case where no contract on the list of Article 4(1) Rome I-P is concerned and
the service characterising the contract cannot be identified (Article 4(2) 2nd
sentence Rome I-P). The Commission thus proposes to convert the presumptions of Article 4(2), (3) and (4) Rome Convention into fixed rules
which will replace the flexible system of closest connection and presumption
of Article 4(1)-(4) Rome Convention. An exception to the application of the
law of the place of habitual residence of the party effecting the characteristic
performance which is possible under present law due to the rebuttable nature
of the presumptions and the exception clause of Article 4(5) Rome Convention will no longer be admissible. This departure from the flexible approach
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of the Rome Convention to a system of strict rules will lead to the mandatory
application of the law specified in Article 4(1) and Article 4(2) 1st sentence
Rome I-P with no discretion left to the courts.
Even though the Institute welcomes some points of the Commission’s proposal (in particular the introduction of a general definition of habitual
residence in Article 18 Rome I-P and the deletion of the special rule for carriage contracts in Article 4(4) Rome Convention), it believes that the general
approach to (almost) completely abandon flexibility in Article 4 Rome I-P is
not desirable. Article 4 Rome I-P in its present wording does not only seem
to be in contradiction with the general objective of balancing certainty and
flexibility as expressed by the European Parliament and the Commission in
the neighbouring field of non-contractual obligations (see infra nos. 45–46).
The strict rules of Article 4(1) Rome I-P would also overrule case law of different Member States’ courts which have relied on the flexibility of Article 4
Rome Convention to adequately cope with the needs of commercial practice
(see infra nos. 47–56). From a comparative point of view, the Commission’s
proposal would disturb international concordance which currently exists
with important trading partners of the EU (see infra no. 57). The Institute
thus regards four modifications as necessary:
– The test of closest connection should be retained as a general rule in Article 4(1).
– This test should be supplemented with a presumption in favour of the law
of the party effecting the characteristic performance in Article 4(2).
– A clarifying list of presumptions for specific contracts should be included
after the general presumption as special presumptions in Article 4(3).
– A more narrowly drafted escape clause should constitute the final paragraph of Article 4(4) which makes it clear that the exception clause is to be invoked in exceptional circumstances only.

Comments
Overview of the proposal
42. Article 4 Rome I-P constitutes one of the most significant departures
from the law as it now stands under the Rome Convention. Probably motivated by a divergence of the national courts’ practice relating to the relationship between Article 4(2) and Article 4(5) Rome Convention, the Commission proposes to enhance certainty by adopting a list of fixed connection
points for certain contracts enumerated in Article 4(1) Rome I-P. Contracts
not specified in the list of Article 4(1) Rome I-P shall be governed by the law
of the country in which the party required to perform the service characterising the contract has his habitual residence (Article 4(2) 1st sentence Rome IP). The flexible criterion of the closest connection is only retained in the ex-
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ceptional case where no contract on the list of Article 4(1) Rome I-P is concerned and the service characterising the contract cannot be identified (Article 4(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P). The Commission thus proposes to convert
the presumptions of Article 4(2), (3) and (4) Rome Convention into fixed
rules which replace the flexible system of closest connection and presumptions of Article 4(1)-(4) Rome Convention. An exception to the application
of the law of the place of habitual residence of the party effecting the characteristic performance which is possible under present law due to the rebuttable
nature of the presumptions and the exception clause of Article 4(5) Rome
Convention will no longer be admissible.
On a more technical level, the Commission proposes to introduce a general
definition of habitual residence for companies and contracts concluded in the
course of operation of a subsidiary, a branch or other establishment in Article
18 Rome I-P which absorbs the present Article 4(2) 2nd sentence Rome
Convention. Finally, the Commission proposes to abolish the special rule for
carriage contracts in Article 4(4) Rome Convention and instead integrate
such contracts into the general system (Article 4(1)(c) Rome I-P).
Consequence: No discretion left to the courts in the vast
majority of cases
43. These changes, in particular the change from the flexible system of the
Rome Convention to the strict rules of Article 4(1) and (2) 1st sentence
Rome I-P, will lead to the mandatory application of the law specified in Article 4(1) Rome I-P for the named categories of contracts or, respectively, to
the mandatory application of the law of the country in which the party who is
required to perform the service characterising the contract has its habitual
residence (Article 4(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P). The courts will thus be obliged always to apply the law of the habitual residence of the seller, service
provider, carrier, transferor or assignor of intellectual property rights, franchisee or distributor unless the parties have chosen the law applicable to their
contract. An exception which is possible under present law due to the rebuttable nature of the presumptions and the escape clause of Article 4(5) Rome
Convention will no longer be admissible. Only in the exceptional case of no
contract of the list of Article 4(1) Rome I-P being concerned and the service
characterising the contract not possible to be identified, the flexible criterion
of the closest connection may be applied (Article 4(2) 2nd sentence Rome
I-P).
The Institute’s opinion: Compromise between certainty and flexibility
44. Even though the Institute welcomes some points of the Commission’s
proposal – in particular the introduction of a general definition of habitual
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residence in Article 18 Rome I-P73 and the deletion of the special rule for carriage contracts in Article 4(4) Rome Convention74 – it believes that the
general approach to (almost) completely abandon flexibility in the determination of the law applicable to a contract in the absence of a parties’ choice is not
desirable. Even though such strictness is obviously favourable to promote
legal certainty and the uniform application of a future Community instrument, it leaves judges hardly any space to balance commercial interests and
adapt the rule to the needs of commerce. This marks a considerable departure
from the practice of most European countries prior to the enactment of the
Rome Convention.75 The Institute believes that in the field of obligations a
common policy must prevail which allows for exceptional deviations from
the basic conflict rule both in contractual and non-contractual matters. The
loss of foreseeability generated by the exception clause of Article 4(5) Rome
Convention should also be viewed in the context of procedural devices. Exception clauses lend themselves to deviating interpretations by national courts
as long as no common and authoritative interpretation exists. Until 2004 the
Protocols on the interpretation of the Rome Convention had not entered
into force, and to date the ECJ has not handed down a single judgment on the
Rome Convention. A future Rome I Regulation will be subject, under Article 68 EC, to interpretation by the ECJ from the onset forward. It will be up
to the ECJ to identify fact situations which allow a deviation from the basic
conflict rules, and the ECJ will certainly prevent former national conflict
rules from being perpetuated under the cover of an exception clause.
The Institute thus proposes to retain the flexible principle of closest connection, supplemented with a system of presumptions, and draft only the exception clause more narrowly, thereby finding a compromise between enhanced certainty of application and retained judicial flexibility in individual
cases. If a clarifying list of presumptions for specific contracts is favoured by
the European legislator, such a list could be included as special presumptions –
thus achieving the compromise solution of a closest connection criterion test
supplemented with presumptions and an exception clause featuring three
narrowing elements: (1) The presumption of the closest connection may be
disregarded only “exceptionally”. (2) The closer connection to another
country must not only “appear” from the circumstances, it must be “clear”.
(3) A closer connection as such does not matter, it must be “manifestly”
closer.

See infra nos. 171 seq. (comment on Article 18).
See infra no. 50.
75 Giuliano/Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations: O.J. EC 1980 C 282/1 (20).
73
74
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The Commission’s and Parliament’s opinion in the neighbouring field of
non-contractual obligations
45. A compromise between legal certainty and judicial flexibility appears to
match the position of both the Commission and the European Parliament in
the neighbouring field of non-contractual obligations. Both in the original76
and in the amended77 proposal for a regulation on the law applicable to noncontractual obligations (Rome II), the Commission has proposed the introduction of an exception clause to the general rule for the law applicable to
non-contractual obligations arising out of a tort or delict78 “which aims to
bring a degree of flexibility, enabling the court to adapt the rigid rule to an individual case so as to apply the law that reflects the centre of gravity of the
situation”.79 The European Parliament has gone even further and pointed out
in a newly drafted Recital 8 to the proposed Rome II Regulation that “the
need for legal certainty must always be subordinate to the overriding need to
do justice in individual cases and consequently the courts must be able to
exercise discretion”.80
Contradiction between Article 4 Rome I-P and Recital 8 Rome I-P
46. The fixed rules of Article 4 Rome I-P also seem to contradict the
general objective of the instrument as stated in Recital 8. Recital 8 states that
“to contribute to the general objective of the instrument – certainty as to the
law in the European judicial area – the conflict rules must be highly foreseeable.” However, it is also acknowledged that “the courts must retain a degree
of discretion to determine the law that is most closely connected to the situation in a limited number of hypothetical cases.” It is difficult to see in which
“limited number of hypothetical cases” this “degree of discretion” is maintained. It should be remembered that for all contracts specified in Article 4(1)
and Article 4(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P, i.e. all contracts of sale, provision of
services, carriage, relating to a right in rem or a right to use immovable
property, relating to intellectual or industrial property, franchising and distribution and all other contracts where the characteristic performance can be
identified, the rules of Article 4(1) and 4(2) Rome I-P leave no discretion at
all. Only in the very exceptional case of other contracts (Article 4(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P) is a certain discretion kept, but this is not a result of a compromise between certainty and individual justice, but rather a consequence of
COM(2003) 427 final (supra n. 5).
Rome II-AP (supra n. 7).
78 Article 3(3) of the original proposal and Article 5(3) of the amended proposal (Rome
II-AP).
79 COM(2003) 427 final (supra n. 5).
80 European Parliament (supra n. 6) A6–0211/2005, p. 3.
76
77
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the fact that, in the case described by Article 4(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P, it is
hard to think of a criterion which would make a strict rule possible.
Practical inappropriateness of strict rules for individual contracts
47. Most importantly, the proposed fixed rules of Article 4(1) Rome I-P
would overrule jurisprudence in different Member States which has relied on
the flexibility of Article 4 Rome Convention to adequately cope with the
needs of commerce. This shall be demonstrated by use of examples of national
jurisprudence for the different contracts specified in Article 4(1) Rome I-P.
Article 4(1)(a) Rome I-P: Contracts of sale
48. Concerning the fixed rule for contracts of sale, Article 4(1)(a) Rome IP referring to the law of the seller will normally indicate the law which is best
suited for the contract. However, the inappropriateness of a fixed rule is demonstrated by a case decided by the German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) in
2004.81 In this case the BGH had to decide about the law applicable to a contract for the purchase of a claim, governed by German law but secured by a
mortgage over property situated in France and thus governed by French law.
After pointing out that the contract did not have a right in immovable
property as its subject matter because it was concerned with the purchase of
the secured claim and not the mortgage which was accessory to the claim, the
BGH nevertheless used the escape clause of Article 4(5) Rome Convention82
to apply French law to the contract of sale because the mortgage related to
property in France, the contract of sale had been certified by a French notary,
the contract was written in French, the lawyers on both sides were French,
the sales price was in French francs and the aim of the parties was essentially to
buy the mortgage and not the claim secured by it. Even if the synchronisation
of the laws applicable to several contracts is only one argument when it comes
to the application of the escape clause of Article 4(5) Rome Convention, an
accessory choice of law might under certain circumstances be appropriate
from a practical point of view, in particular in contracts relating to claims secured by rights in immovable property as these come very close to the presumption in Article 4(3) Rome Convention. It should not in general be
prohibited as it would under the strict character of Article 4(1)(a) Rome
I-P.83
BGH 26. 7. 2004, IPRax 2005, 342 (345 seq.).
The corresponding Article 28(5) EGBGB.
83 Dickinson 172; the accessory determination of the applicable law can also be found in
other national case law, see Cour d’appel Versailles 6. 2. 1991 (Bloch c. Société Lima), Rev.
crit. d.i.p. 80 (1991) 745 (746 seq.) with note Lagarde; Bank of Baroda v. Vysja Bank Ltd.,
81
82

71 (2007)

comments on rome i proposal

261

Article 4(1) (b) Rome I-P: Contracts for the provision of services
49. Contracts for the provision of services may also be more closely connected with another country than the country where the service provider is
habitually resident. Hard cases where the law of the service provider had only
a remote connection with the contract and where the application of the escape clause was at least conceivable can be found in UK case law.84 A particularly striking example for the inappropriateness of the law designated by Article 4(1)(b) Rome I-P is a case decided by the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof
(OGH) in 1998.85 The OGH had to decide which law applies to a contract
with an arbitrator. Such a contract86 may well be understood as a contract “for
the provision of services” and would thus fall under Article 4(1)(b) Rome I-P.
Alternatively, one would consider the arbitrator to perform the service characteristic of the contract, thus leading to the application of Article 4(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P. In both cases the law of the country where the arbitrator is
habitually resident would have to be applied with no exception possible. As a
consequence, in an arbitration tribunal with arbitrators from different countries, the contractual liability of the arbitrators might be subject to different
laws which do not necessarily coincide with the law applicable to the arbitration proceedings. The OGH understandably considered this result as inappropriate and decided to subject all contracts with arbitrators to the law
which governs the arbitration proceedings.87 Such a solution would no longer
be possible under Article 4(1)(b) Rome I-P.

[1994] 2 Lloyd’s L.Rep. 87 (93); OLG Hamm 13. 11. 1995, NJW-RR 1996, 1144 (1145);
OLG Düsseldorf 20. 6. 1997, RIW 1997, 780 (780 seq.).
84 Definitely Maybe (Touring) Ltd. v. Marek Lieberberg Konzertagentur GmbH, [2001] 1
W.L.R. 1745 (1749); Ennstone Building Products Ltd. v. Stanger Ltd., [2002] 2 All E.R.
(Comm.) 479 (489); Kenburn Waste Management Ltd. v. H. Bergmann, [2002] International
Litigation Procedure 588 (594); Caledonia Subsea Ltd. v. Microperi Srl, [2002] Scots Law
Times 1022 (1029).
85 OGH 28. 4. 1998 ZRvgl. 39 (1998) 259. In this case the Rome Convention was not
yet applicable. The Austrian national law at that time was, however, similar to Article 4
Rome Convention.
86 Such a contract does not fall under the exclusion clause of Article 1(2)(e) Rome I-P
because it does not concern the “arbitration agreement” submitting the dispute to arbitration but rather the contract with the arbitrator to conduct the arbitration proceedings. The
Giuliano/Lagarde report (supra n. 75) 12, only states that “[t]he exclusion of arbitration
agreements does not relate solely to the procedural aspects, but also to the formation, validity and effects of such agreements. Where the arbitration clause forms an integral part of
a contract, the exclusion relates only to the clause itself and not to the contract as a whole.”
It seems, thus, only concerned with the arbitration agreement itself, not with the contract
with the arbitrators.
87 OGH 28. 4. 1998 (supra n. 85) 261.
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Article 4(1)(c) Rome I-P: Contracts for carriage
50. The same can be true for contracts of carriage. Even though the Institute welcomes the abolition of Article 4(4) Rome Convention,88 this does
not mean that the considerations underlying this provision were wholly unfounded from the outset. It may well be that the habitual residence of the carrier points to the law of a country of a flag of convenience wholly unconnected with the operation of the ship and the execution of the contract. In appropriate exceptional circumstances it should be possible for the courts to
derogate from the law of the carrier’s habitual residence which would not be
the case under Article 4(1)(c) Rome I-P, but which would be possible under a
system of presumptions supplemented by a narrowly drafted exception
clause.89
Article 4(1)(d) Rome I-P: Contracts relating to a right in rem in immovable
property or a right to use immovable property
51. The English text of Article 4(1)(d) Rome I-P (“a contract relating to a
right in rem or a right of user of immovable property”) seems to have suffered
from a translation error as both the German (“dingliches Recht an einem
Grundstück oder ein Recht zur Nutzung eines Grundstücks”) and the
French text (“un droit réel immobilier ou un droit d’utilisation d’un immeuble”) indicate that a different wording was intended. The Institute thus
proposes to bring the English wording in line with the German and French
texts of the Rome I-P (“right in rem in immovable property or a right to use
immovable property”). In substance, the Institute proposes to change the
strict rule of Article 4(1)(d) Rome I-P into a more flexible presumption
which would make it possible for the national courts in appropriate circumstances to submit contracts relating to immovable property between parties
which have their habitual residence in the same country to the law of that
country.90 In cases which fall outside the rule on exclusive jurisdiction in Article 22 No. 1 Brussels I Regulation and which will thus most likely be dealt
with by the courts of both parties’ habitual residence, such a change would
make it possible to apply the lex fori and thus save both time and money in
judicial proceedings.
88 For a detailed opinon see Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I,
pp. 44 seq.; see also Mankowski, Vorschlag Rom-I-VO 103.
89 For an example for the application of Article 4(5) Rome Convention on transport
contracts Cour de cassation 4. 5. 2003, Rev. crit. d.i.p. 92 (2003) 285 (286) with note Lagarde.
90 For an example OLG Köln 12. 9. 2000, IPRspr. 2000, no. 26, p. 60 (61). A similar solution is adopted in the field of non-contractual obligations, see Article 5(2) Rome II-AP,
(supra n. 7).
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Article 4(1)(e) Rome I-P: Leases for the temporary use of immovable property
52. Article 4(1)(e) Rome I-P provides for an exception to the general rule
on rights in immovable property or rights to use immovable property in Article 4(1)(d) Rome I-P. The very existence of such an exception demonstrates
that there is a need for flexibility in determining the law applicable to contracts in the absence of choice and that a system of strict rules is unsuited in a
world of increasingly complex contracts. It is by no means certain that today’s
legislator is able to foresee all situations in which an exception to the general
rules is justified. It should be remembered that the situation described in Article 4(1)(e) Rome I-P – which nowadays seems to be widely accepted as an
exception to the general rule of Article 4(1)(d) Rome I-P – evolved as a result
of the national courts’ application of the exception clause.91 Like all other provisions of Article 4(1) Rome I-P, Article 4(1)(e) Rome I-P should also be
changed into a presumption.
In the wording of Article 4(1)(e) Rome I-P, it is not understandable why
the habitual residence of the owner should be decisive for the applicable law
as the owner of the property is not necessarily the same person as the landlord
of the tenancy agreement.92 Thus the Institute proposes to replace the word
“owner” by the word “landlord”. Even though an extension of Article 4(1)(e)
Rome I-P to non-personal use and non-natural persons as tenants might be
thinkable,93 such an extension would not be in line with the wording of the
exclusive jurisdiction rule of Article 22 No. 1 Brussels I Regulation. The applicable law for the contract would thus diverge from the law of the courts
having exclusive jurisdiction under Article 22 No. 1 Brussels I Regulation, a
divergence which would increase both costs and length of judicial proceedings and is not advisable.
Article 4(1)(f) Rome I-P: Contracts relating to intellectual or
industrial property rights
53. The strict rule in Article 4(1)(f) Rome I-P is particularly unsuited to the
needs of commercial and judicial practice in the field of intellectual property
related contracts. This is due to the wide variety of contracts in this field.
Some of these contracts might have as their main object a franchise, research
cooperation or joint venture agreement and deal with the transfer or license of
intellectual property rights only in ancillary provisions. As the wording of Article 4(1)(f) Rome I-P does not specify what is meant by “contracts relating to
91 For references see Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 46 with
n. 122–123.
92 Article 22 No. 1 Brussels I Regulation, which was (probably) the model for Article
4(1)(e) Rome I-P, also uses the word “landlord” and not the word “owner”.
93 Mankowski, Vorschlag Rom-I-VO 104.
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intellectual or industrial property rights”, it is quite unclear whether in the
situation described above (franchise, distribution or joint venture contract
with ancillary license of intellectual property rights) the strict rule of Article
4(1)(f) Rome I-P would submit the whole franchise, research cooperation or
joint venture agreement to the law of the transferor or assignor of the intellectual property rights or whether Article 4(1)(f) Rome I-P would apply only to
the part of the contract dealing with intellectual property transfers or licenses
(thus resulting in a dépeçage which may raise serious problems of coordination) or whether contracts which include transfers or licenses of intellectual
property rights only as ancillary provisions would be excluded from the scope
of Article 4(1)(f) Rome I-P altogether. This is a particular problem in franchising contracts which according to Article 4(1)(g) Rome I-P would be governed by the law of the country where the franchisee is habitually resident
whereas Article 4(1)(f) Rome I-P would call for the application of the law of
the franchisor as licensor of the intellectual property rights.94 The Institute
thus proposes to clarify the ambit of Article 4(1)(f) Rome I-P. This could be
done by including a “notwithstanding point (f)” in those provisions which
might conflict with Article 4(1)(f) Rome I-P, in particular Article 4(1)(g) and
(h) Rome I-P. Another solution would be to narrow the wording of Article
4(1)(f) Rome I-P from “a contract relating to intellectual or industrial
property rights” to “a contract having as its main subject matter the transfer or
license of an intellectual or industrial property right”.
54. The wide variety of contracts relating to intellectual property rights
also calls for a differentiated solution instead of a strict, clear-cut rule.95 Even
though the application of the law of the assignor or transferor of the intellectual property right might be appropriate in simple contracts which resemble
an outright sale – such as an assignment or license for consideration in the
form of a lump sum payment –, this does not hold true as a general rule. More
complex intellectual property transactions often include an explicit or implicit96 duty of the licensee to exploit the intellectual property right, sometimes supplemented by clauses indicating quantities of production or modalities of use, while the licensor does not accept any commitment beyond
the toleration of use of his rights. This casts doubt on the proposition that it is
94 It may even be the case that license of intellectual property rights is the most important
part of the franchise contract, see Austrian OGH 5. 5. 1987, GRUR Int. 1988, 72 (73)
(“Stefanel”).
95 For the different approaches see, e.g., Fawcett/Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law (1998) 558 seq.; Metzger, Transfer of Rights, License Agreements,
and Conflict of Laws: Remarks on the Rome Convention of 1980 and the Current ALI
Draft, in: Intellectual Property in the Conflict of Laws, ed. by Basedow/Drexl/Kur/Metzger
(2005) 61 (63 seq., 69 seq.)
96 This is, e.g., the case if the licensee’s or assignee’s consideration is a payment of royalties rather than a payment of a lump sum.
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the licensor who effects the performance characteristic of the contract (as it is
the licensee who accepts the commercial risks linked to the exploitation). It
may also be the case that the intellectual property rights licensed or assigned
are mainly exercised in the country of the licensee’s or transferee’s habitual
residence or principal place of business. Another example of an intellectual
property contract where the performances of both parties are essential and
characteristic is a contract to publish and distribute a book. For these reasons
it is not surprising that many national courts have refused to always regard the
assignment or license of an intellectual property right as the performance
characteristic of the contract and instead stressed the importance of an individual assessment of the license or transfer contract.97 The Institute thus proposes to delete Article 4(1)(f) Rome I-P altogether and instead submit contracts relating to intellectual property rights to the general rule of characteristic performance in order to make it clear that it is left to the judges’ appraisal
of the circumstances of the case whether there is a characteristic performance
and which party has promised it. If the legislator nevertheless prefers a special
rule for contracts relating to intellectual property rights, the Institute proposes
to change Article 4(1)(f) Rome I-P into a presumption in favour of the law of
the transferor or licensor which, however, excludes contracts in which the
transferee or licensee has accepted an explicit or implicit duty to exploit the
rights. The wording should be amended in order to reflect that not only transfers, but also licenses of intellectual property rights are covered.98
Article 4(1)(h) Rome I-P: Distribution contracts
55. A final example for the inappropriateness of a fixed rule without any
flexibility can be drawn from the provision on distribution contracts (Article
4(1)(h) Rome I-P). This provision seems not to be fully harmonised with Article 7(1) Rome I-P. Under the strict rule of Article 4(1)(h) Rome I-P, a distribution contract will always be governed by the law of the country in which
the distributor has his habitual residence. It may, however, be that the distributor also acts as an agent with the consequence that Article 7 Rome I-P
would apply. Article 7(1) Rome I-P subjects the relationship between principal and agent (which concerns inter alia the distribution contract) to the law
of the country in which the agent has his habitual residence, thus arriving in
most cases at the same result as Article 4(1)(h) Rome I-P. However, if the
97 OLG Hamburg 23. 10. 1997, GRUR Int. 1998, 431 (432) (“Feliksas Bajoras”) regards
not the transfer, but rather the exploitation of the copyright as the characteristic performance; LG Düsseldorf 10. 1. 1999, GRUR Int. 1999, 772 (773 seq.) (“Virusinaktiviertes
Blutplasma”) stresses the importance of an individual assessment of license contracts and applies in the given case the law of the place of habitual residence of the licensee who accepted a duty to exploit the rights.
98 For doubts under the present wording Dickinson 172.
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agent exercises or is to exercise his main activity in the country where the
principal has his habitual residence, the law of that country shall apply (Article
7(1) in fine Rome I-P). In this situation, it is unclear whether Article 4(1)(h)
Rome I-P or Article 7(1) Rome I-P shall prevail. This clearly demonstrates
that a fixed rule for all distribution contracts is not appropriate and ought to
be replaced by a more flexible presumption which makes it possible in some
cases to apply a different law. A redrafting of Article 7(1) Rome I-P is also required in order to bring this provision in line with Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6.99
Conclusion
56. Obviously the examples cited above do not lead to the conclusion that
the rules of Article 4(1) Rome I-P are not useful indications of the law which
should regularly be applied to the named contracts. However, the existence of
the exceptional cases described above evidences that the fixed rules should be
turned into presumptions, indicating the most appropriate law to be applied
in general but leaving open the possibility to depart in extraordinary cases. If
the courts are deprived of this flexibility it will be quite likely that they will
tend to characterise contracts in hard cases as falling outside the rules of Article 4(1) and (2) 1st sentence Rome I-P in order to regain flexibility under Article 4(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P. Given the fact that a uniform interpretation
of a future Community instrument would be ensured by the ECJ and a very
high degree of legal certainty can already be achieved by the parties’ choice of
law under Article 3 Rome I-P, it seems advisable to keep the flexible closest
connection test and a system of rebuttable presumptions as the general rule
and draft only the exception clause more narrowly, thereby finding a compromise between judicial flexibility and enhanced uniformity of application.
International concordance
57. A final argument against the adoption of Article 4 Rome I-P as proposed by the Commission is international practice outside the EU. The conflict rules of many countries outside the EU and in particular most of the
more modern codifications of Private International Law opt for a flexible approach to the law applicable to contractual obligations if the parties have not
made a choice of law. The flexible criterion of closest connection can be
found in the laws of Switzerland (Article 117(1) IPRG of 1987),100 Russia
(Article 1211(1) of the Russian Civil Code part 3 of 2001),101 the Republic of
See infra nos. 118–119 (comment on Article 7).
Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht vom 18. 12. 1987, BBl. 1988 I 5 =
AS 1988, 1776.
101 Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossijskoj Federacii 2001, no. 49, pos. 4552, translated
into German in RabelsZ 67 (2003) 341 (347).
99

100
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Korea (Article 26(1) Conflict of Laws Act of 2001),102 Québec (Articles 3112
seq. of the Code Civil québecois of 1991),103 the People’s Republic of China
(Article 126 of the Chinese contract law of 1999)104 and in the Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts of 1994
(Article 9).105 Most of these legal systems supplement the general test of closest
connection with presumptions, be it a general presumption in favour of the
law of the party effecting the characteristic performance or special presumptions for specific types of contracts106 or a combination of both.107 These
examples are clear evidence of the fact that international practice outside the
EU seems to converge at a test of closest connection quite often linked with a
system of presumptions. The introduction of the strict regime of Article 4
Rome I-P would sacrifice international convergence which is undesirable
from the point of view of world-wide harmonisation of conflict rules.
Article 5 – Consumer contracts
1. Consumer contracts within the
meaning and in the conditions provided for by paragraph 2 shall be
governed by the law of the Member
State in which the consumer has his
habitual residence.
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply to contracts concluded by a natural person,
the consumer, who has his habitual
residence in a Member State for a
purpose which can be regarded as
being outside his trade or profession
with another person, the professional, acting in the exercise of his
trade or profession.

1. Subject to the provisions in paragraphs 2 and 3 consumer contracts
within the meaning and in the conditions provided for by paragraph 2
shall be governed by the law of the
Member State country in which the
consumer has his habitual residence.
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply to contracts concluded by a natural person,
the consumer, who has his habitual
residence in a Member State for a
purpose which can be regarded as
being outside his trade or profession
with another person, the professional, acting in the exercise of his
trade or profession.

102 Law no. 6465, translated into English in Yearbook of Private International Law (YB.
Priv.Int.L.) 5: 2003 (2004) 315 (322) with comments by Kwang Hyun Suk at p. 99; translated into German in RabelsZ 70 (2006) 342 (347) with comments by Pissler at p. 279.
103 Code civil du 18. 12. 1991, L.Q. 1991, ch. 64 = RabelsZ 60 (1996) 327 (332 seq.).
104 Contract law of the People’s Republic of China 1999, available at ⬍http://english.
mofcom.gov.cn/article/topic/lawsdata/chineselaw/ 200211/20021100053894.html⬎.
105 Available at ⬍http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-56.html⬎.
106 As in Article 26 of the Korean Conflict of Laws Act.
107 As in Article 117 of the Swiss IPRG, Article 1211 of the Russian Civil Code Part 3
and Articles 3112 seq. of the Code civil québecois.
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It shall apply on condition that the
contract has been concluded with a
person who pursues a trade or profession in the Member State in
which the consumer has his habitual
residence or, by any means, directs
such activities to that Member State
or to several States including that
Member State, and the contract falls
within the scope of such activities,
unless the professional did not know
where the consumer had his habitual
residence and this ignorance was not
attributable to his negligence.

3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to:
(a) a contract for the supply of services where the services are to be
supplied to the consumer exclusively
in a country other than that in which
he has his habitual residence;
(b) contracts of carriage other
than contracts relating to package
travel within the meaning of Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990;
(c) contracts relating to a right in
rem or right of use in immovable
property other than contracts relating to a right of user on a timeshare
basis within the meaning of Directive 94/47/EC of 26 October 1994.

RabelsZ

It shall apply on condition that the
contract has been concluded with a
person professional who pursues a
trade or profession in the Member
State country in which the consumer
has his habitual residence or, by any
means, directs such activities to that
Member State country or to several
Member States countries including
that Member State country, and the
contract falls within the scope of
such activities, unless the professional did not know where the consumer had his habitual residence and
this ignorance was not attributable to
his negligence.
3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to:
(a) a contract for the supply of services where the services are to be
supplied to the consumer exclusively
in a country other than that in which
he has his habitual residence;
(b) (a) contracts of carriage other
than contracts relating to package
travel within the meaning of Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990;
(c) (b) contracts relating to a right
in rem or right of use in immovable
property other than contracts relating to a right of user on a timeshare
basis within the meaning of Directive 94/47/EC of 26 October 1994.

Summary
The Institute generally welcomes the Commission’s proposal for Article 5
Rome I-P. It provides for a clear conflicts rule for consumer contracts and accounts for both the problems experienced with Article 5 Rome Convention
as well as the replies to the questions in the Commission’s Green Paper.
Nonetheless, the Institute regards four modifications as necessary:
The scope of application of Article 5(1) and (2) Rome I-P should not be
limited to consumers who are habitually resident in a Member State. Instead,
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it should apply to all consumers within the meaning of the proposed Regulation irrespective of their place of habitual residence (see infra nos. 62 and 65).
– The language of Article 5(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P should account for
the definition of “professional” established in Article 5(2) 1st sentence Rome
I-P (see infra no. 65).
– The exception in Article 5(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P relating to the professional’s non-negligent ignorance of the consumer’s place of habitual
residence should be deleted (see infra nos. 66–71).
– The list of excluded contracts in Article 5(3) Rome I-P should not cover
contracts for the supply of services where the services are to be supplied to the
consumer exclusively in a country other than that in which he has his habitual
residence (see infra no. 73).
Comments
Overview of the proposal
58. The Commission’s proposal for consumer contracts takes centre stage
in the envisioned Regulation.108 It departs from the Rome Convention in
several respects: First, it mainly provides for the application of the law of the
Member State in which the consumer has his habitual residence and thereby
abandons the principle of free choice of law applied under the Convention.
Second, it defines consumer contracts with exclusive reference to the persons
involved and thus does not follow the Convention’s approach of defining
consumer contracts with additional reference to the object of the contract.
Third, it restricts application of the consumer’s law with the help of the
targeted activity criterion and thus replaces the long and complex, yet incomplete list of conditions applied under the Convention to limit the principle of
free party choice of law.
General rule: Application of the law of the consumer’s habitual residence
59. The general conflicts rule for consumer contracts codified in Article
5(1) Rome I-P provides for application of the law at the consumer’s place of
habitual residence and thus abandons the Convention’s complex interplay of
free party choice of law and mandatory rules. The Institute embraces this
change even though it did not endorse systematic application of the consumer’s law in its previous comment.109 However, the provision as submitted
by the Commission has some significant advantages:110 First, it renounces the
108 See for first appraisals of Article 5(1) Rome I-P Mankowski, Vorschlag Rom-I-VO
105–107; id., Art. 5 Rom I-VO 121.
109 Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 51–52.
110 See also Mankowski, Vorschlag Rom-I-VO 106; id., Art. 5 Rom-I-VO 151–154.
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rather vague concept of mandatory rules and thus avoids the parallel application of different laws entailed in the current version of Article 5 Rome Convention. This in turn leads to more legal certainty which helps to reduce both
compliance and litigation costs. Second, due to Article 16 Brussels I Regulation, the proposed provision avoids a split of jurisdiction and applicable law.
This is particularly desirable in consumer transactions given that the claims involved are usually small.111 Third, it protects the consumer’s expectation in
having his law applied without significantly weakening the professionals’ position. Even though the latter must adjust their general conditions of contract
to the laws of potentially 25 different legal systems the professionals are not
worse off than under the Rome Convention:112 They must abide with the
mandatory rules of the consumer’s law but they are free to depart from the default rules as long as they comply with the requirements of the Directive on
unfair terms in consumer contracts.113 It must finally be borne in mind that
there is no evidence that a choice-of-law clause in a consumer contract has
ever been acknowledged by a European court.114 All in all, Article 5(1) Rome
I-P therefore manages to strike a fair balance between the interests of consumers on the one hand and the interests of professionals on the other.115
Scope of application: Consumer contracts and targeted activity criterion
60. Article 5(2) Rome I-P defines the scope of Article 5(1) Rome I-P. It
provides that the law of the consumer’s habitual residence shall govern a contract under three conditions: First, the contract must be a contract concluded
by a consumer and a professional. Second, the professional must direct business activities to the consumer’s habitual place of residence. Third, the contract must fall within the scope of such activities.

111 See for a more detailed discussion Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper
Rome I, pp. 52 seq.
112 Bitterich 268; but see Dickinson 173.
113 Council Directive (EC) No. 13/1993 of 5. 4. 1993 relating to unfair terms in consumer contracts, O.J. EC 1993 L 95/29.
114 See the case report and the conclusions drawn therefrom by Basedow, Consumer contracts and insurance contracts in a future Rome I Regulation, in: Enforcement of International Contracts in the EU (supra n. 9) 269 (279 seq.); id., Internationales Verbrauchervertragsrecht – Erfahrungen, Prinzipien und europäische Reform, in: FS Jayme (supra n. 71) 3
(16 seq.).
115 Bitterich 268; Mankowski, Art. 5 Rom-I-VO 150–160. This is also due to the targeted
activity criterion which is embedded in Article 5(2) Rome I-P and discussed in more detail
infra nos. 63–65.
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Consumer contracts: Contracts between a consumer and a professional
61. Article 5(2) Rome I-P defines a consumer contract as a contract concluded by a natural person, the consumer, who has his habitual residence in a
Member State for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade
or profession with another person, the professional, acting in the exercise of
his trade or profession. The Institute welcomes this definition.116 It significantly extends the substantive scope of Article 5 Rome I-P because it defines
consumer contracts solely with reference to the persons involved and refrains
from setting up additional requirements relating to the object of the contract.
More specifically, it extends the scope of Article 5 Rome I-P to areas which
are not covered by Article 5 Rome Convention although European and national laws provide for mandatory consumer protection rules in these areas. In
contrast to the definition applied by the Rome Convention, the Commission’s definition covers, for example, loans and credits not linked to the
supply of goods or services, timeshare agreements on immovable property as
well as tenancy agreements for holiday homes situated abroad but marketed in
the country of the consumer’s habitual residence. By the same token, it covers
the growing number of contracts relating to intangible goods that cannot be
classified as consumer contracts under the Rome Convention because they
concern the supply of neither goods nor services.117 In addition to extending
the substantive scope of Article 5 Rome Convention, the proposed definition
also clarifies its personal scope: It stipulates expressly that only natural persons
can be consumers and thus ends a long-lasting dispute about whether legal
persons can benefit from the protection afforded by Article 5 Rome Convention.118 Since it does so by implementing definitions contained in other Community acts119 as well as the case law of the ECJ,120 it aligns Article 5 Rome I-P
with other areas of European consumer protection law.

116 It corresponds to the Institute’s previous proposal, see Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 104 seq.; see also Mankowski, Vorschlag Rom-I-VO
105 seq.; id., Art. 5 Rom-I-VO 122–123 and 141–142.
117 See for a more detailed account Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper
Rome I, pp. 48 seq.; Mankowski, Art. 5 Rom-I-VO 122–123.
118 See for the discussion in Germany for example Reithmann/Martiny (-Martiny) no. 803;
Staudinger (-Magnus) Art. 29 EGBGB, no. 44.
119 Article 2(b) of Council Directive (EC) No. 13/1993 (supra n. 113).
120 See for example ECJ 22. 11. 2001 – case C-541/99 (Cape Snc v. Idealservice Srl),
E.C.R. 2001, I-9049, para. 17 (regarding the notion of consumer in the Council Directive
[EC] No. 13/1993 [supra n. 113]); ECJ 19. 1. 1993 – case C-89/91 (Shearson Lehmann Hutton Inc. v. TVB Treuhandgesellschaft für Vermögensverwaltung und Beteiligungen mbH), E.C.R.
1993, I-139, para. 22 (regarding the notion of consumer in Article 13 of the Brussels Convention); ECJ 3. 7. 1997 – case C-269/95 (Francesco Benincasa v. Dentalkit Srl.), E.C.R.
1997, I-3767, para. 17 (regarding the notion of consumer in Article 13 of the Brussels Convention).
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62. Against this background, the Institute recommends adoption of the definition as proposed by the Commission. One modification, however, seems
appropriate: In its current version the definition limits the personal scope of
Article 5 Rome I-P to consumers that have their habitual place of residence
in a Member State. Thus, it excludes consumers habitually resident outside
the European Union. This reduction of the article’s personal scope of application is astonishing: First, limiting the protection afforded by Article 5 Rome
I-P to consumers residing in the European Union has never been a point of
discussion under the Rome Convention. Second, none of the replies121 to the
Commission’s Rome I Green Paper argued for exclusion of consumers not
resident within the European Union. Third, the Explanatory Memorandum
does not even mention it. Therefore, it seems that the exclusion of consumers
residing outside the European Union was not intended. More important,
however, is that it is not desirable. There is no reason to deprive consumers
from outside the European Union of the protection afforded to them under
their own laws. There is no reason to establish two different consumer protection schemes under the envisioned Rome I Regulation, one for consumers
residing within the European Union and one for consumers residing outside.
To the contrary: Any such distinction would be discriminatory in nature and,
therefore, should not be incorporated in the envisioned Regulation.122
Targeted activity criterion: Direction and scope of professional activities
63. The second and third conditions for application of Article 5(1) Rome
I-P implement the targeted activity criterion already present in Article 15(1)
(c) of the Brussels I Regulation. It is meant to replace Article 5(2) Rome
Convention which has caused numerous disputes about the appropriate scope
of Article 5 Rome Convention. As the Institute has pointed out in its previous comment, the long and complex list of conditions for the application of
the law of the consumer’s habitual place of residence has proven too wide in
some cases and too narrow in others.123 It covers some consumers which do
not deserve the protection afforded by the law of their habitual residence –
such as the consumer who receives a special invitation in the meaning of Article 5(2) Rome Convention after first business contacts in the professional’s
country. On the other hand it does not cover cases – such as the infamous
Grand Canary cases – in which protection of mobile consumers by the mandatory rules of their laws of habitual residence would have been desirable.
The targeted activity criterion embedded in Article 5(2) 2nd sentence Rome
Supra n. 45.
See also Bitterich 268; Mankowski, Vorschlag Rom-I-VO 106; id., Art. 5 Rom-I-VO
160–162.
123 See for a more detailed account Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper
Rome I, pp. 50 seq.
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I-P effectively avoids problems of over- and under-inclusiveness by providing
for a flexible standard.
64. At the same time it entails two further advantages: First, it strikes a fair
balance between the high standard of consumer protection envisioned by the
EC Treaty and the needs of the internal market in consumer transactions. It
guarantees application of the protective provisions of the law of the consumer’s habitual place of residence where the consumer expects these provisions to apply. On the other hand it allows professionals to escape the consumer protection laws of certain states by limiting their offers to consumers
from other states. In this way, the targeted activity criterion also accommodates the needs of electronic commerce and other modern techniques of long
distance contracting. Second, the targeted activity criterion leads to the
desired synchronisation of jurisdiction and applicable law.124 Since Articles
15(1)(c) and 16 Brussels I Regulation provide for jurisdiction at the consumer’s place of habitual residence if the professional has directed his business
activities to that country it is guaranteed that the court will apply its own law
in consumer cases. This is particularly desirable given the small stakes in consumer cases which render the costly assessment of foreign law an inefficient
endeavour.
65. Against this background, the Institute welcomes the proposed revision
of Article 5(2) Rome I-P. However, two changes are recommended: First, for
the reasons pointed out earlier, Article 5 (2) Rome I-P should not be limited
to consumers who are habitually resident in a Member State.125 Second, Article 5(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P should be couched in more concise terms by
applying the definition of “professional” provided for in Article 5(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P. More specifically, it should simply require that the “professional” pursues a trade or profession at the consumer’s habitual residence instead of referring to a contract that has been concluded with a “person” who
pursues a trade or profession in that country.
Exception: Non-negligent ignorance of consumer’s habitual residence
66. In addition to defining the scope of application in a positive way, Article 5(2) provides for one exception that excludes application of the law of
the consumer’s place of habitual residence: According to Article 5(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P, the consumer’s law does not apply if the professional did not
know where the consumer had his habitual residence and this ignorance was
not attributable to his negligence. The provision raises difficulties for the following reasons: First of all, it leads to an unfortunate – and unintended – mix
124 See Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 52 seq.; see also
Mankowski, Vorschlag Rom-I-VO 106; id., Art. 5 Rom-I-VO 128–129 and 130–131.
125 See supra no. 62.
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of the proposals submitted by the Institute and the Group Europeén du Droit
International Privé (GEDIP).126 This is because it adopts a variant of the
GEDIP awareness criterion according to which the professional can escape
the application of the consumers’ law if he establishes that due to the consumer’s conduct he was not aware of the country in which the consumer had
his habitual residence. This criterion, however, was never meant to be introduced next to the targeted activity criterion as proposed by the Institute and
as implemented in the Commission’s proposal in Article 5(2) 2nd sentence
Rome I-P. More specifically, it was never meant to serve as an exception to
the targeted activity criterion. Rather, it was meant to define the situations in
which the consumer should – or should not – enjoy the protection afforded
to him by the law of his habitual residence. The introduction of a variant of
the GEDIP criterion in Article 5(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P, therefore, contradicts its original purpose.
67. More important, however, is that the GEDIP criterion as implemented
in the Commission’s proposal does not bear any practical meaning: It is hard
to imagine a case where the supplier has directed his business activities towards the country where the consumer has his habitual residence and where
the supplier is not negligent in ignoring that the consumer is habitually resident in that specific country. In fact, it seems that all cases are sufficiently
covered by the targeted activity criterion embedded in Article 5(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P.
68. To illustrate this finding three scenarios must be distinguished: In the
first scenario the professional is located in state A and directs his business activity (exclusively) to country B where a consumer habitually residing in B
accepts his offer to enter into a contract. In this scenario, Article 5(1) Rome IP is clearly applicable: The professional has directed business activities within
the meaning of Article 5(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P to the consumer’s country
and there is no way that he could claim that he was not negligent in not
knowing that the consumer was habitually resident in that country.
69. In the second scenario the professional, again, is located in state A and
directs his business activity (exclusively) towards country B. This time, however a consumer from country C accepts his offer. Here, the professional indeed might be non-negligent in not knowing that the consumer was from C
with the result that the adjusted GEDIP criterion could exclude application
of Article 5(1) Rome I-P. However, non-application of the law at the place of
the consumer’s habitual residence already follows from the targeted activity
criterion embedded in Article 5(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P: The professional
did not direct his business activity to C. Therefore, he did not direct his business activity to the country in which the consumer was habitually resident –
as required by the targeted activity criterion.
126

Supra n. 45.
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70. In the third scenario, the professional, again, is located in state A, but
directs his trade to country B and C. In this case Article 5(1) Rome I-P is
clearly applicable if the professional indiscriminately directs his activities to B
and C, i.e. if he does not distinguish between consumers habitually resident in
B and those habitually resident in C. As in the first scenario, there is no way
that the professional can claim that he was not negligent in not knowing the
consumer’s place of habitual residence. If, however, the professional distinguishes between his business activities directed towards B and C and if a consumer from C accepts his offer directed to consumers in state B, the professional might indeed invoke non-negligent ignorance of the consumer’s place
of habitual residence. And in contrast to the second scenario, he has also directed his business activity to the country in which the consumer with whom
he has entered the contract was habitually resident. However, as in the second
scenario, non-application of the consumer’s law already follows from the
targeted activity criterion. This is because it requires that the contract eventually concluded falls within the scope of the activities he has directed to
country C. If, however, the contract was concluded as a result of business activities directed to B it cannot be said that it falls within the scope of the activities the professional directed to the consumer’s country C.
71. Against this background, the GEDIP criterion does not take on any
importance. Where the application of the consumer’s law seems inappropriate, the targeted activity criterion adequately limits the scope of Article 5(1)
Rome I-P.127 It should be noted, however, that as a result of the targeted activity criterion consumer transactions not covered by Article 5 Rome I-P will
be subject to the general provisions of Articles 3 and 4 Rome I-P.
Exclusion of certain contracts
72. Article 5 (3)(a)-(c) Rome I-P provides for three exceptions to the wide
scope of application defined by Article 5(2) Rome I-P. While two of them
correspond to the Institute’s prior proposal and should be retained, the exception relating to contracts where the services are to be supplied exclusively in a
foreign country should be deleted.128
Contracts for the supply of services in a foreign country
73. Article 5(3)(a) Rome I-P excludes the application of Article 5(1)
Rome I-P in regards to contracts for the supply of services where the services
are to be supplied to the consumer exclusively in a country other than that of
127 Bitterich 268. See for a detailed account Rühl, Das neue europäische Kollisionsrecht
für Verbraucherverträge: Zur geplanten Kombination von Ausrichtungskriterium und
subjektiver Schutzklausel: GPR 2006, 196–202.
128 See infra no. 73.
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his habitual residence. It equals Article 5(4)(b) Rome Convention and rests
on the idea that a consumer does not need the protection of his own laws
where he has agreed to the supply of goods or services in a foreign country.
However, in light of the targeted activity criterion employed in Article 5(2)
Rome I-P, the exception cannot be justified anymore. To the contrary: If the
professional has directed his business activities towards the consumer’s place of
habitual residence – as required by Article 5(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P – the
consumer should enjoy the protection afforded to him by his own law no
matter where the services are to be supplied. Therefore, the exception should
be deleted.129
Contracts of carriage and package travel
74. Article 5(3)(b) Rome I-P excludes contracts of carriage other than
contracts relating to package travel within the meaning of Directive 90/314/
EEC of 13 June 1990.130 This exception equals Article 5(4)(a) Rome Convention. It is justified on two grounds: First, contracts of carriage for both persons
and goods are usually subject to uniform law and, therefore, do not require
the protection established by Article 5(1) and (2) Rome I-P.131 Second, they
cannot adequately be dealt with by application of the law at the consumer’s
habitual place of residence: Cross-border carriage, especially for the conveyance of passengers, usually involves a large number of consumers from different countries. Therefore, application of the consumer’s law would require the
carrier to comply with different protective laws at the same time. It is evident
that this is neither feasible nor desirable.132 It is, therefore, to be welcomed that
contracts of carriage – except for those relating to package travel – are not
governed by Article 5(1) Rome I-P but by the general rules of Articles 3 and
4 Rome I-P.
Contracts relating to a right in rem or right of use in immovable property
75. Article 5(3)(c) Rome I-P excludes contracts relating to a right in rem
or a right of use in immovable property – other than a right of use on a timeshare basis within the meaning of Directive 94/47/EC of 26 October 1994133
See also Mankowski, Art. 5 Rom-I-VO 125–127.
Council Directive (EEC) No. 314/1990 of 13. 6. 1990 on package travel, package
holidays and package tours, O.J. EC 1990 L 158/59.
131 See for example Staudinger (-Magnus) Art. 29 EGBGB, no. 59. See also Morris, The
Conflict of Laws (2005) no. 4–043 (regarding jurisdiction).
132 See for example Audit, Droit international privé (1997) no. 808; Reithmann/Martiny
(-Martiny) no. 819; Staudinger (-Magnus) Art. 29 EGBGB, no. 59. See also Giuliano/Lagarde
(supra n. 75) 57. But see Mankowski, Art. 5 Rom-I-VO 124–125.
133 Council Directive (EC) No. 47/1994 of 26. 10. 1994 on the protection of purchasers
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– from the article’s scope of application. The exclusion is new insofar as Article 5 Rome Convention does not contain an express exception for any such
contracts. Instead, it excludes contracts relating to a right in rem or a right of
use in immoveable property by limiting the scope of application to contracts
that relate to the supply of goods and services. Under the Commission’s proposal, in contrast, the article’s scope of application is significantly broader in
that it relates to all contracts between a consumer and a professional irrespective of the object of the contract.134 Therefore, an express exception for contracts relating to a right in rem or a right of use in immovable property is
necessary.135 It is justified on the basis that real property transactions – other
than timesharing agreements – are closely linked to the land register of the
situs, the forms employed and the practice of the land registrar and its administrative personnel.
Article 5a – Insurance contracts
1. The law applicable to the insurance
contract shall be the law of the country in
which the policyholder has his habitual
residence or central administration at the
time of the conclusion of the contract.
2. The parties to the contract of insurance may choose
(a) the law of the country in which the
risk or part of it is situated in accordance
with the internal law of the forum;
(b) in case of an insurance contract
limited to events occurring in a given
State, the law of that State;
(c) in life insurance contracts, the law of
a country of which the policyholder is a
national;
(d) in travel or holiday insurance of a
duration of six months or less, the law of
the country where the policyholder took
out the policy.
3. The law applicable to a compulsory
insurance contract is the law of the country
which imposes the obligation to take out
insurance.
in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis, O.J. EC 1994 L 280/83.
134 See supra no. 61.
135 But see Mankowski, Art. 5 Rom-I-VO 127–128.

278

max planck institute

RabelsZ

4. The rules set out in paragraphs 1
and 2 of this Article do not apply to reinsurance and to the insurance of large risks
as defined in Council Directive 73/239/
EEC as amended by Council Directives
88/357/EEC and 90/618/EEC, as
they may be amended.

Summary
The Institute regrets the Commission’s proposal to perpetuate the excessively complicated choice-of-law rules implemented by the Insurance Directives of the second generation. It repeats its recommendation to consolidate
the existing conflict rules into one provision thereby simplifying the rules
without causing any major substantive change.
Comments
Overview of the proposal
76. The Commission’s proposal essentially carries on the regime of insurance contracts established by the Insurance Directives and the Rome Convention. Under Article 22(a) Rome I-P and Annex 1, the conflict rules contained in Articles 7 and 8 of the second Non-life Insurance Directive 88/357/
EEC and in Article 32 of the Consolidated Directive 2002/83/EC on Life
Assurance still prevail over the general conflict rules as set forth in the draft
regulation. Since both directives have been adopted with an eye towards the
implementation of the internal insurance market, they only deal with transborder insurance contracts concluded by insurance companies established in a
Member State and cover risks situated in other Member States. As far as risks
located in third states are concerned the general conflict rules of the Rome I
Regulation will apply; this has also been the case under the Rome Convention. A slight change is brought about by the proposed Regulation for a third
group of cases: At present, if a risk located in a Member State is covered by an
insurer established in a third state, neither the Rome Convention nor the Insurance Directives apply; consequently, the matter is left to national conflict
rules. Under the draft regulation these cases will also be subject to the general
conflict rules of Articles 3–5 Rome I-P. This is due to the fact that the coordination of the general conflict rules with the Directives will no longer be effected by a general exclusion of risks located in Member States as stated in Article 1(3) Rome Convention. Instead Article 22(a) Rome I-P ensures that the
general conflict rules will only be superseded if the special conflict rules of the
Directives actually apply.

71 (2007)

comments on rome i proposal

279

Technical error
77. The list of Directives in Annex 1 of the Rome I-P that contain special
conflict rules which prevail over the general conflict rules of the Rome I-P
correctly refers to the second Non-life Insurance Directive 357/1988/EEC
and its conflict rules in Articles 7 and 8. With regard to life assurance the list
specifies Directive 619/1990/EEC as amended as the relevant instrument for
the determination of the applicable law. It must be recalled that this Directive
has been derogated by the “consolidated” Directive 2002/83/EC, see its Article 72 and Annex V A. The relevant conflict rules are now contained in Article 32 of Directive 2002/83; Annex 1 of the draft regulation should be
amended accordingly.136
Inconsistencies of the two conflicts regimes
78. The Max Institute has pointed out the inconsistencies of the different
conflict regimes in its comments on the Green Paper.137 As has been explained, a British insurer may choose the applicable law in a hull insurance
policy sold to the owner of a sailboat registered in Denmark under the conflict rules of Directive 88/357/EEC relating to large risks, which include
marine hull insurance.138 If the boat were registered in Croatia, the case would
concern a risk situated outside the Community139 and therefore would fall
outside the scope of the conflict rules of the Directives; it would be covered
by the Rome I Regulation which does not distinguish small and large risks,
but would protect the boat owner under the special conflicts rule for consumer contracts contained in Article 5 Rome I-P. It is difficult to see why a
consumer domiciled in a third state should be afforded better protection than
a consumer domiciled within the Union.
Another inconsistency relates to the demarcation of the area where free
choice of law is allowed. If a professional or small trader who is established in a
Member State is protected under Directive 88/357/EEC against the choice
of the insurer’s law in an intra-Community case, why should it make a difference for that insurance policy if the policyholder moves the business to
Switzerland? Under the present complex regime, the applicable conflict rules
would in fact change and would allow free choice. Such examples clearly
show that the current situation is untenable. Historical development led to
See also infra no. 182 (comment on Article 22).
Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 26 seq.
138 See the Danish Højesteret 31. 3. 1998, Ugeskrift for retsvæsen (UfR) 1998, 723,
where the choice-of-law clause was proposed by the English insurer only after the conclusion of the contract and therefore held to be invalid.
139 See Article 2(d) 2nd indent on the situation of the risk in case of insurance relating to
vehicles.
136
137
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the adoption of the Insurance Directives by the Community and of the Rome
Convention by the Member States,140 but it would be outright contradictory
and arbitrary if they were continued after the Community has acquired competence and responsibility for the various conflicts regimes. Therefore, the
opportunity of the conversion of the Rome Convention into a Community
instrument must be seized to restore both consistency and transparency to the
respective conflict rules.
A special conflict rule for insurance contracts
79. One possibility for bringing the conflict rules for insurance contracts in
line with the general conflict rules would be to extend the general rules of the
future Rome I Regulation to insurance contracts. If references to the Insurance Directives in the third and fourth indents of Annex 1 to the proposal are
deleted,141 all transnational insurance contracts would be subject either to Article 3, 4 or 5 Rome I-P. This solution would result in a very basic change in
Community policy. The law of the policyholder would only remain applicable in the case of insurance contracts concluded by consumers. In all other
cases the insurer would most likely choose its own law as being applicable to
the contract. Thus, the scope of the freedom to choose the applicable law
would be broadened considerably and in particular for insurance purchased
by professionals and small traders.
It would also be broadened to all insurance contracts which grant cover for
both private and professional purposes. As the ECJ has recently pointed out in
respect of jurisdiction, the concept of consumer has to be interpreted in a narrow way and does not include persons who contract for both private and professional purposes.142 Thus, fire insurance purchased by a farmer for the farmhouse which serves as his home and for farming would not be considered to
be a consumer insurance contract. It appears that the demarcation of the
scope of free choice of law under the insurance directives is more appropriate
even if arbitrary to a certain extent. The distinction between large risks and
small risks enshrined in the insurance directives has served as a model for the
admission of choice of court agreements in Article 14 Brussels I Regulation.
It should also be adopted for choice of law. Consequently, a future Rome I
Regulation should not simply extend the general rules relating to contracts of
all kinds, but should contain a specific conflict rule on insurance contracts.
80. The proposal of the Institute essentially consolidates the present conflict rules contained in the insurance directives. Its basic principles are as follows:
140
141
142

Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 26.
See also infra no. 182 (comment on Article 22).
ECJ 20. 1. 2005 – case 464/01 (Gruber v. BayWa), E.C.R. 2005, I-439, para. 38–45.
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– Application of the general conflict rules in respect of large risks, i.e. primarily free choice of law, see para. 4;
– Compulsory insurance is subject to the law of the country which imposes the duty to insure, see para. 3;
– The non-compulsory insurance of small and medium risks is basically
subject to the law of the country where the policyholder has his habitual
residence, see para. 1;
– Para. 2 lists a number of cases where the parties may chose the law applicable to small and medium risks in non-compulsory insurance contracts;
these cases summarise the existing law of the Directives.
No indirect choice of law
81. The Institute has not adopted the indirect choice of law permitted by
the Directives. Under the present regime the parties may choose the applicable law if the private international law of the Member State where the policyholder is habitually resident so allows; in such a case, the choice of law
would be binding on courts in the whole Community, i.e. also in Member
States which do not permit a free choice of law in insurance contracts. Thus,
an insurer established in Germany or France where choice of law is strictly
confined could choose the applicable law in a contract with a British applicant since the free choice of law is permitted under the conflict rules of the
common law in the United Kingdom and the insurance directives refer to
British law as the applicable law. The experience of more than 15 years shows,
however, that this is a pure hypothesis. The risk that some of the numerous
mandatory provisions contained in national insurance contract law will be enforced against a choice of law is considered very high by insurers, and they
consequently refrain from making a choice of law.143 In order to make national
conflict rules in the Member States compatible as mandated by Article 65 EC,
the Institute therefore favours an exclusion of the free choice of law in respect
of small and medium risks unless specifically provided in para. 2; the perpetuation of the present state of law as proposed by the Commission does not appear to be reconcilable with Article 65 EC.
Article 6 – Individual employment contracts
1. Notwithstanding the provisions
of Article 3, in a contract of employment a choice of law made by the
parties shall not have the result of depriving the employee of the protec-

1. [no changes]

143 For further details see Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I,
pp. 25 seq.
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tion afforded him by the mandatory
rules of the law which would be applicable under this Article in the absence of choice.
2. A contract of employment
shall, in the absence of choice in accordance with Article 3, be governed:
(a) by the law of the country in or
from which the employee habitually
carries out his work in performance
of the contract. The place of performance shall not be deemed to
have changed if he is temporarily
employed in another country. Work
carried out in another country shall
be regarded as temporary if the employee is expected to resume working in the country of origin after
carrying out his tasks abroad. The
conclusion of a new contract of employment with the original employer or an employer belonging to
the same group of companies as the
original employer does not preclude
the employee from being regarded as
carrying out his work in another
country temporarily;

(b) if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in or from
any one country, or he habitually
carries out his work in or from a territory subject to no national sovereignty, by the law of the country in
which the place of business through
which he was engaged is situated.

RabelsZ

2. A contract of employment
shall, in the absence of choice in accordance with Article 3, be governed:
(a) by the law of the country in or
from which the employee habitually
carries out his work in performance
of the contract. The place of performance shall not be deemed to
have changed if he is temporarily
employed in another country. The
country where the work is habitually carried out shall not be regarded as having
changed if the employee is posted to work
in another country for a limited period.
Work carried out in another country
shall be regarded as temporary if the
employee is expected to resume
working in the country of origin
after carrying out his tasks abroad.
The conclusion of a new contract of
employment, e.g. with the original
employer or an employer belonging
to the same group of companies as
the original employer does not preclude the employee from being regarded as carrying out his work in
another country temporarily shall not
exclude a finding that such a posting has
taken place;
(b) if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in or from
any one country, or he habitually
carries out his work in or from a territory subject to no national sovereignty, e.g., personnel on international
flights, by the law of the country in
which the place of business through
which he was engaged is situated; or
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3. The law designated by paragraph 2 may be excluded where it
appears from the circumstances as a
whole that the contract is more
closely connected with another
country, in which case the contract
shall be governed by the law of that
country.
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(c) in case of seamen by the law of the
country whose flag the ship flies.
3. The law designated by determined in accordance with paragraph 2
may be excluded may exceptionally not
be applied where it appears is clear
from the circumstances as a whole
that the contract is manifestly more
closely connected with another
country, in which case the contract
shall be governed by the law of that
country.

Summary
The Institute basically welcomes the Commission’s proposal for Article 6
Rome I-P. It leaves its approved structure intact and aims at clarifying certain
disputes experienced with Article 6 Rome Convention. Nevertheless, the Institute regards the following modifications as necessary:
– The words “or from” should be deleted in Article 6(2)(a) Rome I-P. Instead, a clear-cut rule for employment contracts of international flight personnel should be inserted into the regulation, preferably in Article 6(2)(b)
Rome I-P (see infra nos. 84–87 and 88–91).
– With regard to the Commission’s attempt to clarify the concept of temporary employment, two substantial changes are recommended: First, Article
6(2)(a) 2nd sentence Rome I-P should be reformulated such as to provide for a
flexible definition of temporary employment, and the overly rigid definition
provided for in Article 6(2)(a) 3rd sentence Rome I-P should be deleted (see
infra nos. 93–94). Second, Article 6(2)(a) 4th sentence Rome I-P should be
rephrased. It should clarify that the conclusion of a new contract does not
militate against the finding that a posting was temporary and that this result is
not limited to the two major cases (new contract with the same employer or
with an employer belonging to the same group of companies as the original
employer) as currently laid down in Article 6(2)(a) Rome I-P (see infra
nos. 95–100).
– The amendment in Article 6(2)(b) Rome I-P relating to employment
contracts “habitually carried out in or from a territory subject to no national
sovereignty” should be deleted and replaced by a suitable conflict-of-law rule
for maritime employment contracts, preferably in Article 6(2)(c) Rome I-P
(see infra nos. 101–115).
– The “escape clause” in Article 6(3) Rome I-P should be reformulated to
emphasise that the rules set forth in Article 6(2)(a) and (b) Rome I-P are to be
disregarded in exceptional cases only. Further, some minor stylistic changes
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are recommended without altering the content of Article 6(3) Rome I-P (see
infra no. 116).
Comments
Overview of the proposal
82. The Commission’s proposal maintains the general structure of Article 6
Rome Convention. The Institute embraces this decision. As Article 6 Rome
Convention was generally regarded as well drafted, it should essentially remain unchanged.144 Article 6(1) Rome Convention allows for a choice of the
applicable law but sets forth that the choice of law cannot deprive the employee of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law
which would be applicable in the absence of choice. This rule ensures that the
employee will always benefit from a certain minimum standard which cannot
be derogated from to his detriment by a choice of law. It further ensures that
employees will generally enjoy the protection of the law of their workplace.
Under the Rome Convention, the law to be applied in the absence of choice
(the so-called objectively applicable law) is determined by two basic rules set
forth in Article 6(2) Rome Convention: If the employee habitually carries
out his work in one country, the law of the country in which he carries out
his work in performance of the contract governs his employment contract,
even if he is temporarily employed in another country (Article 6(2)(a) Rome
Convention). If the employee does not habitually carry out his work in any
one country, Article 6 (2) (b) Rome Convention provides for the application
of the law of the country in which the place of business through which the
employee was engaged is situated. Finally, Article 6 (2) in fine Rome Convention allows the application of the law of a country having a closer connection
to the contract than the law otherwise determined in accordance with the
two basic rules (the so-called “escape clause”).
83. The changes proposed by the Commission concern the following details: First, the basic rule in Article 6(2)(a) Rome I-P shall not only apply to
cases in which an employee habitually carries out his work “in” one country
but also to cases in which an employee habitually carries out his work “from”
one country. Second, the proposal rephrases Article 6(2)(a) Rome Convention, adds a definition of temporary employment and sets forth that the conclusion of a new contract with the original employer or an employer belonging to the same group of companies as the original employer does not preclude regarding a posting abroad as temporary. Third, the Commission’s proposal provides for the application of the rule in Article 6(2)(b) Rome I-P in
144 See Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 60; Magnus/Mankowski (supra n. 45) 170.
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cases where the employee habitually carries out his work “in or from a territory subject to no national sovereignty”. Fourth, it reformulates the escape
clause and relocates it to paragraph 3.
Working “in or from a country”
84. The proposal amplifies the basic rule in Article 6(2)(a) Rome I-P to
take account of the law as stated by the ECJ with regard to Article 19 Brussels
I Regulation. According to the Commission, the proposed changes will make
it possible to apply the rule to personnel working on board of aircraft if there
is “a fixed base from which the work is organised and where the personnel
perform other obligations in relation to the employer”.145 However, the proposed amendment is superfluous as Article 6(2)(a) Rome I-P already refers to
the concept of temporary employment. Further, the Commission is mistaken
in believing that the proposed amendment provides for a clear-cut rule concerning employment contracts of personnel on international flights.
Codifying the ECJ case law is superfluous
85. The ECJ has interpreted the notion of “the place where an employee
habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract” when ruling
on jurisdictional issues under Article 19 No. 2 (a) of the Brussels I Regulation
(or under its predecessor Article 5 No. 1 Brussels I Convention). Pursuant to
this provision, an employer domiciled in a Member State may be sued “in the
courts for the place where the employee habitually carries out his work or in
the courts for the last place where he did so”. Unlike Article 6(2) (a) Rome
I-P, Article 19 Brussels I Regulation does not expressly mention that the place
where the employee habitually carries out his work remains unchanged when
he temporarily works abroad. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the
courts at the place where the employee habitually works remain competent
even though the employee is temporarily posted to another country.146
86. Although not directly referring to the concept of temporary employment, the ECJ effectively reads this concept into the Brussels I Regulation by
stating that the habitual place of work refers to the place where the “employee
has established the effective centre of his working activities and where, or from
See Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 7.
See only Franzen, Arbeitskollisionsrecht und sekundäres Gemeinschaftsrecht, Die
EG-Entsende-Richtlinie: Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 1997, 1055 (1057); Palao
Moreno, Multinational Groups of Companies and Individual Employment Contracts in
Spanish and European Private International Law: YB. Priv. Int. L. 4: 2002 (2003) 303
(327); Rauscher (-Mankowski), Europäisches Zivilprozeßrecht – Kommentar (2003) Art. 19
Brüssel I-VO, no. 7; Junker, Gewöhnlicher Arbeitsort und vorübergehende Entsendung im
Internationalen Privatrecht, in: FS Andreas Heldrich (2005) 719 (725).
145
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which, he in fact performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer”.147 Thus, even in cases where an employee carries out some parts of
his contractual obligations in different states, one can conclude that the habitual work place is located in only one country. For example, in Rutten/Medical
Cross the ECJ made clear that the habitual work place of an international sales
representative is located in the country where he spends most of his working
time (in the case at hand, two thirds of his overall time), in which he has an office from where he organises most of the work for his employer, and to which
he returns after each business trip abroad.148 In other words, the ECJ regarded
the business trips to foreign countries as a form of temporary posting abroad
which cannot alter the conclusion that the work was habitually carried out in
the employee’s country of origin. Given that Article 6(2)(a) 2nd sentence
Rome I-P already refers to temporary postings, the codification of the ECJ
case law with essentially the same scope is superfluous.
87. The Institute therefore recommends eliminating this amendment as it
creates more confusion than clarity.
Introducing a clear-cut rule for contracts of personnel on international flights
88. The Institute welcomes the Commission’s attempt to tackle the disputed issue of which law shall apply to employment contracts of airline flight
personnel. However, the Institute regards the current proposal as insufficient
and strongly recommends the adoption of a conflicts rule for these employment contracts in Article 6(2)(b) Rome I-P.
89. It should be noted that the dispute concerns only airline personnel routinely employed on international flights. Flight attendants or pilots servicing
national routes maintain a habitual place of work in the respective country. If
these employees occasionally fly on international routes, their habitual place
of work is not altered; rather, they are temporarily employed abroad. Regarding
employment contracts of flight personnel on international flights, three connecting factor analyses can be found in academic opinion and case law: (1)
First, it is argued that flight personnel habitually work on an aircraft.149 As the
aircraft must be attributed to the state in which it is registered, an employment contract is governed by the law of this state, if the employee serves only
147 See ECJ 9. 1. 1997 – case C-383/95 (Petrus Wilhelmus Rutten v. Cross Medical Ltd.),
E.C.R. 1997, I-57, para. 23 (emphasis added).
148 ECJ 9. 1. 1997 (previous note) para. 27.
149 See Mankowski, Arbeitsverträge von Seeleuten im deutschen Internationalen Privatrecht, Ein Beitrag zur Auslegung des Art. 30 II EGBGB und zum sog. Zweitregistergesetz:
RabelsZ 53 (1989) 487 (508); Junker, Internationales Arbeitsrecht im Konzern (1992) 188;
Franzen, Der Betriebsinhaberwechsel nach § 613a BGB im internationalen Arbeitsrecht
(1994) 96 seq.; see also Coursier, Le conflit de lois en matière de contrat de travail (1993)
109.
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on planes registered in this state. Conversely, if he is attached to aircraft registered in multiple states, there is no habitual place of work in one single
country and Article 6(2)(b) Rome I-P applies accordingly. (2) Other commentators point out that pilots or flight attendants working on international
flights do not usually have a habitual place of work in one country as they perform a substantial part of their work at airports located in different states.150
Consequently, the law of the country applies where the business is seated
through which the employee was engaged. (3) This interpretation is generally
supported by a third view which, however, argues that the business engaging
the employee is not necessarily located where the employment contract is
signed. Rather, one must apply the law of the country where the employee is
“integrated” into the business (“the base”). Flying personnel are normally integrated in the airbase from which they usually start and where they return
to.151
90. The proposed clarification regarding work “from a country” does not
provide for clear guidance in cases concerning employment contracts of personnel working on board of aircraft. On first review, the Commission seems
to favour an application of the law of the base. But as pointed out above,152 the
application of the law of the base is generally regarded as falling under Article
6(2)(b) Rome I-P and not, as the Commission seems to suggest, under Article
6(2)(a) Rome I-P. In addition, the Explanatory Memorandum points out that
the law of the base only applies where the personnel perform “other obligations in relation to the employer (registration, safety checks)”.153 This argument does not support the law of the base as a connecting factor since flight
personnel usually carry out these activities not only at their base but at all airports where the aircraft starts from.
91. Against this background, the Institute proposes to choose the seat of the
engaging business as the relevant connecting factor. First, it is difficult to
argue that flying personnel have a habitual work place in one country. Unlike
seamen, the members of the crew of an aircraft also have considerable work to
do on the ground, such as security checks on the plane, assisting with passenger check-in, cooperation with catering services, or doing paper work.
Furthermore, some airlines man their aircraft by using employment agencies
that send temporary personnel on a short-notice basis to work for different
150 BAG 12. 12. 2001, BAGE 100, 130 (137); Lagarde, Sur le contrat de travail international: analyse rétrospective d’une évolution mal maîtrisé, in: Les transformations du droit
du travail, Études offertes à Gerard Lyon-Caen (1989) 83 (92); Staudinger (-Magnus) Art. 30
EGBGB, no. 162; Münch. Komm. BGB (-Martiny) (supra n. 48) Art. 30 EGBGB, no. 52.
151 Gamillscheg, Ein Gesetz über das internationale Arbeitsrecht: Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 1983, 307 (334); Däubler, Das neue Internationale Arbeitsrecht: RIW 1987, 249
(251).
152 See supra no. 89.
153 Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 7.
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airlines. Thus, on the very same day such personnel may conceivably work on
aircraft registered in different countries. To link such employment contracts
to the registration would lead to arbitrary results. In contrast, the seat of the
engaging business ensures the necessary flexibility. For clarification, we propose that international flight personnel be explicitly mentioned as an example
in Article 6(2)(b) Rome I-P. It should be left to the courts to decide which
circumstances justify applying the law of the base.
Clarifying the concept of temporary employment
92. The Institute embraces the Commission’s efforts to clarify the notion
“temporarily employed” by introducing guidelines in Article 6(2)(a) 2nd to 4th
sentence Rome I-P. The Commission was right in rejecting calls for the introduction of upper limits or presumptions beyond which a posting shall be
deemed to be permanent.154 Any given period will be arbitrary and could
prove too rigid to cover the various situations of modern employment contracts.155 Notwithstanding this general approval, we strongly recommend
overhauling the proposed clarifications as both the proposed definition of
temporary employment and the guidelines concerning postings within the
same group are too rigid.
Article 6(2)(a) 2nd and 3rd sentence Rome I-P: Avoiding a too rigid definition of
temporary employment
93. First, the general statement contained in Article 6(2) 2nd sentence
Rome I-P should be replaced. The proposal states that the “place of performance” shall not be deemed to have changed if the employee is temporarily
employed in another country. The reference to the place of performance is
imprecise since the crucial question is whether a temporary employment
changes the “habitual place of work”. Further, Article 6(2) 2nd sentence
Rome I-P should circumscribe temporary employment as “posting to work
in another country for a limited period”.156 A further legal definition of the
term “posting limited in time” should be avoided in order to ensure flexible
154 See, e.g., Heilmann, Das Arbeitsvertragsstatut (1991) 144 (arguing that an employment may not be regarded as temporary after the employee worked two years abroad); Bamberger/H. Roth (-Spickhoff), Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (2003) Art. 30
EGBGB, no. 20 (assuming the same after three years); v. Hoffmann/Thorn, Internationales
Privatrecht8 (2004) 460 (assuming the same after one or two years).
155 Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 63; Magnus/Mankowski
(supra n. 45) 171; Schlachter, Fortentwicklung des Kollisionsrechts der Arbeitsverträge, in:
Das Grünbuch zum Internationalen Vertragsrecht, ed. by Leible (2004) 155 (156); and generally Junker (supra n. 149) 183; Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht2 (-Birk) I (2000)
§ 20, no. 37.
156 See Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 61 seq.
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handling by the courts. This approach provides the flexibility needed in
today’s complex work environment as it allows the courts to consider the
agreement initially concluded by the parties when determining if a posting
does or does not alter the habitual place of work.
94. Second, Article 6(2)(a) 3rd sentence Rome I-P should be deleted as it
provides for too rigid a definition of temporary employment. It covers postings in which the employee “is expected to resume working in the country of
origin after carrying out his tasks abroad”. Thus, the employee must have already worked in the home country before being posted abroad. Further, the
parties must have agreed that the employee will return to work in his home
country after he has completed his mission abroad. For a large majority of
cases, this definition might prove adequate. However, three important constellations are not covered: First, if an employer hires a new employee to habitually work in country A but – before the employee starts his work there –
sends him temporarily to country B, e.g., to help out in one of his foreign
subsidiaries, the employee does not “resume” (in the French version “reprendre son travail dans le pays d’origine”, in the German version “seine Arbeit
im Herkunftsstaat wiederaufnehmen”) his work in his “home state”. Second,
one can envision a posting that sends workers abroad for a period of time and
after this period their contracts shall terminate, e.g., because they reach their
retirement age. Third, the definition also does not cover the scenario that an
employee will be sent abroad with the promise to return either to his home
state or a third foreign country. In these cases, the employee was not “expected to return” to his “home state”. Yet, in all three scenarios it may be reasonable to apply the law of the posting state.
Article 6(2)(a) 4th sentence Rome I-P: Temporary employment and the
conclusion of a new employment contract
95. The Institute embraces the Commission’s attempt to clarify that the
conclusion of a new or a second employment contract by itself may not
necessarily change the habitual place of work, and the Institute suggests only
minor changes to the proposed language.
96. In line with GEDIP,157 the Institute had called for such a clarification
with regard to postings taking place within the same group of companies as
multinational corporations in particular will often assign workers to a foreign
branch or subsidiary. Sometimes these (re)assignments are precipitated by a
decision of the group’s management and the worker is as a result sent to work
in another country without alteration in the employment contract. This scenario does not pose any particular problem. If the posting is temporary, the
habitual place of work is still located in the employee’s country of origin.
157

Supra n. 45.
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More often, the original employment contract is modified before the new
posting takes place. Frequently, the employee concludes a contract with the
initial employer which contains (1) a clause providing for (re-)employment
upon return and (2) stipulations regarding special social benefits, e.g., staff
pension funds. Subsequently, a second contract is concluded between the
worker and the new employer, usually another company of the same group. It
is sometimes limited in time; in other cases the first employer reserves his
right to end the secondment to the second employer.
97. The recent ECJ decision in Pugliese/Finmeccanica158 has demonstrated
the difficulties in assessing the habitual place of work in such ambiguous situations under the Brussels Convention. In Pugliese, the ECJ held that in a dispute between an employee and the first employer, the place where the employee performs his obligations to a second employer can be regarded as the
place where he habitually carries out his work when the first employer, with
respect to whom the employee’s contractual obligations are suspended, has, at
the time of the conclusion of the second contract of employment, an interest
in the performance of the service by the employee to the second employer in
a place determined by the latter. According to the ECJ, the existence of such
an interest must be assessed on a comprehensive basis, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case.159
98. The Commission was right to reject this criticised160 case law when
drafting the Rome I-P. To base the applicable law on the “interest” of the first
employer does not fit into the structure of Article 6 Rome I-P. The applicable
law must be determined in accordance with the general rules set forth in Article 6(2) Rome I-P. The Commission’s proposal clarifies that the habitual
place of work under the first contract does not necessarily change when a new
contract with an employer belonging to the same group of companies is entered into. The proposal does not touch upon the question of where the habitual place of work under the second contract is located. This solution gives
courts the necessary leeway to take into account all relevant circumstances. In
some cases, one can argue that according to Article 6(2)(a) Rome I-P both
contracts shall be governed by the law of the posting country as the first contract is the basis for the posting and the second merely shapes the conditions of
158 See ECJ 10. 4. 2003 – case C-437/00 (Giulia Pugliese v. Finmeccanica SpA, Alenia Aerospazio Division), E.C.R. 2003, I-3573.
159 ECJ 10. 4. 2003 (previous note) para. 26.
160 See e.g. Huet, [note ECJ 10. 4. 2003 (supra n. 158)]: Clunet 131 (2004) 632 (634);
Mankowski, Rumpfarbeitsverhältnis und lokales Arbeitsverhältnis (komplexe Arbeitsverhältnisse) im Internationalen Privat- und Prozessrecht: RIW 2004, 133 (135 seq.); Krebber,
Gerichtsstand des Erfüllungsortes bei mehreren, aber aufeinander abgestimmten Arbeitsverhältnissen: IPRax 2004, 309 (311 seq.); Leipold, Einige Bemerkungen zur Internationalen Zuständigkeit in Arbeitssachen nach Europäischem Zivilprozessrecht, in: Gedächtnisschrift für Wolfgang Blomeyer (2004) 143 (149 seq.).
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the posting. However, in those cases where the circumstances suggest that a
new employment has been taken up, it is reasonable to apply the law of this
subsequent country to the second contract. In the latter case the question
arises whether also the first contract is governed by the law of the country in
which the employee works for his new employer. Again, courts are free to
take into account all relevant circumstances.
99. In addition to the Institute’s proposal, the Commission wants to further
clarify that a new contract concluded with the same employer does not
necessarily change the habitual place of work. The Commission seems to
have in mind cases in which the original employer revises the existing contract or concludes a second contract with the employee before sending him
abroad, for example to adjust salaries based on changes in a cost-of-living
index. The Commission is correct that a posting may also be regarded as temporary under these circumstances. However, by expressly regulating two important constellations involving contract revisions (contracts concluded with
the same employer or an employer within the same group of companies),
courts may construe Article 6(2)(a) Rome I-P as covering these two scenarios
exclusively. Such a construction would be too narrow. There are other constellations in which the fact that a second contract was concluded should not
exclude the finding that the law of the home country shall govern the contract of employment even though the second contract was neither concluded
with the old employer nor an employer belonging to the same group of companies. This may be the case in which a company sends one of his employees
to work for some months in a “friendly firm” to obtain (international) work
experience.
100. To overcome the danger of an overly narrow interpretation, we suggest rephrasing Article 6(2)(a) 4th sentence Rome I-P. It should be emphasised
that the two constellations mentioned therein must be understood as
examples. This clarification will ensure that the Regulation makes reference
to the most important constellations without excluding similar cases. Moreover, if our suggestion to delete the rigid definition of temporary employment in Article 6(2)(a) 2nd and 3rd sentence Rome I-P is followed, and our
proposal to include a flexible definition in Article 6(2)(a) 2nd sentence Rome
I-P is adopted, one must adapt 6(2)(a) 4th sentence Rome I-P accordingly.
Namely, it should state that the conclusion of a new contract “shall not exclude a finding that such a posting has taken place” instead of “does not preclude the employee from being regarded as carrying out his work in another
country temporarily”.
Working in “territories subject to no national sovereignty”
101. The Commission’s proposal amends Article 6(2)(b) Rome Convention as to also apply to cases where the employee “habitually carries out his
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work in or from a territory subject to no national sovereignty.” The Institute
strongly recommends deleting this amendment.
Deleting “or from”
102. If our suggestion to delete the “or from” in Article 6(2)(a) Rome I-P
is followed, one also needs to delete it in the first part of Article 6(2)(b) 1st sentence Rome I-P (“if the employee does not habitually work in or from one
country [...]”).
103. The second “or from” mentioned in Article 6(2)(b) Rome I-P must
also be deleted, irrespective of whether our other recommendations are considered or not. It seems that the English version contains a translation error.
Whereas the English provision reads, “work in or from a territory subject to no
national sovereignty”, the French and German version only refer to work in
such a territory (“ou s’il accomplit habituellement son travail dans un espace
non soumis à une souveraineté nationale”; “oder wenn er seine Arbeit gewöhnlich in einem Raum verrichtet, der keiner nationalen Staatsgewalt unterliegt”).
The scope of the amendment is confusing
104. Also the reference to employment contracts carried out in (or from)
“a territory subject to no national sovereignty” should be abolished. The Explanatory Memorandum does not explain which type of employment should
be covered by the proposed amendment. Under public international law, territories subject to no national sovereignty are the High Seas, the Antarctica
and the air space above these territories.161 The High Seas have to be distinguished from the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), i.e. the area beyond and
adjacent to the territorial sea which may extend to a distance of 200 nautical
miles out from the baseline. The EEZ is subject to some form of national control162 as the coastal State enjoys certain sovereign rights, mainly relating to the
exploration and exploitation of natural resources.163 The same can be said
about the continental shelf (which in specific cases might stretch further out
from the coast than the EEZ)164 although the rights of the coastal State over
the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters or
the air space above those waters.165 Against this background, the amendment
does not cover work on oil rigs or floating installations within the EEZ or the
161 Cf. Torres Bernadez, Territorial Sovereignty, in: Encyclopaedia of Public International
Law, ed. by Bernhardt (2002) 823 (824).
162 Cf. Article 55 United Nations Conventions on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
163 Cf. Article 56(1)(a) UNCLOS.
164 Cf. Articles 76, 77 UNCLOS.
165 Cf. Article 78 UNCLOS.
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continental shelf.166 Further, outer space is a territory under no national control. However, as work in outer space is not yet of permanent nature, employees on space stations and similar constructions must be regarded as temporarily posted and habitually working elsewhere.
105. When drafting this amendment, it seems that the Commission primarily had in mind crew members onboard ships as well as airline personnel
on international flights. This becomes apparent if one reviews the Green
Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention into a Community instrument.167 The Commission asked whether the Rome Convention should be
clarified with regard to the position of employees carrying out their work “at
a place not subject to national sovereignty”. As examples, the Commission
mentioned employment contracts of sailors and pilots.168
106. Although the Institute welcomes the attempt to introduce conflict
rules for the employment contracts of personnel on international flights and
seamen sailing on international routes, it calls for the deletion of the reference to work in a “territory subject to no national sovereignty” and the introduction of clear-cut rules for the employment contracts of personnel on
international flights169 and maritime employment contracts.170 First, the
amendment suggested by the Commission is ambiguous. If it is intended to
cover employment contracts of flying personnel (which often fly over the
High Seas), it is unclear how Article 6(2)(b) Rome I-P (“work habitually carried out in a territory subject to no national sovereignty”) relates to Article
6(2)(a) Rome I-P (“work habitually carried out in or from a country”). As
pointed out above, the Commission argues that employment contracts of
flight attendants are governed by Article 6(2)(a) Rome I-P – at least if the
employees are integrated to a base and carry out parts of their work there.171
Also, with regard to the work of seamen sailing on international routes, the
scope of the amendment is not clear: Even though a substantive part of the
ship’s voyage may lead through international waters, it is difficult to argue
that the High Seas are the place where they have established the effective
centre of their working activities. Further, by referring to work on territories
subject to no national sovereignty, the amendment provides no guidance
166 This would be in line with the ECJ case on jurisdictional issues. The Court has held
that work carried out by an employee on fixed or floating installations positioned on or
above the part of the continental shelf adjacent to a Contracting State, in the context of
prospecting and/or exploiting its natural resources, is to be regarded as work carried out in
the territory of that State for the purposes of applying Article 5(1) Brussels Convention, see
ECJ 27. 2. 2002 – case C-37/00 (Herbert Weber v. Universal Ogden Services Ltd.), E.C.R.
2002, I-2013.
167 Green Paper Rome I (supra n. 2).
168 Green Paper Rome I (supra n. 2) p. 37.
169 See supra nos. 88–91
170 See infra nos. 107–115.
171 See supra no. 90.

294

max planck institute

RabelsZ

with regard to maritime employment contracts habitually carried out in the
EEZ of different states.
Introducing a special conflicts rule for maritime employment contracts
107. The Institute renews its call for the introduction of a clear-cut rule for
the disputed question of which law should govern maritime employment
contracts in the absence of a choice of law.172
The dispute
108. As pointed out in our comments to the Green Paper, some courts
apply the national law of the ship’s flag. It is argued that the ship is the place
where a seaman habitually carries out his work according to Article 6(2)(a)
Rome Convention and that the flag determines the nationality of the ship.
However, if the ship flies a flag of convenience, constituting the only connection with the law of the flag state, the law of the country with the closest connection to the case is applicable according to Article 6(2) in fine Rome Convention (now Article 6(3) Rome I-P). This seems to be the majority view of
academic opinions in Germany,173 France,174 and Belgium;175 in the United
Kingdom, however, the view prevails that the contract shall be governed by
the law of the country in which the place of business is situated through
which the seaman was engaged in accordance with Article 6(2)(b) Rome
Convention.176 The latter opinion is founded mainly on the argument that
ships are constantly moving through waters belonging to different countries
so that there is no habitual place of work in one country.

See Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 63 seq.
See only Basedow, Billigflaggen, Zweitregister und Kollisionsrecht in der Deutschen
Schiffahrtspolitik, in: Recht der Flagge und “billige” Flaggen, ed. by Drobnig/Basedow/
Wolfrum (1990) 75 (83) (BerDGesVölkR, 31); Mankowski, Seerechtliche Vertragsverhältnisse im Internationalen Privatrecht (1995) 494; Junker, Die einheitliche europäische Auslegung nach dem EG-Schuldvertragsübereinkommen: RabelsZ 55 (1991) 674 (679);
Taschner, Arbeitsvertragsstatut und zwingende Bestimmungen nach dem Europäischen
Schuldvertragsübereinkommen (2003) 151; Kegel/Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht9
(2004) 685; Junker, Internationales Arbeitsrecht in der geplanten Rom I-Verordnung: RIW
2006, 401 (408). But see Palandt (-Heldrich), Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch65 (2006) Art. 30
EGBGB, no. 8 (arguing for the application of the law of the place of business through
which the crew member was engaged).
174 Audit, Droit international privé3 (2001) no. 811.
175 Rigaux/Fallon, Droit international privé2 II (1992) no. 1389.
176 Dicey/Morris, The Conflict of Laws13 II (2000) no. 33–067; Kaye, The New Private
International Law of Contract of the European Community (1993) 235.
172
173
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109. The court practice in Europe is unsettled. The German Bundesarbeitsgericht177 left the connecting factor open and instead made reference to
the law of the country with the closest connection to the case in accordance
with Article 30(2) in fine EGBGB, i.e. the German incorporation of Article
6(2) Rome Convention. In the Netherlands, one can find judgments applying the law of the country whose flag the ship flies178 as well as judgments
applying the law of the country in which the place of business is situated
through which the seaman was engaged,179 while the French (Article 5 Code
du travail maritime180) and the Italian laws (Article 9 Codice della navigazione181) are based on the flag state principle.
Secondary ship registers
110. Many countries have created special ship registers for merchant ships,
thus offering ship owners an alternative to flagging out. Some states, such as
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France, have established such registers in their overseas territories possessing labour laws with lower standards
of protection than the “mother country.” However, the ships logged in these
registers fly the mother country’s flag. Nonetheless, this type of second ship
register does not impact the operation of the conflict-of-law rules. If Article
6(2)(b) Rome I-P refers to the place of business through which the crew
member was engaged, the law of the overseas territory applies since the ship
owner(s) or its relevant branch will usually be established there. If courts apply
the law of the country whose flag the ship flies, the law of the overseas territory will also apply. Article 21 Rome I-P provides that where a state comprises several territorial units, each of which has its own rules of law in respect
to contractual obligations, each territorial unit shall be regarded as a country.
However, Article 21 Rome I-P is of no avail where the conflict rule refers to
the law of the flag state and where this state is divided in several units having
their own contract law. Here, it must be left to the internal law of the flag state
to determine the applicable rules of employment law. The national law leads

177 BAG 3. 5. 1996, IPRax 1996, 416 (418); cf. also LAG Hamburg 19. 10. 1995,
IPRspr. 1996, no. 50a.
178 Pres. Rb. Rotterdam 5. 10. 1995, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (Ned. IPR)
1996, 123, no. 94; Hof Arnheim 8. 4. 1997, Ned. IPR 1998, 112, no. 100.
179 Rb. Rotterdam 8. 3. 1996, Ned. IPR 1996, 584, no. 445.
180 It states: “La présente loi est applicable aux engagements conclus pour tout service à
accomplir à bord d’un navire français. Elle n’est pas applicable aux marins engagés en
France pour servir sur un navire étranger.”
181 It states: “I contratti di lavoro della gente del mare, del personale navigante della navigazione interna e del personale di volo sono regolati dalla legge nazionale della nave o dell’
aeromobile, salva, se la nave o l’ aeromobile è di nazionalità straniera, la diversa volontà delle
parti.”
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to an application of the law of the overseas territories where the secondary
ship registers are established.
111. Germany has created an international ship register which is not an alternative register but rather a supplement to the German ship register so that
ship owners may employ seamen domiciled outside the EC at conditions
below German standards. § 21 (4) FlaggRG,182 which is considered to be a
statutory interpretation of Article 30 EGBGB, i.e. the German incorporation
of Article 6 Rome Convention, states that the law applicable to employment
contracts of seamen without domicile or permanent residence in Europe on
ships registered in the International Ship Register cannot simply be determined by applying the law of the flag. Rather, courts determine the applicable law by applying the law of the country which has the closest connection
to the case.183
Choosing the law of the flag state as the relevant criterion
112. The foregoing survey shows that there is a need to introduce a special
conflicts rule for maritime employment contracts in order to enhance legal
certainty. It is clear that both criteria used in Article 6(2) Rome I-P and European court practice can be manipulated to establish artificial links. If the law
of the flag state is applied as the general rule, ship owners can choose a flag of
convenience for their vessels. If the law of the business through which the seaman was engaged is applied, employment agencies – so-called manning companies – can be deliberately incorporated in countries with lower protection
standards in order to engage crew members there.
113. Nonetheless, the Institute favours the flag state rule. This nexus serves
best the needs of legal certainty. It has the important advantage of being unambiguous, since the flying of two different flags is proscribed. Furthermore,
many courts in Europe apply this traditional rule. From a comparative perspective, the flag is the most widely used connecting factor in maritime private international law. Also, the public law provisions relating to maritime
employment, e.g., manning rules, are primarily based on the flag state principle. Finally, the structure of Article 6 Rome I-P supports this choice. Under
182 § 21(4) was inserted into the “Gesetz über das Flaggenrecht der Seeschiffe und die
Flaggenführung der Binnenschiffe” (FlaggRG) by Art. 1 No. 2 des “Gesetzes zur Einführung eines zusätzlichen Registers für Seeschiffe unter der Bundesflagge im internationalen Verkehr (Internationales Seeschiffahrtsregister – ISR)” of 23. 3. 1989 (BGBl. 1989 I
550). A revised version of the FlaggRG (as announced on 4. 7. 1990) can be found in BGBl.
1990 I 1342.
183 BAG 3. 5. 1995, IPRspr. 1995, no. 57. The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has held for cases concerning ships of second ship registers that, according to
§ 21(4) FlaggRG, the flag state rule cannot be applied, cf. BVerfG 10. 1. 1995, BVerfGE 92,
26 (39).
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Article 6(2) Rome I-P, priority is given to the habitual place of work, i.e. to a
connecting factor related to the employee and the factual environment of his
work, whereas the place where the contract is made is only of subsidiary significance. Since the ship can be considered as the place where crew members
habitually carry out their work, a connecting factor that is related to the ship,
such as the flag, should be relevant in accordance with Article 6(2)(a) Rome
I-P. Despite the fact that a ship crosses waters belonging to many different
countries, it can be connected with the country whose flag the ship flies.
114. Therefore, a subsection (c) should be added making the application of
the law of the flag state the general rule. This rule should also, in principle, be
applied to flags of convenience. If, however, the flag is the only connection to
the flag state, there may be a closer link to another state. In that case, the applicable law shall be identified in accordance with Article 6(3) Rome I-P.184
Courts then must apply the law of the country which has the closest connections to the employment contract. The criteria used to find the closest connection may be, inter alia, the nationality of the parties, the seat of the employer or the place where the contract was concluded.
115. There should be no special rules for secondary ship registers. Again,
the law of the flag state should be applicable unless the circumstances of the
case show that the contract as a whole is more closely connected with another
country. However, it should be left to the internal conflict rules of the flag
state to determine whether the employment standards of the overseas territory in which the special ship register was created or the rules of the “mother
country” should apply.
Minor changes concerning the escape clause
116. The Institute suggests minor changes in the wording of the present
Article 6(3) Rome I-P. Although a uniform interpretation of the Regulation
should be ensured by the ECJ, it seems advisable to emphasise that the rules
set forth in Article 6(2)(a) and (b) Rome I-P are to be disregarded in exceptional cases, where it is clear from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with another country. Further,
some minor stylistic changes are recommended which do not alter the content of the escape clause. Specifically, instead of “designated by paragraph 2”,
we suggest the wording “determined in accordance with paragraph 2”; and as
substitute for “may be excluded” we recommend the wording “may exceptionally not be applied”.

184 See LAG Baden-Württemberg 17. 7. 1980, IPRspr. 1980, no. 51: The German nationality of the economic shipowner and the seaman prevail over the law of Cyprus as the
flag state.
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Article 7 – Contracts concluded
by an agent

Article 7 – Contracts concluded
by an agent Voluntary agency

1. In the absence of a choice
under Article 3, a contract between
principal and agent shall be governed
by the law of the country in which
the agent has his habitual residence,
unless the agent exercises or is to
exercise his main activity in the
country in which the principal has
his habitual residence, in which case
the aw of that country shall apply.

1. In the absence of a choice
under Article 3, a A contract between principal and agent shall be
governed by the law of the country
in which the agent has his habitual
residence, unless the agent exercises
or is to exercise his main activity in
the country in which the principal
has his habitual residence, in which
case the law of that country shall
apply designated by Articles 3 to 6.
2. The relationship As between
the principal and third parties arising
out of the fact that the agent has
acted in the exercise of his powers, in
excess of his powers or without
power the existence and extent of the
agent’s powers and the effects of the
agent’s exercise or purported exercise of
his powers shall be governed by the
law of the country in which the
agent had his habitual residence
when he acted.
However, the applicable law shall
be the law of the country in which
the agent acted if either the principal
on whose behalf he acted or the third
party has his habitual residence in
that country

2. The relationship between the
principal and third parties arising out
of the fact that the agent has acted in
the exercise of his powers, in excess
of his powers or without power, shall
be governed by the law of the
country in which the agent had his
habitual residence when he acted.

However, the applicable law shall
be the law of the country in which
the agent acted if either the principal
on whose behalf he acted or the third
party has his habitual residence in
that country or the agent acted at an
exchange or auction.

a) the agent did not act in the course of
his trade or profession,
b) the third party neither knew nor
ought to have known the habitual
residence of the agent, or
c) the agent acted at an exchange
or auction.
For the purpose of this paragraph, an
employed agent who acts in his professional capacity but who has no personal
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3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2,
where the law applicable to a relationship covered by that paragraph
has been designated in writing by the
principal or the agent and expressly
accepted by the other party, the law
thus designated shall be applicable to
these matters.

4. The law designated by paragraph 2 shall also govern the relationship between the agent and the
third party arising from the fact that
the agent has acted in the exercise of
his powers, in excess of his powers or
without power.
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business establishment, shall be deemed
to have his habitual residence at the business establishment of the principal to
which he is attached, provided that the
third party knew or ought to have known
that the agent is attached to the principal’s
establishment.
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2,
where the law applicable to a relationship covered by that paragraph
has been designated in writing by the
principal or the agent third party and
expressly accepted by the other
party, the law thus designated shall
be applicable to these matters, provided that the agent knew or ought to
have known this designation.
4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and
3, to the extent that the subject matter of
the agency is a right in immovable
property the law of the country where the
immovable property is situated shall
apply to the matters covered by paragraph
2.
4. 5. The law designated by paragraphs 2 to 4 shall also govern the relationship between the agent and the
third party arising from the fact that
the agent has acted in the exercise of
his powers, in excess of his powers,
or without powers.

Summary
The Institute generally welcomes the introduction of a separate conflicts
rule on the law applicable to voluntary (or consensual) agency in Article 7
Rome I-P. A uniform provision eliminates the existing uncertainties in this
area of law and thus corresponds to the needs of international market transactions. While the basic concept of Article 7 Rome I-P is in line with the law of
many legal systems, there are several important deviations in detail entailing
impractical results. Therefore, the Institute recommends the following modifications of Article 7 Rome I-P:
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– The law applicable to the internal relationship between principal and
agent should be determined according to the general rules of Articles 3 to 6
Rome I-P (see infra nos. 117–119).
– The scope of Article 7(2) Rome I-P has to be redefined. The provision
should only apply to questions relating to the consequences of the agent’s acts
as to the validity of the main operation, i.e. the question whether the agent
was able to bind the principal vis-à-vis the third party, and should not determine the law governing the contract concluded by the agent as a whole.
Therefore, the heading of the article should also be clarified (see infra
nos. 120–122).
– In order to meet the sound expectations of international trade, the law of
the place where the agent acted (Article 7(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P) should
merely apply as a fall back rule in cases in which (a) the agent did not act in the
course of his trade or profession, (b) the habitual residence of the agent could
not reasonably be known by the third party, or (c) the agent acted at an exchange or auction (see infra nos. 123–129).
– A new provision on the authority of employed agents should be introduced into Article 7(2) Rome I-P (see infra no. 130).
– In order to avoid unreasonable discrepancies resulting from the application of two different laws to the same situation, the law chosen by the principal and the third party (Article 7(3) Rome I-P) should apply to the agent/
third party relation as well, provided that this choice could reasonably be
known by the agent. Article 7(3) and (4) Rome I-P have to be changed accordingly (see infra nos. 131–133).
– The wording of Article 7(3) Rome I-P should be changed to allow for an
implicit acceptance of a choice-of-law clause as already recognised in Article
3(1) 2nd sentence Rome I-P. Moreover, in the English language version the
word “agent” must be replaced by the term “third party” (see infra nos. 134–
136).
– A new paragraph dealing with the authority to affect rights in immovable
property should be inserted into Article 7 Rome I-P. Otherwise, mandatory
legal procedures required by the local land law could be seriously hampered
(see infra nos. 137–138).

Comments
Article 7(1) Rome I-P: The connecting factors as to the internal
relationship
117. Article 7(1) Rome I-P provides for a special regime for contracts between principal and agent. In the absence of a choice of law, their internal relationship is either governed by the law of the agent’s habitual residence, or by
the law of the principal’s habitual residence if the agent has to exercise its main
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activity in that latter country. This provision constitutes a departure from the
general conflicts rules of the Commission’s proposal contained in Articles 3–6
Rome I-P in two respects. First, party autonomy is not restricted irrespective
of the nature of the contract. Second, it contains a flexible objective connecting factor. The Commission argues that the adoption of a comprehensive
special regime for agency contracts as suggested in Article 7 Rome I-P has the
advantage of bringing together all the rules governing the legal relationship
arising from agency contracts in a single article.185
118. There are, however, several problems resulting from this proposal.
First of all, Article 7(1) Rome I-P does not distinguish between commercial
contracts on the one hand and consumer or employment contracts on the
other hand although many contracts between principal and agent will meet
the conditions of an employment contract or those of a consumer contract.
For instance, a consumer contract may occur when a person not acting in his
professional capacity appoints a foreign lawyer, a foreign estate agent, a
foreign insurance agent, a foreign investment counsel, etc.186 The scenario of
an employment contract arises when a foreign principal engages a permanent
agent who is dependent on the principal’s instructions.187 According to the
wording of Article 7(1) Rome I-P, free choice of law is possible even if these
contracts qualify as consumer contracts or employment contracts. Thus, consumers and employees could easily be deprived of the protection granted by
Articles 5 and 6 Rome I-P which is obviously contrary to their underlying
policy. Moreover, as regards consumers, they even cannot rely on the application of the law of their habitual residence in the absence of a choice-of-law
clause because the contract will generally be localised at the agent’s, i.e. the
professional’s, habitual residence by virtue of Article 7(1) Rome I-P.
Furthermore, this provision may give rise to difficult problems of characterisation because, different from Article 7(1) Rome I-P, Article 4(1) Rome
I-P stipulates fixed and inflexible rules. If, e.g., a principal grants authority to
a foreign agent in the context of a contract for the provision of services or a
distribution contract and if the agent has to exercise its main activity in the
country in which the principal has his habitual residence, Article 7(1) Rome
I-P points to the law of that country whereas the law of the agent’s habitual
residence shall apply according to Article 4(1)(a) or (h) Rome I-P. It is unclear
whether one of the two provisions is supposed to prevail or whether there
shall be a dépeçage, i.e. some parts of the contract will be submitted to the law
determined by Article 7(1) Rome I-P while the rest will be governed by the
law designated by Article 4(1)(a) or (h) Rome I-P.188
Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 7.
Cf., e.g., Dicey/Morris (supra n. 176) no. 33–404; Münch. Komm. BGB (-Martiny)
(supra n. 48) Art. 29 EGBGB, no. 18 seq.
187 Dicey/Morris (supra n. 176) no. 33–405.
188 See supra no. 55 (comment on Article 4).
185
186
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119. Yet, such inconsistent results can readily be avoided by a rephrasing of
Article 7(1) Rome I-P: A contract between two persons appointing one of
them as the agent of the other constitutes a normal contractual agreement.
Therefore, the general conflicts regime for contractual obligations, viz. Articles 3 to 6 Rome I-P, can be applied to these agreements without difficulty.
This has always been the solution under the Rome Convention189 and there is
no obvious reason to change this approach. If necessary, the purpose of giving
guidance to the courts as regards the law governing the internal relationship
can be fully served by an explicit reference to the law designated by Articles 3
to 6 Rome I-P in Article 7(1) Rome I-P. In case the Commission wants to
adopt a flexible conflicts rule as to the internal relationship this end would be
achieved more appropriately by the (re)introduction of flexible presumptions
and/or an escape clause190 in Article 4 Rome I-P.191 For these reasons, the Institute recommends rephrasing Article 7(1) Rome I-P and making an explicit
reference to Articles 3 to 6 Rome I-P.
Article 7(2) Rome I-P: The objective connecting factors as to the
external relationship
The scope of the law applicable to the external relationship
120. According to Article 7(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P, “the relationship between the principal and third parties arising out of the fact that the agent has
acted in the exercise of his powers [...] shall be governed by the law of the
country in which the agent had his habitual residence when he acted”. The
principal/third party relationship created by the agent’s acts will usually be a
normal contract whose applicable law has to be determined according to Articles 3 to 6 Rome I-P.
121. However, the wording of Article 7(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P is at least
misleading in this respect: For instance, assume that principal P situated in
country X confers authority to agent A who has his business establishment in
country Y. A concludes in country Y a sales contract on behalf of P according
to which P has to deliver goods to third party T. In this scenario, A acts in
exercise of his powers and creates a legal relationship between P and T, i.e. a
contract of sale. Consequently, pursuant to their respective wordings, Article
4(1)(a) Rome I-P as well as Article 7(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P would apply to
189 See Giuliano/Lagarde (supra n. 75) 13; Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green
Paper Rome I, p. 92; this fact is also recognised by the Commission, cf. Rome I-P
COM(2005) 650 final, p. 7.
190 See further supra nos. 42–57 (comment on Article 4).
191 Under the Rome Convention the situations addressed in Article 7(1) Rome I-P fell
within the scope of Article 4(5) Rome Convention, cf., e.g., Hoge Raad 1. 11. 1991, Ned.
IPR 1993, 241, 242; Verhagen, Agency in Private International Law (1995) 197; Dicey/
Morris (supra n. 176) nos. 33–401.
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this situation simultaneously. A possible interpretation of the Rome I-P
would be that the law of the seller’s habitual residence (law X) would govern
the contract of sale if it was concluded by the seller personally, while the same
contract would be subject to the law of the agent’s habitual residence (law Y)
if it was made through an agent. With regard to consumers and employees,
the same problems already mentioned in the context of Article 7 (1) Rome IP also result from Article 7(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P.192 Finally, the current
drafting of Article 7(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P has the effect that a possible
choice of law for the contract arranged by A between P and T would have to
meet a higher formal standard (written form, express acceptance, cf. 7(3)
Rome I-P) compared to a contract concluded personally (no written form,
implied acceptance, cf. Article 3(1) 2nd sentence Rome I-P). In summary, it
neither makes sense to subject a normal contractual obligation to the law designated by Article 7(2) Rome I-P nor to require the special formal standards
of Article 7 (3) Rome I-P as to party autonomy just because this contract was
negotiated through an agent.
122. It is likely that Article 7(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P is essentially intended to only cover the question whether the agent was actually able to bind
the principal vis-à-vis the third party and to address other related issues of voluntary agency whereas the main contract as such should be subject to its own
governing law. This interpretation would be in line with all legal systems
which already have a separate conflicts rule on the law applicable to the authority of an agent.193 In order to clarify the true scope of Article 7(2)-(4)
Rome I-P, the wording of Article 7(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P has to be

See supra no. 118.
Cf., e.g., Argentina, France, the Netherlands, Portugal: Article 11(1) Hague Agency
Convention of 1978: “As between the principal and the third party, the existence and extent of the agent’s authority and the effects of the agent’s exercise or purported exercise of
his authority shall be governed by [...]”; Austria/Liechtenstein: Article 49(1) IPRG/Article 53(1) IPRG: “Die Voraussetzungen und die Wirkungen der gewillkürten Stellvertretung im Verhältnis des Geschäftsherrn und des Stellvertreters zum Dritten sind nach dem
Recht zu beurteilen [...]”; Switzerland: Article 126(2) IPRG: “Die Voraussetzungen,
unter denen eine Handlung des Vertreters den Vertretenen gegenüber dem Dritten verpflichtet, unterstehen [...]”; Italy: Article 60(1) 1st sentence legge 31. 5. 1995, no. 218: “La
rappresentanza volontaria è regolata [...]”; Spain: Article 10(11) Código civil (C.c.): “A la
representación legal se aplicará [...] y a la voluntaria [...]”; Belgium: Article 108 1st sentence
Code de droit international privé (CDIP): “La question de savoir si un intermédiaire peut
représenter envers les tiers la personne pour le compte de laquelle il prétend agir est régie
[...]”; Québec: Article 3116 Code civil (C.c. Québec): “L’existence et l’étendue des pouvoirs du représentant dans ses relations avec un tiers, ainsi que les conditions auxquelles sa
responsabilité ou celle du représenté peut être engagée, sont régies [...]”; Portugal: Article
39(1) Código civil (C.c.) (replaced by the Hague Agency Convention of 1978, a similar
provision still applies in Angola and Mozambique): “A representação voluntaria é regulada,
quando à [...]”.
192
193
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changed accordingly. For the same reasons, the current heading of Article 7
Rome I-P ought to be replaced by “voluntary agency”.
The relevance of the habitual residence of a non-professional agent
123. Issues relating to voluntary agency are governed by the law of the habitual residence of the agent (cf. Article 7(2) 1st sentence Rome I-P). The
agent’s habitual residence is deemed to be at the place of his business establishment if he acts in the course of his trade or profession (cf. Article 18 Rome IP). Applying the law of the place of business of the professional agent is a
sound and sensible solution which particularly meets the needs of international trade.194 This place constitutes a fixed criterion which is easily perceptible both to the principal and the third party, and which can be readily operated in practice. That is why the connecting factor of the agent’s business establishment is commonly accepted in most legal systems.195
124. At present, however, not a single national law provides for the application of the law of the habitual residence of an agent who does not act in his
professional capacity.196 This can be explained by the fact that, contrary to his
business establishment, the habitual residence of a non-professional agent is
not linked to his permanent economic activity. Accordingly, the place of the
habitual residence has little (if any) relevance with regard to the agent’s authority. The personal habitual residence of the agent may be chosen for purely
private reasons such that this criterion appears to be quite fortuitous. In particular, the private habitual residence of the agent will not normally be easily
perceptible for third parties. Moreover, outside the ambit of Article 18 Rome
I-P, the legal concept of habitual residence is extremely flexible and allows for
the balancing of various factors, in particular private circumstances. Thus, a
choice-of-law provision based on this concept does not cater to the basic purpose of a separate conflicts rule on the tripartite setting of agency, i.e. the need

See Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 95.
Argentina, France, the Netherlands, Portugal: Article 11(1) Hague Agency Convention of 1978; Italy: Article 60(1) legge 31. 5. 1995, no. 218; Rumania: Article 95 I legea
105/92; Switzerland: Article 126(2) IPRG; Austria: Article 49(2) IPRG (cf. OGH 21. 2.
1985, ZRvgl. 28 [1987] 53 [62]; 11. 10. 1995, SZ 68/181 [415]; 22. 10. 2001, SZ 74/177
[366]); Liechtenstein: Article 53(2) IPRG (literally the same as Article 49(2) Austrian
IPRG); Germany: cf. BGH 26. 4. 1990 IPRspr. 1990, no. 25 = NJW 1990, 3088; Korea:
Article 18(2) Gukjesabeob; Portugal: Article 39(3) C.c. (replaced by the Hague Agency
Convention of 1978, a similar provision still applies in Angola and Mozambique).
196 Indeed, according to Article 108 2nd sentence of the Belgian CDIP it is deemed that
the agent has acted in the country in which he has his habitual residence. Yet, it flows from
Article 108 1st sentence that the decisive connecting factor is the place of acting rather than
the habitual residence, and that Article 108 2nd sentence only contains a rebuttable presumption.
194
195
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for legal certainty.197 Therefore, the Institute strongly recommends applying
simply the law of the place of acting (lex loci actus) rather than the law of the
agent’s private habitual residence in cases in which the agent did not act in the
course of his trade or profession.198
The third party’s unawareness of the agent’s habitual residence
125. The lex loci actus should also apply in cases in which the agent acted
in his professional capacity but the third party was not and could not reasonably be aware of the agent’s habitual residence (more precisely: his business establishment, cf. Article 18 Rome I-P). In these cases it would be unfair to
third parties to apply the law of the agent’s place of business because they
would not have had a chance to ascertain the true scope of the agent’s authority.199 Nonetheless, under the proposed Article 7(2) Rome I-P such a
situation may arise in fact when the agent acts in a third state which is neither
the country of the principal’s habitual residence nor that of the third party’s
habitual residence.
126. Such a setting may occur, for instance, at an international trade fair.
Assume that an Italian commercial agent negotiates car supply contracts with
French and Spanish customers at the international motor show in Geneva/
Switzerland, or that a Dutch agent of a software company is supposed to sell
computer programs to various European clients at the CeBIT fair in Hannover/Germany. Assume further that the agent does not disclose the place of
his business establishment (Italy, the Netherlands) during the negotiations and
finalises the whole transaction at the place of the trade fair. In this fact pattern,
the application of Italian or Dutch agency law as prescribed by Article 7(2) 1st
sentence Rome I-P comes as a surprise to the third parties. In the absence of
any other perceptible connecting factor, the trading partners will rather have
relied on the lex loci actus (Swiss or German law respectively) as the law governing the existence and the extent of the agent’s authority. Consequently,
the application of the lex loci actus should primarily depend on whether the
third party could reasonably be expected to know the agent’s business establishment rather than on the question whether the agent acted in the country
of the third party or the principal.200

See Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 92 seq.
See further infra nos. 125–126.
199 See Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 95.
200 Cf., e.g., the existing provisions in Italy: Article 60(1) 1st sentence legge 31. 5. 1995,
no. 218; Switzerland: Article 126(2) IPRG; Liechtenstein: Article 53(2) IPRG; Austria:
§ 49 (2) IPRG; Korea: Article 18(2) Gukjesabeob; for Germany see BGH 26. 4. 1990 (supra
n. 195); Portugal: Article 39(3) C.c. (replaced by the Hague Agency Convention of 1978, a
similar provision still applies in Angola and Mozambique). See further infra nos. 127–129.
197
198

306

max planck institute

RabelsZ

The precedence of the agent’s business establishment over the place of acting
127. The main rationale underlying the connecting factor of the agent’s
place of business is that it provides legal certainty to each of the three parties
involved in the agency situation. As this criterion is usually easily perceptible
both for the principal and for the third party, they can readily ascertain the law
applicable to the agent’s authority right from the beginning of the business
contact. Consequently, they can check (or limit) the actual scope of the
powers of the agent before the contract is concluded. Furthermore, the application of the law of the agent’s business establishment to voluntary agency accounts for the fact that professional agents play a crucial role in international
commercial practice and that their authority should be subject to a single law
with which they are familiar, provided that legitimate interests of third parties
are not prejudiced.201
128. Yet, under the Commission’s proposal the place of acting becomes the
most important connecting factor: By virtue of Article 7(2) 2nd sentence
Rome I-P, the lex loci actus always takes precedence if the agent either acts in
the country of the principal or in that of the third party. One might argue that
at least the second rule can be justified by the consideration that the agent
travels to the third party so that the latter should be able to rely on his “home
territory”.202 It is to be borne in mind, however, that counterparties negotiating with professional agents from foreign countries usually qualify as experienced business people who ought to be aware of the possibility of as well as
the dangers linked to the application of a foreign law to cross-border transactions. Foreign law may apply, e.g., to the main contract concluded through
the agent (cf. Articles 3 seq. Rome I-P), to the authority of a legal representative of a company (which has to be determined according to the lex societatis), or to an authority of an agent acting in a situation where the agent and
the third party are in different countries and the contract is concluded by
means of telecommunication (in such cases the agent’s authority is either subject to the law of the place where the agent actually executes the relevant acts,
or more generally to the law of his business establishment, cf., e.g., Article 13
of the Hague Agency Convention of 1978). Thus, the reasoning of having to
protect a third party’s reliance on the application of their own law when the
agent acts in their country does not seem to be compelling.203

201

See also supra no. 123 and Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I,

p. 95.
202 Cf. Karsten, Explanatory Report, in: Actes et documents de la Treizième session 4 au
23 octobre 1976, IV: Contrats d’intermédiaires/Agency (1979) 378 (427) no. 211.
203 In the same sense, e.g., OGH 21. 2. 1985, 55 and 62; 22. 10. 2001, 366 (both supra
n. 195).
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129. Most importantly, the solution suggested by the Commission entails
unsound results in common, international commercial transactions as may be
shown by the following examples:
First of all, this is true for an authority which shall be exercised vis-à-vis different counterparties but concerns the same type of transactions or negotiations.204 The trade fairs mentioned above205 can serve as examples. If the Commission’s proposal applied to these situations, the authority of the Dutch
agent at the CeBIT fair in Hannover would have to be determined according
to German law when the agent deals with a German client (cf. Article 7(2)
2nd sentence Rome I-P) while the agent’s powers would be subject to Dutch
law (cf. 7(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P) when negotiating with counterparties
from other countries. The same problem would arise when, e.g., a German
company appoints a German law firm to sell parts of the company’s business
to foreign investors. Assume that the law firm arranges a meeting with
possible buyers from several countries in London. Pursuant to Article 7(2)
Rome I-P, the power of the lawyers to negotiate on behalf of the German
company would depend on English law with regard to third parties situated in
England (cf. Article 7(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P), and on German law with
regard to all other participants in the meeting (cf. Article 7(2) 1st sentence
Rome I-P). In a variant of this scenario one might imagine that a Luxembourg bank has been mandated by a client to arrange a syndicated loan in
London or Zurich. In each of these common fact patterns the agent is supposed to effect the same types of negotiations, at the same place, and at the
same time. Hence, a sensible solution would have been to apply the same law
to the agent’s powers, i.e. the law of the business establishment of the agent
(on condition that the business establishment could reasonably be known by
the third party). By virtue of Article 7(2) Rome I-P, however, the law applicable to the authority would inevitably have to be split. This outcome is
clearly contrary to the sound expectations of the parties involved and consequently of the business world as a whole.
Secondly, the solution laid down in Article 7(2) Rome I-P is impractical in
the case of ongoing business relations between principals and third parties
which are mediated by a permanent agent. Assume that the agent initially
travelled to the third party where he concluded the first contract. This constituted the beginning of a longstanding business relationship. Some of the
following transactions are arranged at the agent’s place of business, others at
the principal’s place of business, and again others at the third party’s place of
204 See with regard to Article 11(2) Hague Agency Convention of 1978 Hay/MüllerFreienfels, Agency in the Conflict of Laws and the 1978 Hague Convention: Am. J. Comp.
L. 27 (1979) 1 (46); Verhagen (supra n. 191) 295 seq.; cf. also Ruthig, Vollmacht und Rechtsschein im IPR (1996) 136 seq.; Rueda Valdivia, La representación voluntaria en la contratación internacional (1998) 189 seq.
205 See supra no. 126.
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business. The Commission’s proposal leads to a constant change of the law applicable to the agent’s authority in such cases. Again, this consequence does
not seem to cater to the sound expectations of business practice.
Finally, the solution embodied in Article 7(2) Rome I-P is unsuited to
cases in which the agent acts on behalf of both sides when forming a contract.206 It is hardly understandable why the agent’s powers should be subject
to the law of principal A if the agent acts in this country while the law of principal B should prevail if the agent concludes the contract in the latter country.
A more convincing solution would be applying the law of the business establishment of the agent as a compromise because both parties have chosen this
intermediary. Consequently, this law is equally foreseeable for both of them.
In summary, the connecting factor of the habitual residence of an agent
who acts in the course of his trade or profession, i.e. his business establishment
(cf. Article 18 Rome I-P), should always prevail if the agent’s business establishment could reasonably be known by the third party.207 This would also
correspond to the law as it stands in many legal systems today.208 Thus, the Institute suggests adjusting Article 7(2) 2nd sentence Rome I-P accordingly.
The assimilation of employed agents and self-employed agents
130. Employed agents are of considerable commercial importance. Strictly
speaking, many of them will not have a business establishment of their own.209
However, they perform a permanent economic activity on behalf of a principal which is at least comparable to that of self-employed agents. In fact, in
commercial reality employed agents serve as the “alter ego” of the principal.210 Such employees are typically attached to a particular business establishment of the employer where they receive their instructions, coordinate their
work and to which they are bound by virtue of their contract of employment.
206 See with regard to the Hague Agency Convention of 1978 Verhagen (supra n. 191)
293 seq.
207 See Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 95.
208 Italy: Article 60(1) 1st sentence legge 31. 5. 1995, no. 218; Switzerland: Article 126(2)
IPRG; Korea: Article 18(2) Gukjesabeob; Austria: § 49(2) IPRG (cf. OGH 21. 2. 1985, at
55, 62; 22. 10. 2001, 366 [both supra n. 195]); Liechtenstein: Article 53(2) IPRG; Portugal:
Article 39(3) C.c. (replaced by the Hague Agency Convention of 1978, a similar provision
still applies in Angola and Mozambique); for Germany see OLG Frankfurt 11. 7. 1985,
IPRspr. 1985, no. 21 = IPRax 1986, 373 (375); LG Bielefeld 23. 6. 1989, IPRspr. 1989,
no. 32 = IPRax 1990, 315 (316); Reithmann/Martiny (-Hausmann) no. 2444; Staudinger
(-Magnus) Einl. zu Art. 27–37 EGBGB, no. A 26; Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht5
(2004) 302.
209 According to the Commission’s understanding of Article 18 Rome I-P, only persons
exercising a liberal profession or a business activity in a self-employed capacity have an “establishment” of their own. This follows from the Explanatory Memorandum of the 2003
Rome II proposal, COM(2003) 427 final (supra n. 5) p. 27.
210 Karsten (supra n. 202) 400, no. 78.
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When performing their services on behalf of the principal, employed agents
will regularly disclose the principal’s identity as well as the fact that they work
for this principal on a permanent basis at the beginning of the negotiations.
Thus, third parties will be in a position to foresee the fact that the agent is attached to the principal’s business establishment and that his authority is subject to the law of that place. Hence, employed agents ought to be equated
with self-employed agents. A corresponding provision exists in several countries211 and should also be introduced into the future Rome I Regulation. To a
certain extent, such a rule would synchronise the law governing the authority
of employed agents with the law applicable to the powers of the legal representatives of a corporate body, i.e. the lex societatis. As a result, it will
usually make no difference concerning the applicable law whether a managing employee or a director of a company concludes a contract on behalf of
the corporate body. For these reasons, the Institute recommends inserting a
third sentence into Article 7(2) Rome I-P dealing with employed agents.
Article 7(3) Rome I-P: The subjective connecting factor as
to the external relationship
The scope of the law chosen by the parties
131. According to the wording of Article 7(3) and (4) Rome I-P, a possible
choice of law for the agent’s authority only affects the legal relationship between principal and third party whereas the agent/third party relation always
has to be determined according to the objective connecting factors of Article
7(2) Rome I-P. As a consequence, two different laws can apply to the same
situation which might result in difficult problems:212
Assume that principal P grants authority to agent A who is supposed to
travel to third party T to conclude a contract. P is established in country X
while T is established in country Y. The parties agree that law X shall apply to
the agent’s authority. Assume further that A actually exceeds his authority
when agreeing on the precise terms of the contract concluded with T. Pursuant to Article 7(3) Rome I-P, the question whether A was nonetheless able
to bind P vis-à-vis T, e.g., as a result of apparent authority, has to be decided
according to law X. Yet, the question whether A can be held liable by T as
211 Cf. Argentina, France, the Netherlands, Portugal: Article 12 Hague Agency Convention of 1978; Switzerland: Article 126(3) IPRG; Korea: Article 18(3) Gukjesabeob;
Austria: § 49(2) IPRG (cf. OGH 21. 2. 1985, 55, 62; 11. 10. 1995, 415 [both supra n. 195]);
Luxembourg: Article 53 IPRG (literally the same as § 49(2) Austrian IPRG); for Germany
see OLG Frankfurt 8. 7. 1969, IPRspr. 1968/69, no. 21 = AWD 1969, 415; 11. 7. 1985
(supra n. 208), IPRax 1986, 373 (375); LG Bielefeld 23. 6. 1989 (supra n. 208), IPRax
1990, 315 (316); Reithmann/Martiny (-Hausmann) no. 2443; Kropholler (supra n. 208) 302
seq.
212 See also Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 97.
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falsus procurator has to be answered by law Y (cf. Article 7(4) Rome I-P).
Clearly, these two questions are closely connected with each other and should
be subject to a single law. What would happen, e.g., if law X decides that A’s
acts did not bind P because A exceeded his powers while law Y states that A
acted within his (apparent) authority? The outcome of the Commission’s
proposal seems to be that T has no debtor at all. The opposite scenario might
occur as well: Inadvertently, T is entitled to proceed against two debtors. Obviously, such inconsistencies have to be avoided.
For this reason, the law chosen by the principal and third party has to apply
to the agent/third party relation as well.213 Hence, Article 7(4) Rome I-P
should refer not only to para. 2 but also to para. 3 (as well as to the new rule
concerning immovable property).
132. A consequence of the proposed change is that the choice of law between principal and third party as to the agent’s authority can also affect legitimate interests of the agent, viz. his possible liability as falsus procurator.
Therefore, this choice should only be valid if it could reasonably be known by
the agent.
133. In the context of Article 7(4) Rome I-P, a remark with regard to the
Rome II proposal has to be made. Its recital 16 states: “Special rules should be
laid down for non-contractual obligations arising from unjust enrichment
and agency without authority.”214 Consequently, the Rome II-AP seems to
cover the aforementioned case as well, i.e. the liability of the falsus procurator.
However, one can infer from the German (“Geschäftsführung ohne Auftrag”) and French (“gestion d’affaires”) language versions that the recital is
meant to address the issue of negotiorum gestio. In order to prevent misunderstandings, the wording of recital 16 Rome II-AP should be changed accordingly.215
The possibility of an implied acceptance of the choice of law
134. The Commission’s proposal advocates a bilateral choice of law between principal and third party with regard to the law governing the agent’s
213 This is expressly laid down in the corresponding provisions in Argentina, France, the
Netherlands, Portugal (cf. Article 15 Hague Agency Convention of 1978), and Rumania
(cf. Article 100 legea 105/92). Implicitly, this is also recognised in Austria (cf. OGH 22. 10.
2001 [supra n. 195] 365 seq.), Spain (cf. Derecho International Privado5, ed. by Caravaca/
Carrascosa González II [2004] 632 et seq.; Rueda Valdivia [supra n. 204] 152 seq.), and Germany (cf. OLG Karlsruhe 8. 5. 1998, IPRspr. 1998, no. 27 = MDR 1998, 1470; Staudinger
[-Magnus] Einl zu Art. 27–37 EGBGB, no. A 12; Reithmann/Martiny [-Hausmann]
no. 2436).
214 Cf. Rome II-AP (supra n. 7) p. 11.
215 It has been suggested to implement the term “benevolent intervention of another’s
affaires” as English term for negotiorum gesto, cf. Principles of European Law on Benevolent Intervention in Another’s Affairs (PEL Ben. Int.), ed. by v. Bar (2006) 53.
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powers (cf. Article 7(3) Rome I-P). By contrast, the Institute favoured in its
former proposal a unilateral determination of the applicable law by the principal, provided that the third party and the agent were or could reasonably be
aware of this designation.216 This latter solution is already implemented in several jurisdictions.217 In favour of a unilateral approach one can argue that it is
fully in line with the legal concept of voluntary agency in substantive law: In
every legal system the principal grants the authority and determines its extent
without participation of the third party.218 It is difficult to see why this should
be different in the conflict of laws.
135. However, if one wants to stick to the bilateral concept, at least an implicit acceptance of the choice of law should be allowed: Assume that an agent
travels to country X and presents to the third party a written proxy expressly
stating that the authority is subject to law Y. Hence, the third party is fully
aware of the principal’s intention as to the choice of law. If the third party does
not object expressly but negotiates a contract with the agent, there is no need
to protect the third party by applying law X to the authority. Rather, one
should interpret the behaviour of the third party as an implied acceptance of
the choice-of-law clause in favour of law Y. Otherwise, Article 7(3) Rome IP seems to be deprived of any practical significance – from the perspective of
the principal at least. In order to allow such an implied acceptance, the term
“expressly” should be deleted in Article 7(3) Rome I-P.219
136. A final amendment which is necessary applies to the English language
version only: The word “agent” in Article 7(3) Rome I-P has to be replaced
by the term “third party”. This would correspond to the German and French
language versions. The contractual choice of the law applicable to agency is
made by agreement between the principal and the third party who are affected by the extent of the agent’s powers.
The additional connecting factor as to authorities relating
to immovable property
137. The Commission’s proposal does not provide for a special provision as
to an authority whose subject matter is a right in immovable property. Thus,
free choice of law would be possible with regard to these types of authority
See Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 93 seq.
Cf. Austria: § 49(1) IPRG; Liechtenstein: Article 53(1) IPRG; Spain: Article 10(11)
C.c. (cf. Derecho Internacional Privado [supra n. 213] 632); Korea: Article 18(4) Gukjesabeob; for Germany see Reithmann/Martiny (-Hausmann) no. 2436; Staudinger (-Magnus)
Einl. zu Art. 27–37 EGBGB, no. A 12; Kropholler (supra n. 208) 303.
218 Possibly with the consent of the agent.
219 This would correspond even to legal systems following a bilateral construction, cf.,
e.g., Rumania: Article 95 I legea 105/92 and Switzerland: Article 126(2) in connection
with Article 116(2) IPRG.
216
217
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(cf. Article 7(3) Rome I-P). Moreover, even the objective connecting factors
for the agent’s authority laid down in Article 7(2) Rome I-P might point to a
country other than the country in which the property is situated. This would
be the case, for instance, when a German principal appoints a German estate
agent to sell the principal’s holiday apartment in Austria to a third party not
situated in Austria. In this case, the agent’s power to transfer the apartment
would have to be determined under Article 7(2) Rome I-P according to a law
different from the law governing the transfer itself because the latter is commonly subjected to the lex rei sitae, i.e. the law of the country in which the
property is situated.
138. Yet, many countries have implemented a special legal regime with regard to the transfer or change of rights in immovable property. Regularly, this
regime is mandatory and provides for special procedural requirements before
public authorities. Often, a legal title relating to immovable property is only
effective vis-à-vis third parties when it is registered in an official land register.220 The purpose of these regimes is to enhance legal certainty to the greatest possible extent and to protect third parties as well as the legal owner.221
Against this background, it is hardly conceivable that the registrar would accept an authority subjected to a foreign law with the inevitable uncertainties
resulting from it.222 If constrained to do so by a future Rome I Regulation, the
registrar would insist on a potentially time-consuming documentation of
foreign agency law, and the transaction would not be finalised until he was satisfied with the proof of foreign law. For these reasons, it would be more appropriate to apply the lex rei sitae not only to the transfer of a right in immovable property but also to an authority which is supposed to effect such a transfer or change. Thus, the introduction of a corresponding conflicts rule, as is
already the case in many legal systems,223 seems reasonable.
220 Such a system is adopted, e.g., in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Australia, Canada,
England, Greece, Turkey, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and (partly) Poland, cf. the comprehensive comparative surveys in Böhringer, Comparison of the Land Registry System in
Central Europe with Other Forms of Property Law: Introduction to the Basic Features of
Central European Land Registry Law and Apartment Ownership: Notarius International 2
(1997) 166 (169 seq.); Reithmann/Martiny (-Limmer) no. 1013 seq.; v. Hoffmann, Das Recht
des Grundstückkaufs (1982) 29 seq.
221 See Böhringer (previous note) 174.
222 See Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 95.
223 Cf. Rumania: Article 100 legea 105/92; Portugal: Article 39 (4) C.c. (replaced by the
Hague Agency Convention of 1978, a similar provision still applies in Angola and Mozambique); for Austria cf. Rummel (-Schwimann), Kommentar zum Allgemeinen Bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuch II (1992) § 49 IPRG, no. 5; for Germany cf. RG 18. 10. 1935, RGZ 149, 93
(94) = IPRspr. 1935–44, no. 153; OLG München 10. 3. 1988, IPRspr. 1988, no. 15 =
IPRax 1990, 320 (322); Staudinger (-Magnus) Einl. zu Art. 27–37 EGBGB, no. A 30; Kropholler (supra n. 208) 303; for Switzerland cf. Vischer/Huber/Oser, Internationales Vertragsrecht2 (2000) no. 1023; Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG2 (-Keller/Girsberger) (2004)
Art. 126, no. 35; for Spain cf. Rueda Valdivia (supra n. 204) 319 seq.
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Article 8 – Mandatory rules

Article 8 – Internationally
mandatory rules

1. Mandatory rules are rules the
respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its
political, social or economic organisation to such an extent that they are
applicable to any situation falling
within their scope, irrespective of
the law otherwise applicable to the
contract under this Regulation.

1. Internationally mandatory rules
are rules the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country or the
Community for safeguarding its political, social or economic organisation to such an extent that they are
applicable to any situation falling
within their scope, irrespective of
the law otherwise applicable to the
contract under this Regulation.
2. Nothing in this Regulation
shall restrict the application of the
rules of the law of the forum in a
situation where they are internationally mandatory.
3. Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the internationally
mandatory rules contained in European
Regulations nor the application of Member State rules which implement internationally mandatory European Directives.
In the latter case, the provisions of the relevant Directive apply as implemented in
the domestic law of the forum.
4. The internationally mandatory
rules of the law governing the contract
under this Regulation apply to the contract if they so demand.
3. 5. Effect may be given to the internationally mandatory rules of the law
of another country with which the
situation has a close connection. In
considering whether to give effect to
these internationally mandatory rules,
courts shall have regard to their nature
and purpose in accordance with the
definition in paragraph 1 and to the
consequences of their application or
non-application for the objective
pursued by the relevant internationally
mandatory rules and for the parties.

2. Nothing in this Regulation
shall restrict the application of the
rules of the law of the forum in a
situation where they are mandatory.

3. Effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another
country with which the situation has
a close connection. In considering
whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, courts shall have regard
to their nature and purpose in accordance with the definition in paragraph 1 and to the consequences of
their application or non-application
for the objective pursued by the relevant mandatory rules and for the
parties.
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Summary
The Institute generally endorses the Commission’s proposal for Article 8
Rome I-P. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, the Institute considers some
changes necessary:
– As in the French and German version of the Commission’s proposal, the
mandatory rules dealt with in Articles 3(4), 3(5) and 6 Rome I-P should be
clearly distinguished from the internationally mandatory rules protected by Article 8 (see infra no. 141).
– Article 8(1) Rome I-P and a new Article 8(3) should clarify that internationally mandatory provisions of Community law should, like those of the lex
fori, prevail over the law designated by Articles 3 to 7, 9 and 10 Rome I-P (see
infra nos. 142–144).
– As there is uncertainty under the Rome Convention whether the internationally mandatory provisions of the law governing the contract apply, an
added Article 8(5) should make clear that they do, if they so demand (see infra
no. 145).
Comments
Overview of the proposal
139. Article 8 Rome I-P addresses the application of internationally mandatory rules as defined in Article 8(1) Rome I-P. So far, it is confined to internationally mandatory rules of the lex fori (Article 8(2) Rome I-P) and of third
states (Article 8(3) Rome I-P). The Institute, in general, endorses the approach taken by the Commission.224 It explicitly welcomes the definition in
Article 8(1) Rome I-P being based upon the ECJ’s reasoning in its Arblade
judgment which refers to the crucial importance of internationally mandatory provisions for safeguarding the political, social or economic order of the
State in question.225 A definition of internationally mandatory provisions, although shaped in very general terms, is necessary as guidance for the national
courts to ensure a uniform application of Article 8 Rome I-P.
140. The Institute further shares the view that, as under Article 7(1) Rome
Convention, the courts must not only apply the internationally mandatory
rules of the forum state, but may give that effect also to such rules of third
states. Even those Member States which filed reservations under Article
22(1)(a) Rome Convention and did not accept the recognition of foreign
mandatory rules pursuant to Article 7(1) Rome Convention take into account foreign internationally mandatory rules. They do so on the basis of
Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 69 seq.
ECJ 23. 11. 1999 – joined cases C-369/96 and C- 376/96 (Arblade), E.C.R. 1999, I8453, para. 30.
224
225
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their domestic private international law which, in effect, does not render results other than Article 7(1) Rome Convention or the now proposed Article
8(3) Rome I-P would have yielded.226
Reference to “internationally” mandatory rules
141. Despite its general approval the Institute advocates certain amendments of Article 8 Rome I-P for reasons of clarification. As outlined above in
connection with Article 3(4) Rome I-P, Article 8 Rome I-P deals only with
internationally mandatory rules and not with mandatory provisions in the
wider sense of Articles 3(4), 3(5) and 6 Rome I-P.227 The wording of Article 8
Rome I-P should reflect this difference. It is confusing and possibly misleading if both Article 3(4) Rome I-P and Article 8 Rome I-P define mandatory
rules without further qualifications, but in fact relate to different types of provisions. Thus, a distinction should be made as, for example, in the French and
German versions of the Commission’s proposal which refer in Article 3(4)
Rome I-P to “dispositions impératives” and “zwingende Bestimmungen” and in
Article 8 Rome I-P to “lois de police” and to “Eingriffsnormen”. As a consequence, the heading and wording of Article 8 Rome I-P should refer to internationally mandatory rules rather than mandatory rules.
Article 8(3) Rome I-P: Internationally mandatory rules
of Community law
142. As already seen, the Commission is committed to specifically protect
internationally mandatory provisions of Community law as was done, for
example, by the ECJ in its Ingmar decision.228 However, as pointed out above,
Article 8 Rome I-P should provide this protection rather than Article 3(5)
Rome I-P.229
143. In the first place, one could even question whether a special provision
for the protection of internationally mandatory rules of Community law is
necessary at all. To the extent that provisions of Community law explicitly
claim international application regardless of the law governing the contract,
those provisions might already take precedence over the choice of law rules
contained in the Regulation according to Article 22 Rome I-P. If, though,
the international applicability is not ruled out explicitly, such Community
law is at least part of the lex fori and thus already protected by Article 8(2)
226

See the references in Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 71

seq.
227
228
229

See supra no. 29 (comment on Article 3).
ECJ 9. 11. 2000 (supra n. 58).
See supra no. 41 (comment on Article 3).
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Rome I-P.230 Hence, for example, in a recent decision on the application of
certain provisions implementing the Consumer Credit Directive231 the German Bundesgerichtshof took for granted that, in principle, internationally
mandatory rules derived from Community law can be protected by Article
7(2) Rome Convention, i.e. the current Article 8(2) Rome I-P, if the parties
choose the law of a non-Member State.232 Furthermore, Article 13 Rome IIAP addressing the application of internationally mandatory provisions within
the future Rome II Regulation does not provide for any special protection of
internationally mandatory rules of Community law233.
144. Nevertheless, it would be sensible to expressly clarify that Article 8(1)
and (2) Rome I-P apply to provisions of Community law as well,234 especially
because the opinions differ whether Ingmar is really a case of Article 7(2)
Rome Convention235 and of Article 8(2) Rome I-P. Additionally, at least theoretically, situations are conceivable where a provision of Community law
might be vital for the protection of the political, social or economic order of
the Community, but not of the forum Member State. In such cases it would be
difficult for the national court to apply Article 8(2) Rome I-P due to the current wording of Article 8(1) Rome I-P which only makes reference to the importance of the provision for a “country”. Therefore, it has to be made clear in
Article 8(1) Rome I-P that provisions which are of importance for safeguarding the political, social or economic order of the Community are internationally mandatory as well. Consequently, a new Article 8 (3) should extend Article 8(2) Rome I-P to internationally mandatory provisions contained in European regulations and directives. Finally, as in Article 3(5) of the Institute’s
proposal, it must be clarified that internationally mandatory rules in Directives
apply as implemented in the domestic law of the forum Member State.
An added Article 8(4): Internationally mandatory rules
of the lex contractus
145. The inclusion of a new Article 8(4) should provide further clarification, as already indicated in the Institute’s 2004 comments.236 Article 8 Rome
Dickinson 172.
Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22. 12. 1986 for the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer
credit, O.J. EC 1987 L 42/48.
232 Cf. BGH 13. 12. 2005, NJW 2006, 762 (764).
233 See Article 13 Rome II-AP (supra n. 7) p. 18.
234 Reply of Rauscher (supra n. 45) 19.
235 For further details see Münch. Komm. BGB (-Martiny) (supra n. 48) Art. 34 EGBGB,
no. 32.
236 Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 75; as to the same result
Reply of the Nordic Group for Private International Law to the Commission’s Green Paper
(supra n. 45) pp. 49 seq.
230
231
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I-P in its current wording leaves open whether internationally mandatory
rules of the law governing the contract, especially according to Articles 3 and
4 Rome I-P, are applicable as part of the lex contractus.237 This issue has to be
addressed because in some Member States, as for example, Germany, the
opinion prevails that the conflict rules only refer to the private law of the State
whose law has been elected, but not to its internationally mandatory provisions as far as they form part of its public law.238 In contrast, common law
courts traditionally apply the internationally mandatory provisions of the lex
contractus as part of the governing law.239 The Institute proposes again that
those provisions of the lex contractus should be applied if they so demand, i.e.
if they claim international application to the case at hand. By adding this paragraph, all questions of internationally mandatory rules would be covered
comprehensively.
Article 9 – Consent and material validity
1. The existence and validity of a
contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law
which would govern it under this
Regulation if the contract or term
were valid.
2. Nevertheless a party may rely
upon the law of the country in
which he has his habitual residence
to establish that he did not consent if
it appears from the circumstances
that it would not be reasonable to
determine the effect of his conduct
in accordance with the law specified
in the preceding paragraph.

[no changes]

Article 10 – Formal validity
1. A contract is formally valid if it
satisfies the formal requirements of
the law which governs it in substance
under this Regulation or the law of
the country in which one or other of

1. A contract is formally valid if it
satisfies the formal requirements of
the law which governs it in substance
under this Regulation or the law of
the country in which one or other

Mankowski, Vorschlag Rom-I-VO 110.
Cf. BGH 27. 2. 2003, NJW 2003, 2020 (2001).
239 Cf. Kahler v. Midland Bank LD, [1950] A.C. 24 (H.L.) 27 (per Lord Simonds), 47 (per
Lord Reid), 57 (per Lord Radcliffe).
237
238
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the parties or his agent is when it is
concluded or the law of the country
in which one or other of the parties
has his habitual residence at that
time.
2. A unilateral act intended to
have legal effect relating to an existing or contemplated contract is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law which governs
or would govern the contract in substance under this Regulation or of
the law of the country in which the
act is performed or the law of the
country in which the person who
drafted it has his habitual residence at
that time.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not apply to contracts that
fall within the scope of Article 5.
The form of such contracts shall be
governed by the law of the country
in which the consumer has his habitual residence.
4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1
to 3 of this Article, a contract the
subject matter of which is a right in
immovable property or a right to use
immovable property shall be subject
to the mandatory requirements of
form of the law of the country
where the property is situated if by
that law those requirements are mandatory provisions within the
meaning of Article 8.

RabelsZ

either of the parties or his agent is
present when it is concluded or the
law of the country in which one or
other either of the parties has his habitual residence at that time.
2. A unilateral act intended to
have legal effect relating to an existing or contemplated contract is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law which governs
or would govern the contract in substance under this Regulation or of
the law of the country in which the
act is performed was done or the law
of the country in which the person
who drafted effected it has his habitual
residence at that time.
[no changes]

Summary
The Institute basically welcomes the new rule on formal validity which
corresponds to the Institute’s own recommendations240 and enhances the generally recognised principle of favor negotii. As to the English language version, however, some linguistic amendments seem to be necessary.
240

Cf. Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 77 seq., 110.
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Comments
146. The first paragraph of Article 10 Rome I-P evidences linguistic deficiencies which might result from a translation of the original draft from
French to English: First, the words “one or other” have to be replaced by the
proper English term “either”, and second, the word “present” has to be integrated into the text behind the word “is”.
147. The wording of paragraph 2 is basically modelled on Article 9(4)
Rome Convention which also addresses the problem of formal validity of
unilateral acts. The only change in substance consists of the introduction of a
third connecting factor (habitual residence) at the end of the paragraph. All
the other rules are exactly the same as under the Rome Convention. Consequently, the French and German language versions copy the wording of the
Rome Convention literally to the extent that there is no change in substance
(i.e. concerning the first two connecting factors). However, the English language version changes the words “was done” from Article 9(4) Rome Convention into “is performed” in the context of Article 10(2) Rome I-P. Again,
this seems to be due to the English translation and cannot be explained by any
sound rationale. Therefore, the words “is performed” ought to be replaced by
the words “was done”. This would also be in line with Article 18 Rome IIAP dealing with the same issue. In order to achieve a coherent set of European conflicts rules, the two provisions should be synchronised to the greatest
possible extent.241
148. Finally, the last part of paragraph 2 has to be changed as well: The
English language version refers to the habitual residence of the person who
“drafted” the unilateral act. The “draftsman” of that act, however, appears to
be totally irrelevant as to its formal validity. The proper criterion would rather
be the person who actually “effected” the unilateral act. This would correspond to the German (“Person, die das Rechtsgeschäft vorgenommen hat”)
and the French (“la personne qui l’a établi”) language versions of the proposal. Hence, the English text has to be changed accordingly.

241 Regarding Article 18 Rome II-AP, however, two additional remarks have to be
made: Firstly, the word “and” has to be deleted as it seems to be linguistically superfluous
and does not appear in the original text of the Rome Convention. Secondly, the words “is
done” have to be changed into “was done” which would correspond to Article 9(4) Rome
Convention.
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Article 11 – Scope of applicable law
1. The law applicable to a contract
by virtue of this Regulation shall
govern in particular:
(a) interpretation;
(b) performance;
(c) within the limits of the powers
conferred on the court by its procedural law, the consequences of the
total or partial breach of obligations,
including the assessment of damages
in so far as it is governed by rules of
law;
(d) the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and
limitationof actions;
(e) the consequences of nullity of
the contract.
2. In relation to the manner of
performance and the steps to be
taken in the event of defective performance regard shall be had to the
law of the country in which performance takes place.

[no changes]

Article 12 – Incapacity
In a contract concluded between
persons who are in the same country,
a natural person who would have capacity under the law of that country
may invoke his incapacity resulting
from another law only if the other
party to the contract was aware of
this incapacity at the time of the conclusion of the contract or was not
aware thereof as a result of negligence.

[no changes]
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Article 13 – Voluntary assignment and contractual subrogation
1. The mutual obligations of assignor and assignee under a voluntary assignment or contractual subrogation of a right against another
person shall be governed by the law
which under this Regulation applies
to the contract between the assignor
and assignee.
2. The law governing the original
contract shall determine the effectiveness of contractual limitations on
assignment as between the assignee
and the debtor, the relationship between the assignee and the debtor,
the conditions under which the assignment can be invoked against the
debtor and whether the debtor’s obligations have been discharged.
3. The question whether the assignment or subrogation may be relied on against third parties shall be
governed by the law of the country
in which the assignor or the author
of the subrogation has his habitual
residence at the material time.

1. The mutual obligations of assignor and assignee under a voluntary assignment or contractual subrogation of a claim right against another person shall be governed by
the law which under this Regulation
applies to the contract between the
assignor and assignee.
2. The law governing the assigned
claim original contract shall determine the effectiveness of contractual
and legal limitations on assignment as
between the assignee and the debtor,
the relationship between the assignee and the debtor, the conditions
under which the assignment can be
invoked against the debtor and
whether the debtor’s obligations
have been discharged.
3. The question whether the assignment or subrogation may be relied on against third parties shall be
governed by the law of the country
in which the assignor or the author
of the subrogation has his habitual
residence at the material time time of
the assignment or subrogation.

Summary
The Institute generally welcomes the Commission’s proposal for Article 13
Rome I-P as it introduces a widely recognised conflicts rule regarding the
third party effects of an assignment, a rule which was also proposed by the Institute in its first comment.242 However, the new proposal could be further
improved by taking into account the following issues:
– Concerning the ambit of Article 13 Rome I-P, it is unclear whether the
new Article 13 Rome I-P also encompasses the assignment of non-contractual rights. At the same time, the proposed Regulation on the law applicable
to non-contractual rights (Rome II-AP) does not address this issue. Consequently, the recitals should clarify that Article 13 Rome I-P applies to the as242

Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, pp. 79 seq.
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signment of both contractual and non-contractual claims, and the wording of
the English draft ought to be changed accordingly (see infra no. 150).243
– Moreover, the text of Article 13 Rome I-P leaves open the question of
whether it also covers the creation of limited rights in rem, such as pledges,
charges, nantissements, gages etc. As security rights over receivables usually
fulfil the same economic function as outright transfers or contractual subrogations, this issue should be addressed in the recitals.244
– The wording of Article 13(2) Rome I-P needs improvement. There are
divergences between the German and French versions on the one hand and
the English version on the other. These ought to be eliminated as they might
give rise to confusion regarding the scope of the different paragraphs and their
content (see infra nos. 151–154).
– As far as contractual subrogation is concerned, an alignment of the
French, German and English versions is also desirable (see infra no. 155).
– The English version’s reference to “material time” as used in Article
13(3) Rome I-P does not satisfactorily answer the question as to the relevant
time for the assessment of the assignor’s location. It should therefore be harmonised with the German and French drafts (see infra no. 156).
Comments
Overview of the proposal
149. The Commission’s proposal aims at determining the applicable law regarding the effects of an assignment on third-parties. This issue has been subject to intense discussions in courts as well as in legal literature over the
years.245 Whereas the Commission’s proposal leaves the first paragraph of Article 12 Rome Convention dealing with the contractual relationship between
assignor and assignee mainly unchanged, the wording of the second paragraph addressing the legal status of the debtor has been altered slightly.246 Additionally, a third paragraph has been introduced which subjects the thirdparty effects of an assignment to the law of the place where the assignor has his
habitual residence. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission has chosen this solution because it is favoured by the majority of re-

See also supra no. 11 (comment on Recitals).
See supra no. 11 (comment on Recitals).
245 For an overview with further references see Kieninger/Schütze, Die Forderungsabtretung im Internationalen Privatrecht – Bringt die “Rom I-Verordnung” ein “Ende der Geschichte”?: IPRax 2005, 200 (201). In contrast to the recent developments, Flessner/Verhagen (supra n. 17) 21 seq. argue in favour of the implementation of party autonomy regarding the proprietary aspects of the assignment.
246 This accounts for the English version, see infra nos. 152–155.
243
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spondents to the Green Paper and has been adopted in the UN Convention
on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade.247
Finally, the scope of application of Article 12 Rome Convention has been
extended to contractual subrogation since its economic function is similar to
that of voluntary assignments.248
Assignment of non-contractual claims
150. The English version of Article 13 Rome I-P does not satisfactorily
answer the question whether assignments of non-contractual claims fall into
its ambit. In Article 13(1) Rome I-P, a very general reference is made to “the
voluntary assignment or contractual subrogation of a right against another person
[...]” but paragraph 2 submits certain aspects of the assignment to “the law
governing the original contract”. Because of the latter reference to the “original
contract” and due to the limitation of the whole proposal to contractual obligations (see Article 1(1) Rome I-P), it might be argued that Article 13(1)
Rome I-P applies only to the assignment of contractual claims. However, the
Commission did not address the assignment of non-contractual claims in the
proposed Rome II Regulation; such assignments therefore might be covered
neither by Rome II nor by Rome I if interpreted in a narrow way. In order to
avoid such a gap, the Institute assumes that Article 13 Rome I-P is intended to
cover the assignment of both non-contractual and of contractual claims. This
assumption corresponds to the respective parts of the German and the French
texts which use the more general expressions “Forderung” and “créance
cédée”.249 In order to avoid ambiguities, the Regulation should clearly state in
an added Recital 13a that the ambit of Article 13 Rome I-P will generally include contractual and non-contractual claims.250 Therefore, the English text
needs to be aligned with the wording of the German and French versions by
inserting the term “claim” in both paragraphs 1 and 2.

247 The Convention was adopted in 2001 (supra n. 19). Its text as well as the explanatory
report can be found at ⬍www.uncitral.org⬎. See also the Convention’s Article 22 (“Law
applicable to competing rights”): “With the exception of matters that are settled elsewhere
in this Convention and subject to Articles 23 and 24, the law of the State in which the assignor is located governs the priority of the right of an assignee in the assigned receivable over
the right of a competing claimant.”
248 See Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 8.
249 French version Article 13(1) Rome I-P: “Les obligations entre le cédant et le cessionnaire ou entre le subrogeant et le subrogé [...]”; Article 1 (2) Rome I-P: “La loi qui régit la
créance cédée [...]”. German version Article 13(1) Rome I-P: “Für die Verpflichtungen zwischen Zedent und Zessionar aus der Übertragung einer Forderung”; Article 13(2) Rome IP: “Das Recht, dem die übertragene Forderung unterliegt [...]” (emphasis added).
250 See supra no. 11 (comment on Recitals).
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Interaction between Article 13(2) and (3) Rome I-P
Wording
151. According to the English text of Article 13(2) Rome I-P, which is
generally consistent with the French and German versions, the debtor can
rely on the application of the law governing the original contract regarding
“the effectiveness of contractual limitations on assignment as between the assignee and the debtor, the relationship between the assignee and the debtor,
the conditions under which the assignment can be invoked against the debtor
and whether the debtor’s obligations have been discharged.” However, the
English text deviates from the German and French versions by referring only
to “the effectiveness of contractual251 limitations on assignment as between the
assignee and the debtor” rather then to the far broader term “caractère
cessible [de la créance]” in the French version and the equally broad expression “Übertragbarkeit [der Forderung]” in the German version.252 At the
same time, all three language versions subject (only) the third party effects of
an assignment to the law of the country where the assignor has his habitual
residence (Article 13(3) Rome I-P).
Wording results in uncertainty as to the scope of the different paragraphs
152. This wording is inconsistent and may result in confusion as to which
law generally governs the assignment itself, including its effects on third parties, and the validity and effect of the assignment as between the assignor and
the assignee. The English version suggests that the assignment should generally be subject to the assignor’s habitual residence (Article 13(3) Rome I-P)
because only the effectiveness of contractual limitations on assignments and not
the “assignability” of the claim as such shall be subject to the law governing
the original claim between the debtor and the assignee (Article 13(2) Rome
I-P). The French and German versions on the other hand use broader terms
and, thus, suggest that Article 13(2) Rome I-P encompasses the entire assignment, including, e.g., the relationship between the assignee and the assignor.
Hence, according to the French and German versions, only the third party effects would be subject to the law of the assignor’s habitual residence (Article
13(3) Rome I-P).
Solution: Reformulation of the English version of Article 13(2) Rome I-P
153. These divergences require amendment of all three language versions.
By only submitting the effectiveness of contractual limitations between the asEmphasis added.
The latter would be equivalent to the English terms “assignability” or “assignable
character” of a receivable.
251
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signee and the debtor to the law governing the original claim, the English text
of Article 13(2) Rome I-P does not cover other limitations on assignments
under national law which may similarly affect the legal status of the debtor.
This applies, e.g., to statutory limitations on the assignment of rights with a
personal character or tax claims. Thus, the English version of Article 13(2)
Rome I-P, which is supposed to ensure the protection of the debtor’s legal
position, is too narrow.
154. Including legal limitations on assignment in Article 13(2) Rome I-P, as
done in the Institute’s proposal, enlarges the ambit of debtor protection in the
English version. As a consequence, the debtor can refer to the law governing
the original claim vis-à-vis the assignee whenever his legal status is affected.
Moreover, the expression “legal limitations” ensures that Article 13(2) Rome
I-P not only applies to statutory limitations but also to other limitations, such
as those established in case law. At the same time, Article 13(3) Rome I-P remains unchanged. The French and the German text should be amended accordingly: instead of “caractère cessible” and “Übertragbarkeit”, Article
13(2) Rome I-P should refer to “restrictions contractuelles et non-contractuelles de la cession” and to “vertragliche und nicht-vertragliche Abtretungsbeschränkungen”.
Inconsistency as to the wording regarding contractual subrogation
155. The Institute would also like to draw attention to the fact that the
newly introduced reference to contractual subrogation is implemented differently in each of the three versions: Whereas in the French version reference to
subrogation is constantly made in each paragraph, in the German version no
reference to subrogation can be found and only the broad term “Übertragung” is used. Finally, the English version refers to subrogation but not as
comprehensively as the French version. The Institute is aware that the comprehensive use in the French version results from the fact that French law (and
legal systems influenced by French law) frequently refers to subrogation. Furthermore, reference to subrogation leaves the Commission with the problem
of how to adjust the text in the English and particularly the German version.
In the German version, especially, reference to contractual subrogation causes
problems with regard to the translation, as the term “vertragliche Subrogation” is hardly known in the German legal system. Nevertheless (and even if it
may be obvious to the reader that no material difference is intended in the different texts), an alignment of the three versions should be achieved in order to
enhance uniformity, e.g., by using the English version as a model.

max planck institute

326

RabelsZ

Relevant point in time
156. Concerning the point in time to which the new conflicts rule (Article
13(3) Rome I-P) refers, the German and French texts differ from the English
one. The English version simply mentions the “material time” whereas the
French and German versions refer to the time in which the subrogation or assignment takes place.253 It is far from clear what “the material time” referred
to in the English text means. It should therefore be aligned with the French
and German versions.
Article 14 – Statutory
subrogation

Article 14 – Statutory
Legal subrogation

Where a person has a contractual
claim against another and a third person has a duty to satisfy the creditor,
the law which governs the third person’s duty to satisfy the creditor shall
determine whether the third person
is entitled to proceed against the
debtor.

Where a person, the creditor, has a
contractual claim against another, the
debtor, and a third person has a duty
to satisfy the creditor, the law which
governs the third person’s duty to
satisfy the creditor shall determine
whether and to what extent that third
person is entitled to proceed exercise
the creditor’s rights against the debtor.
The protective rules of the law governing
the debtor’s obligation remain applicable.

Summary
The Institute generally welcomes the new proposal, which adopts in essence the Institute’s earlier recommendations. However, the provision as it
stands is not sufficiently clear on some points:
– The title should be changed to include legal subrogation based not on
statute but on common law (see infra no. 157).
– The text should clarify who is meant by the words “debtor” and “creditor” (see infra no. 158).
– The unclear formulation “proceed against the debtor” should be replaced with “exercise the creditor’s rights” to indicate that the provision deals
only with subrogation and similar instruments, not with other possible claims
(see infra no. 159).
– The provision should make clear that the law governing the third person’s
duty determines not only whether the third person can proceed against the
debtor but also to what extent (see infra no. 160).
253 French version Article 13(3) Rome I-P: “au moment de la cession ou du transfert”;
German version Article 13(3) Rome I-P: “zum Zeitpunkt der Übertragung”.
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– The debtor’s right to rely on defences he had against the creditor should
be included (see infra no. 161).
Comments
Wording
157. The proposal correctly excludes conventional subrogation through its
title. However, the restriction to “statutory” subrogation is too narrow (at
least in the English version) since subrogation by law can also occur through
common law doctrines. “Legal” subrogation is preferable.
158. Article 13 Rome Convention defines debtor and creditor for the purpose of the provision. This is helpful, since the roles are not obvious: The
“third person” is typically also both a debtor (vis-à-vis the main creditor) and
a creditor (vis-à-vis the main debtor after subrogation). Therefore, it is preferable to return to the wording of the Rome Convention and define the terms
used.
Scope of the applicable law
159. Three questions arise in subrogation. The first is the “if ” question:
Does the third person (the one who fulfills the obligation) acquire the creditor’s
claim against the debtor, or the power to enforce it, at all? The second is the
“how much” question: To what extent does he acquire the claim? The third is
the “how” question: In what way exactly can the third person proceed? The
proposal right now is not clear as to which of these questions are addressed.
The Institute recommends two clarifying amendments: First, substituting
“whether and to what extent” for “whether” makes clear that the law governing the third person’s obligation applies to both the “if ” and the “how
much” question. Second, substituting “exercise the creditor’s rights” for
“proceed” achieves two clarifications. First, the provision deals only with subrogation and functionally similar situations in which the third person’s claim is
based on the original creditor’s claim. “Proceed” is too broad because it suggests that all claims the third person has, or at least all claims in connection
with his payment, are governed by this provision. Second, “exercise the creditor’s rights” makes clear that the third question, the “how” question, is governed by the law governing the creditor’s claim.254 This formulation essentially simplifies the language in Article 13 Rome Convention, which reads:
“[...] whether the third person is entitled to exercise against the debtor the
rights which the creditor had against the debtor”. It encompasses both the
254 Cf. ECJ 2. 6. 1995 – case C-428/92 (DAK v. Lærerstandens Brandforsikring G/S),
E.C.R. 1994, I-2259, para. 18 (regarding Article 93(1) of Regulation [EEC] No. 1408/
71).
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situation where the third person acquires the creditor’s right and enforces it as
his own right as well as the situation where the creditor retains the right and
the third person only acquires the power to enforce it.
Debtor’s protection
160. Article 14 Rome I-P, unlike Article 15 Rome I-P, includes no provision regarding the debtor’s protection against the creditor. Such a provision is
unnecessary if the debtor’s obligation and that of the third person are governed by the same law. Yet, both obligations can be governed by different
laws; in this case the debtor has a reasonable interest in maintaining the protection against third parties afforded to him under the law governing his own
obligation to the creditor. For example, the debtor may have paid his debt to
the creditor in ignorance of the subrogation. If the law governing his obligation to the creditor protects him in such a situation against the subrogated
claim brought by a third person, he must be able to rely on this protection
even if the law governing the third person’s obligation does not provide for a
similar protection. The debtor cannot control the relationship between the
creditor and the third person, and creditor and third person should not be able
to limit the debtor’s legal protection through a choice of law agreement.
161. The Institute proposes to add a second sentence clarifying that the
debtor enjoys the same protection vis-à-vis the third party as he would under
the law governing his own obligation. Although the exact extent of this protection is in dispute between different scholars, there is virtually no doubt
about this point in general. The exact definition of “protective rules” can be
left to the courts. However, rules disabling subrogation altogether, which
could in theory also be viewed as such protective rules, are not covered by the
second sentence because whether subrogation is possible at all is part of the
“if ” question. It is governed not by the law governing the debtor’s own obligation, but by the law governing the third person’s obligation. From a choice
of law perspective, the debtor needs protection against the change in the law
applicable to his obligation, not against alterations in the person of his creditor.
Article 15 – Multiple liability

Article 15 – Multiple liability
debtors

Where a creditor has a claim upon
several debtors who are jointly liable
and one of those debtors has in fact
satisfied the creditor, the law of the
obligation of this debtor towards the
creditor governs the right of this
debtor to claim against the other

Where a creditor has a claim claims
upon several debtors, who are jointly
liable and one of those debtors has in
fact satisfied the creditor, the law of
that debtor’s obligation of this debtor
towards the creditor governs the
right of that same debtor to claim re-
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against other debtors.
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course against the other debtors.
Where the law applicable to a debtor’s obligation to the creditor provides for rules to protect him against
actions to ascertain his liability, he
may also rely on them against other
debtors. The other debtors can rely on
the defences they had against the creditor
to the extent allowed by the law governing their obligations to the creditor.

Summary
The Institute welcomes the new proposal, which adopts in essence the Institute’s earlier recommendations. However, the text as it stands now invites
misunderstandings:
– The title should read “multiple debtors” (see infra no. 162).
– Neither joint liability of the debtors nor the identity of the claims against
the debtors should appear as a preliminary requirement for the claim to contribution (see infra no. 164).
– The unclear formulation “claim against” should be replaced with “claim
recourse against” to make clear that the provision deals only with recourse,
not with other possible claims (see infra no. 165).
– The protection of the other debtor should be clarified (see infra no. 166).
Comments
Title
162. “Multiple liability” is not a clear title and should be replaced by
“multiple debtors”, a term used already in the Explanatory Memorandum.255
Applicable law
163. The Institute welcomes the Commission’s decision to let the law governing the obligation of the debtor who has satisfied the creditor (“the
payor”) also govern his claim for contribution and recoupment against the
other debtors, in parallel with Article 14 Rome I-P. If all debtors are liable according to the same law, this solution guarantees consistency in the relations
between debtors and creditor on the one hand and in the relations between
the debtors on the other. If the debtors are liable according to different laws,
this solution runs parallel to that in Article 14 Rome I-P; problems regarding
255

Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 8.
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the relationship between both provisions are minimised. Even if a contractual
relation exists between the debtors, it is unnecessary to apply the law governing that contract to the claim for contribution or recoupment as well. It suffices that the contract may prevail on the level of substantive law.256
When both contractual and delictual obligations are involved, it is unclear
whether Article 15 Rome I-P or the parallel provision of the Rome II-AP
applies. This suggests that Rome I and Rome II should be combined at least
for the provisions concerning the general law of obligations.257 If not, the provisions in Rome I and Rome II should at least contain the same wording.
Article 15 1st sentence Rome I-P: Requirements
164. The proposal requires that the creditor has “a claim upon several debtors who are jointly liable”. This formulation is not sufficiently precise. First,
even in a case of joint liability, the claims against different debtors are normally separate claims, so the provision should mention “claims” rather than
“a claim”. Second, the provision appears to make joint liability a requirement
for the provision to apply. This is awkward in several ways. First, as it stands,
the provision does not cover contribution between debtors who are jointly
and severally liable. Second, whether debtors are jointly liable, as the text now
requires, is a question of substantive law that may well be answered differently
by different debtors’ personal laws. For example, if a principal enters into a
contract for the carriage of goods with a carrier, and the carrier then enters
into a contract with a subcontractor, both contracts may well be governed by
different laws. If the subcontract is a contract for the principal’s benefit as a
third party, the carrier and the subcontractor are both liable to the principal
for damages to the goods, yet their obligations to the principal are governed
by different laws, and both may be jointly liable under one of the laws but not
under the other. Now, in order to determine whether the provision is applicable or not, it is first necessary to determine whether joint liability exists or
not, and this requires determination of the law applicable to this preliminary
question. As such, it raises the issue as to what law determines whether joint
liability exists or not. This is unnecessarily complicated. The existence of
joint liability is relevant only as to whether a claim for contribution or recoupment exists, and this question is to be answered pursuant to the law designated by Article 15 Rome I-P. Joint liability should therefore not be formulated as a requirement for the provision’s applicability.
165. The amendment makes clear that the provision is applicable only if the
first debtor fulfills his own debt. Cases in which the payor is not in fact in debt
256 Hamburg Group for Private International Law, Comments on Draft Proposal Rome II
(supra n. 4) 50.
257 See also supra no. 5 (Introduction).
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and merely fulfils a real debtor’s obligation, whether by accident or on purpose, are too diverse to be formulated as a rule.258 In most cases, such claims
will be regulated by the provision for restitution in the Rome II-AP (another
reason to combine Rome I and Rome II into one regulation).
Article 15 2nd sentence Rome I-P: Debtors’ protection
166. The Institute welcomes the introduction of a provision regarding the
other debtors’ protection. Such a provision should also be added to Article 17
Rome II-AP, where it is currently absent. However, the current wording is
unclear. First, it protects the debtor against “actions” by the payor. This wording introduces a procedural consideration into a rule dealing with choice of
substantive law and does not cover other ways in which the payor may proceed – for example, by way of a set-off between the debtors. Yet the other
debtors require protection in such cases as well. Second, the proposal points
to “rules to protect [the debtor]”. However, the main way in which legal orders protect debtors against recourse is not through specific protective rules,
but rather by denying the creation of a regime of joint liability in the first
place.
The proposed amendment makes clear that the protection goes to the substantive claim, not only to its procedural enforcement. It also makes clear that
when the law governing a debtor’s obligation does not create joint liability,
the debtor is protected against a claim for recourse based on a regime created
under another law. The protection is granted by rules of choice of law, not
substantive law; so whether the debtor can in fact rely on his defence vis-à-vis
the payor is a matter of the substantive law determined by this provision.
Article 16 – Statutory offsetting

Article 16 – Statutory offsetting
Set-off

1. Statutory offsetting shall be
governed by the law applicable to
the obligation in relation to which
the right to offset is asserted.

1. Statutory offsetting Set-off shall
be governed by the law applicable to
the obligation in relation to claim
against which the right to offset set-off
is asserted.
2. This rule does not apply to set-off
by agreement.

Summary
The Institute welcomes the proposal and agrees with the substance of the
proposed rule as it provides for a fair protection of the party facing set-off and
258

Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I, p. 81.
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for a synchronisation of the laws governing the principal claim and the set-off.
Nevertheless, the Institute suggests the following changes:
– Article 16 Rome I-P should make clear that the provision is not limited
to statutory set-off but also encompasses set-off by unilateral declaration (see
infra no. 169).
– Article 16 Rome I-P should state unambiguously that set-off is not governed by the law applicable to the claim of the party which asserts set-off but
by the law applicable to the claim of the other party. The wording “obligation
in relation to which” is not clear enough on this point and should be replaced
by “claim against” (see infra no. 169).
– A second paragraph should be inserted to expressly exclude set-off by
agreement from the scope of application of the rule (see infra no. 170).
Co m m e n t s
Overview of the proposal
167. Article 16 Rome I-P proposes to introduce a specific rule on set-off
which is not to be found in the Rome Convention. Article 16 Rome I-P subjects set-off to the law of the obligation in relation to which the right to setoff is asserted. Set-off by contractual agreement does not fall in the scope of
Article 16 Rome I-P and is instead subject to the general rules on contractual
obligations in Articles 3 and 4 Rome I-P.259
168. The Institute welcomes this proposal and completeley agrees with the
solution adopted.260 It is not only in line with Article 6 of the Insolvency
Regulation,261 but also provides for a fair protection of the party facing set-off
and – as set-off is in most cases invoked as a defence – for a synchronisation of
the laws governing the principal claim and the set-off.
Clarification of the rule
169. The Institute suggests a reformulation of the text: “Set-off ” seems to
be more commonly used than “offsetting”. “Statutory” set-off could be misunderstood as relating only to a set-off effected by operation of law, as for instance espoused by French law, and as excluding set-off by unilateral declaration, which is the concept adhered to by the substantive law of several Member States, e.g., Germany and the Netherlands. Therefore, the limitation to
“statutory” set-off contained in the headline should be dropped. As a conseExplanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 8.
For a detailed opinion see Max Planck Institute, Comments on Green Paper Rome I,
pp. 81–86.
261 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29. 5. 2000 relating to insolvency proceedings, O.J. EC L 160/1.
259
260
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quence, an explicit exclusion of contractual set-off has to be adopted in a new
paragraph 2.262 “Obligation in relation to” could be misunderstood as referring to the claim of the party that asserts the set-off (while it is in fact the obligation of the other party). It should be replaced by “claim against” to make it
clear that the claim of the other party is the relevant claim for determining the
applicable law.
Exclusion of set-off by agreement
170. In addition, the Institute proposes adding a second sentence to Article
16 Rome I-P clarifying that set-off by agreement does not fall in the scope of
Article 16 Rome I-P. This sentence expresses the Commission’s (correct) interpretation of the provision for courts and legal practioners who will have to
apply the regulation and cannot always be expected to read the Explanatory
Memorandum.
Article 17 – Burden of proof
1. The law governing the contract
under this Regulation shall apply to
the extent that it contains, in the law
of contract, rules which raise presumptions of law or determine the
burden of proof.
2. A contract or an act intended to
have legal effect may be proved by
any mode of proof recognized by the
law of the forum or by any of the
laws referred to in Article 10 under
which that contract or act is formally
valid, provided that such mode of
proof can be administered by the
forum.

[no changes]

Article 18 – Assimilation to habitual residence
1. For companies or firms and
other bodies or incorporate or unincorporate, the principal establishment shall be considered to be the
habitual residence for the purposes
of this Regulation.
262

See infra no. 170.

1. For companies or firms and
other bodies or incorporate or unincorporate, the principal establishment shall be considered to be the
habitual residence for the purposes
of this Regulation.
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Where the contract is concluded
in the course of operation of a subsidiary, a branch or any other establishment, or if, under the contract,
performance is the responsibility of
such an establishment, this establishment shall be considered the habitual
residence.
2. For the purposes of this Regulation, where the contract is concluded in the course of the business
activity of a natural person, that
natural person’s establishment shall
be considered the habitual residence.

RabelsZ

Where the contract is concluded
in the course of operation of a subsidiary, a branch, agency or any other
establishment, or if, under the contract, performance is the responsibility of such an establishment, this
establishment shall be considered the
habitual residence.
2. [no changes]

Summary
The Institute welcomes the introduction of a general provision in Article
18 Rome I-P defining the habitual residence for companies and persons acting within their trade or profession. This constitutes a sound and reasonable
approach which has already been implemented in the context of Brussels I (cf.
Article 60(1) Brussels I Regulation) and the 2003 Rome II proposal263 (cf. its
Article 19) as well as the amended 2006 proposal (cf. Article 20 Rome II-AP).
However, the respective wordings of the Rome I and Rome II proposals
differ considerably regarding the basic connecting factors and the different
language versions. Yet, there does not seem to be any substantial reason for
these differences since the provisions are supposed to address exactly the same
question. Hence, they should generate the same results and therefore should
be fully synchronised. In other words, Article 18 Rome I-P is a good example
of the need for a common pool of standardised and literally identical general
provisions for implementation in the different European instruments of private international law.
Comments
171. In order to have a coherent conflicts regime within the European
Community and in particular with regard to a possible (and reasonable) future
merger of Rome I and Rome II, such general questions as addressed in Article 18 Rome I-P ought be dealt with identically in the two instruments. According to the Explanatory Memorandum of Article 18 Rome I-P, the article
is modelled on the corresponding rule in Rome II, i.e. Article 20 Rome II263

COM(2003) 427 final (supra n. 5).
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AP and Article 19 of the 2003 proposal.264 Rome II equates the habitual
residence of a company with their “principal establishment” in the English,265
French (“principal établissement”) and German (“Hauptniederlassung”) language versions. Hence, this basic decision in favour of the principal establishment should be the starting point when drafting a similar rule for Rome I.
While the English language version of Article 18(1) 1st sentence Rome I-P is
in line with this concept, the French (“administration centrale”) and the German (“Hauptverwaltung”) texts point to the central administration as the habitual residence of a company. Consequently, either the German and French
language versions of Rome I, or the Rome II proposal as well as the English
language version of Rome I have to be adjusted.
As to the question which connection factor seems to be preferable, there is
a theoretical argument in favour of the principal place of business because it
consists of the centre of the company’s business activity and commercial intercourse vis-à-vis third parties while the central administration is defined as the
centre of the company’s internal organisation.266 Hence, at least theoretically,
the principal establishment can be identified more readily by third parties.267
In practice, however, it is hardly conceivable that the principal establishment
and the central administration actually diverge. Moreover, such cases appear
to be already covered by Article 18(1) subpara. 2 Rome I-P. Thus, both terms
will regularly yield similar results in practice. The Institute nonetheless recommends sticking to the connecting factor “principal establishment” (“principal établissement”, “Hauptniederlassung”) as a matter of uniformity of terminology.
172. The word “or” in Article 18(1) 1st sentence Rome I-P of the English
language version should be deleted for linguistic purposes. The same holds
true for Article 20(1) 1st sentence Rome II-AP.
173. It has been pointed out above that Article 18(1) 2nd sentence Rome IP is rooted in Article 19(1) 2nd sentence of the 2003 Rome II proposal. According to the Explanatory Memorandum of the 2003 Rome II proposal on
Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 8.
It may be noted that Article 18(1) Rome I-P refers to the “principal establishment”
like Article 19(1) of the 2003 Rome II proposal (supra n. 5) originally did. However, Article 20(1) Rome II-AP now uses the term “principal place of business” while the German
(“Hauptniederlassung”) and the French (“principal établissement”) language versions stick
to the literal equivalent of the term “principal establishment”. As a matter of linguistic coherence with the English versions of Rome I and II, the English version of the Rome II-AP
should stick to the latter term as well.
266 Cf. von der Groeben/Schwarze (-Troberg/Tiedje), Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag6
(2003) Art. 48 EG, no. 9 seq.; v. Bar/Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht2 I (2003) § 7,
no. 36; Kropholler, Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht8 (2005) Art. 60, no. 2; Rauscher (-Staudinger), Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht (2004) Art. 60 Brüssel I-VO, no. 1.
267 Cf. also the Explanatory Memorandum of the 2003 Rome II proposal on Article 19,
COM(2003) 427 final (supra n. 5) p. 27.
264
265
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Article 19, the provision is explicitly modelled on Article 5(5) Brussels I
Regulation.268 However, the English language version of Article 18(1) 2nd
sentence Rome I-P replaces the term “branch, agency or other establishment” as embedded in Article 5(5) Brussels I Regulation with the term “subsidiary, a branch or any other establishment”. Hence, the word “agency” is
deleted, and the word “subsidiary” is newly introduced into the text. Consequently, a judge might interpret this change as to the wording as a change in
substance, in particular with regard to the term “subsidiary”. Yet, it follows
from the German and the French language versions of Article 18(1) 2nd sentence Rome I-P and from the Rome II proposals as well as from the Explanatory Memorandum269 that neither a linguistic nor a substantive deviation from
Article 5(5) Brussels I Regulation was actually intended: Both the German
and French language versions copy the wording of Article 5(5) Brussels I
Regulation verbatim. Therefore, the English language version of Article
18(1) 2nd sentence Rome I-P (and of Article 20 Rome II-AP) should also be
aligned with Article 5(5) Brussels I Regulation in order to avoid unnecessary
problems of interpretation.
Article 19 – Exclusion of renvoi
The application of the law of any
country specified by this Regulation
means the application of the rules of
law in force in that country other
than its rules of private international
law.

The application of the law of any
country specified by this Regulation
means the application of the substantive rules of law in force in that
country other than its and not the
rules of private international law.

Summary/Comments
174. With regard to the proposed Article 3(2) Rome I-P, Article 19 Rome
I-P has to be modified insofar as it is based on the presumption that only the
law of a country can be chosen by the parties as their governing law. Renvoi
should also be excluded in cases where the parties avail themselves of Article
3(2) Rome I-P and elect as the governing law principles and rules of substantive law of contract recognised internationally or in the Community. In that
case those rules and principles should apply irrespectively of any conflict rules
they might contain. Otherwise the parties would not be able to choose, for
example, an international convention as their lex contractus if the contract
lies outside the convention’s international scope.

268
269

Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2003) 427 final (supra n. 5) p. 27.
Cf. COM(2003) 427 final (supra n. 5) p. 27.
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Article 20 – Ordre public
The application of a rule of the
law of any country specified by this
Regulation may be refused only if
such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy
(“ordre public”) of the forum.

The application of a rule of the
law of any country specified by this
Regulation may be refused only if
such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy
(“ordre public”) of the forum or of the
Community.

Summary
Apart from a minor technical change,the Institute recommends for reasons
of clarification that Article 20 Rome I-P should not only refer to the forum
state’s public policy but should also explicitly safeguard the ordre public of the
Community.
Comments
Technical change: Reference to any rule of law
175. Article 20 Rome I-P should apply to any rule of law specified by the
Regulation rather than the law of a country. As Article 3(2) Rome I-P allows
the choice of non-State rules and principles as the governing law, those rules
and principles must also be subject to the forum state’s public policy. However, this will not apply to a future Common Frame of Reference270 which according to Article 22(b) Rome I-P will not be subject to the conflict rules of
the envisioned Regulation and thus not be subject to Article 20 Rome I-P.
Public policy of the Community
176. Furthermore, the Institute recommends that by employing the same
technique as in Article 8(1) Rome I-P the public policy of the Community
should be explicitly protected against the application of any law specified by
the future Rome I Regulation. One might question whether such an amendment is necessary for safeguarding the Community’s ordre public, bearing in
mind that Community law is part of the Member States’ legal systems and
thus shares the protection of the national ordre public.
177. Nevertheless, Community public policy should be explicitly mentioned in Article 20 Rome I-P. As Community law increasingly grows and
more and more becomes a legal system of its own,271 the emerging of a Euro-

270
271

See supra no. 9 (comment on Recitals) with n. 14.
See supra no. 31 (comment on Article 3).
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pean ordre public is not an academic question.272 In many areas of Community law basic standards exist and need – as national basic standards – to be
protected against the application of foreign law. In Eco Swiss, for example, the
ECJ regarded Article 81 EC as such a fundamental standard being essential for
the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community.273 Consequently, the court considered the observance of Article 81 EC to be a matter
of public policy even if under national law the infringement of national competition rules would not amount to a violation of the national ordre public.274
As basic standards of Community law like Article 81 EC are not any longer at
the disposal of the Member States, they deserve a more prominent position
within the international private law instruments of the Community.275 Fundamental policies of the Community should not only be clearly protected in
the area of Article 8 Rome I-P and internationally mandatory rules,276 but
also within the domain of the ordre public reservations. After all, an explicit
allusion to the Community public policy would also clarify that in cases of a
conflict between the public policies of the forum and of the Community the
ordre public européen always prevails.
Article 21 – States with more than one legal system
Where a State comprises several
territorial units each of which has its
own rules of law in respect of contractual obligations, each territorial
unit shall be considered as a country
for the purposes of identifying the
law applicable under this Regulation.

[no changes]

Summary/Comments
178. Article 21 Rome I-P relates to states that comprise several territorial
units having different substantive laws in respect of contractual obligations. It
provides that each territorial unit shall be considered as a country for the purpose of identifying the law applicable under the proposed Regulation and,
272 See Basedow, Die Verselbständigung des europäischen ordre public, in: FS Hans Jürgen Sonnenberger (2004) 291 seq.; id, Recherches sur la formation de l’ordre public européen dans la jurisprudence, in: Mélanges en l’honneur Paul Lagarde (2005) 55 seq.
273 ECJ 1. 6. 1999 – case C-126/97 (Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International
NV), E.C.R. 1999, I-3055, para. 36.
274 Cf. ECJ 1. 6. 1999 (previous note) para. 39.
275 Basedow (supra n. 272) 291 (319).
276 See supra nos. 142–144 (comment on Article 8).
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thus, adopts Article 19(1) Rome Convention. It deviates from the current
regime only in so far as it does not adopt Article 19(2) Rome Convention
which releases states with several territorial units from the obligation to apply
the Rome Convention to internal conflicts between these units. As a result,
the envisioned Regulation will not only apply to international but also to domestic contracts.277
179. The Institute welcomes Article 21 Rome I-P as it stands. It provides
for an approved method for choosing the applicable law where states with
more than one legal system are involved. Additionally, it abandons the coexistence of different choice-of-law regimes by submitting both international
and domestic contracts to the same choice-of-law rules. This, in turn, makes
the private international law of contracts less complex, more transparent and
thus more certain.
Article 22 – Relationship with other provisions of Community law
This Regulation shall not
prejudice the application or adoption of acts of the institutions of the
European Communities which:
(a) in relation to particular matters, lay down choice-of-law rules
relating to contractual obligations; a
list of such acts currently in force is
provided in Annex 1; or
(b) govern contractual obligations
and which, by virtue of the will of
the parties, apply in conflict-of-law
situations; or
(c) lay down rules to promote the
smooth operation of the internal
market, where such rules cannot
apply at the same time as the law designated by the rules of private international law.

277

1. This Regulation shall not
prejudice the application or adoption of acts of the institutions of the
European Communities which:
(a) in relation to particular matters, lay down choice-of-law rules
relating to contractual obligations; a
list of such acts currently in force is
provided in Annex 1; or
(b) govern contractual obligations
and which, by virtue of the will of
the parties, apply in conflict-of-law
situations; or
(c) lay down rules to promote the
smooth operation of the internal
market, where such rules cannot
apply at the same time as the law designated by the rules of private international law.
2. This Regulation replaces conflictof-law provisions contained in the Directives enumerated in Annex 1 bis and the
pertinent national transpositions.

Explanatory Memorandum Rome I-P, p. 9.
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Summary
The Institute generally welcomes the scope and purpose of Article 22
Rome I-P. However, a few clarifications with respect to the interpretation of
this provision seem necessary. Also, its text should be slightly amended for the
sake of clarity regarding existing conflict-of-law provisions in certain EC Directives already in force. The Institute suggests the following amendments:
– A second paragraph should be added in order to clarify that certain conflict-of-law rules contained in EC Directives on consumer contracts, as listed
in a new Annex 1 bis, are replaced by the regime of the Rome I-P (see infra
no. 181).
– Annex 1 of the Rome I-P (“List of instruments mentioned in Article
22(a)”) should be revised, as it is incomplete and does not refer to the current
versions of the relevant directives (see infra no. 182).

Comments
180. The Institute supports the Commission’s suggestion in general.
Nevertheless, a few modifications and remarks are in order.
181. Several EC Directives on consumer contracts provide that certain
minimum standards of European consumer law cannot be discarded by a
choice-of-law clause choosing the law of a non-member country with a lesser
standard. The following Directives contain such provisions:
– Article 6(2) of the Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer
contracts,
– Article 9 of the Directive 94/47/EC on the protection of purchasers of
rights to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis,
– Article 1(2) of the Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in
respect of distance contracts,
– Article 7(2) of the Directive 1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of
consumer goods and associated guarantees, and
– Article 12(2) of the Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services.
The Member States have transposed these provisions into national codifications or statutes. Such rules, however, are no longer warranted because under
Articles 3 and 5 Rome I-P the law of the Member State in which the consumer has his habitual residence governs consumer contracts. The parties are
not entitled to replace this law through a choice-of-law clause according to
Article 3(1) Rome I-P. Therefore, Article 22 Rome I-P should make clear
that the Rome I Regulation replaces the national transpositions of the “nonmember country clauses” of the above-mentioned Directives.
182. Annex 1 is not complete and does not refer to the current versions of
the relevant Directives. It should therefore be amended accordingly:
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– Directive 2002/83/EC of 5. 11. 2002 concerning life assurance, as amplified and amended by Directive 2004/55/EC of 26. 4. 2004, should be
added.
– Directive 619/1990/EC should not be listed in Annex 1, as Article 72 in
connection with Annex V, part A of Directive 2002/83/EC has repealed Directive 619/1990/EEC of 8. 1. 1990 as amplified and amended by Directives
96/1992/EC and 12/2002/EC.278
If, however, a special conflict rule on insurance contracts is adopted as proposed above,279 reference to the insurance directives in Annex 1 would have to
be deleted.
183. Finally, it should be emphasised that a future optional Community instrument containing a comprehensive set of contract law rules should be governed by Article 22(b) Rome I-P. According to Article 3(2) Rome I-P, the
parties to a contract may choose a body of rules of non-national origin that is
internationally recognised in the Community. As it stands, this refers for instance to the Principles of European Contract Law.280 In the future, institutions will draft other comparable bodies amenable to a choice by the parties.
Further, the European Commission is currently drafting the Common Frame
of Reference.281 In order to provide a viable optional alternative body of rules
to be chosen by the parties, the Common Frame should be as comprehensive
as possible. It is therefore desirable that this Common Frame contain the current acquis communautaire regarding minimum rules such as consumer protection rules not subject to derogation by the parties: The Common Frame’s attractiveness for the parties also depends on whether it provides a comprehensive body of rules whose content the parties can oversee and foresee without
having to fear the application of exceptional rules, for instance, under Article
5(1) Rome I-P. As already noted,282 however, the Commission’s Explanatory
Memorandum is contradictory with respect to Rome I-P’s relationship with
a possible future optional Community instrument because it is unclear
whether Article 3(2) or Article 22(b) Rome I-P address this problem. Since it
is of utmost importance whether Article 3(2) Rome I-P (applicability of restrictions resulting from Articles 5, 6 and 8 Rome I-P to uniform instrument)
or Article 22(b) Rome I-P (no such applicability) deal with this relationship,
this question should be resolved in a recital.283 For the sake of creating a truly

See supra no. 77 (comment on Article 5a).
See supra no. 79 (comment on Article 5a).
280 Supra n. 11.
281 See the Commission’s reference to the European Contract Law project, i.e. the Common Frame of Reference, in its Explanatory Memorandum on Article 22 Rome I-P, p. 10;
see also supra no. 9 (comment on Recitals) with n. 14.
282 See supra nos. 9 (comment on Recitals) and 28 (comment on Article 3).
283 See supra no. 9 (comment on Recitals).
278
279
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uniform optional instrument, the Institute emphasises its position that Article
22(b) Rome I-P should govern the hierarchy between the Rome I-P and a
future uniform body of rules such as the Common Frame of Reference.
Article 23 – Relationship with existing international conventions
1. The Member States shall notify
the Commission, no later than six
months after the entry into force of
this Regulation, of the list of multilateral conventions governing conflicts of laws in specific matters relating to contractual obligations to
which they are Parties. The Commission shall publish the list in the
Official Journal of the European Union
within six months thereafter.
After that date, the Member States
shall notify the Commission of all
denunciations of such conventions,
which the Commission shall publish
in the Official Journal of the European
Union within six months after receiving them.
2. This Regulation shall not
prejudice the application of international conventions referred to in
paragraph 1. However, where, at the
time of conclusion of the contract,
material aspects of the situation are
located in one or more Member
States, this Regulation shall take precedence over the following Conventions:
– the Hague Convention of 15
June 1955 on the law applicable to
international sales of goods;
– the Hague Convention of 14
March 1978 on the law applicable to
agency.

1. [no changes]

2. This Regulation shall not
prejudice the application of international conventions referred to in
paragraph 1. However, where, at the
time of conclusion of the contract,
all material aspects of the situation
are located in one or more Member
States, this Regulation shall take precedence over the following Conventions:
– the Hague Convention of 15
June 1955 on the law applicable to
international sales of goods;
– the Hague Convention of 14
March 1978 on the law applicable to
agency.
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conventions concluded between
Member States and listed in Annex
II if they concern matters governed
by this Regulation.
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3. [no changes]

Summary/Comments
184. Article 23(1) Rome I-P is a standard formulation on the relationship
of Rome I-P with existing international conventions. It should not be
changed. In accordance with Article 65 EC, Article 23(2) 2nd sentence Rome
I-P takes account of the need to establish, within the European Union, a set
of uniform conflict rules which is not disturbed by international conventions
to which single Member States are parties.
185. In Article 23(2) Rome I-P a translation error should be corrected.
The second sentence should read: “However, where, at the time of conclusion of the contract, all material aspects ....”. This would align the English version with the wording contained in the German and French draft (“alle relevanten Sachverhaltselemente”, “tous les éléments pertinents”).284
186. Also the German version seems to contain a translation error. Article
23(3) Rome I-P in the English and French versions clearly states that the
Rome I Regulation shall take precedence over the bilateral conventions listed
in Annex II if they concern matters governed by this Regulation. The German version is ambiguous. For the sake of clarity it should be changed into:
“Dieser Vorschlag geht auch den in Anhang II aufgeführten bilateralen
Übereinkommen zwischen Mitgliedstaaten vor, soweit diese Übereinkommen Bereiche betreffen, die von dieser Verordnung geregelt werden.”
Annex 1: List of instruments
mentioned in Article 22 (a)

Annex 1: List of instruments
mentioned in Article 22(1)(a)

– Directive on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed
from the territory of a Member State
(Directive 7/1993/EC of 15. 3.
1993)
– Directive concerning the posting of workers in the framework of
the provision of services (Directive
71/1996/EC of 16. 12. 1996)

– Directive on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed
from the territory of a Member State
(Directive 7/1993/EC of 15. 3.
1993)
– Directive concerning the posting of workers in the framework of
the provision of services (Directive
71/1996/EC of 16. 12. 1996)

284

Emphases added.
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– Second non-life insurance
Directive (Directive 357/1988/EEC
of 22. 6. 1988, as amplified and amended by Directives 49/1992/EC
and 13/2002/EC)
– Second life assurance Directive
(Directive 619/1990/EEC of 8. 1.
1990 as amplified and amended by
Directives 96/1992/EC and 12/
2002/EC)

RabelsZ

[The following Directives are only
to be incorporated in the instance
the proposed Article 5a is not
adopted (see supra nos. 79, 182)]
– Second non-life insurance
Directive (Directive 357/1988/EEC
of 22. 6. 1988, as amplified and amended by Directives 49/1992/EC
and 13/2002/EC)
– Second life assurance Directive
(Directive 619/1990/EEC of 8. 1.
1990 as amplified and amended by
Directives 96/1992/EC and 12/
2002/EC)
– Directive 2002/83/EC of 5. 11.
2002 concerning life assurance, as amplified and amended by Directive 2004/
66/EC of 26. 4. 2004.
Annex 1 bis: List of provisions
mentioned in Article 22(2)
– Article 6(2) of the Directive
93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts
– Article 9 of the Directive 94/47/
EC on the protection of purchasers of
rights to use immovable properties on a
timeshare basis
– Article 12(2) of the Directive
97/7/EC on the protection of consumers
in respect of distance contracts
– Article 7(2) of the Directive 1999/
44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of
consumer goods and associated guarantees
– Article 12(2) of the Directive
2002/65/EC concerning the distance
marketing of consumer financial services

Annex II: List of bilateral
conventions mentioned in
Article 23(3)
[...]

Annex II: List of bilateral
conventions mentioned in
Article 23(3)
[...]

